Admission of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the USSR. The black myth about the “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states. When Latvia became part of the USSR

08.02.2022 Medicines 

On April 15, 1795, Catherine II signed the Manifesto on the accession of Lithuania and Courland to Russia

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Russia and Jamois was the official name of the state that existed from the 13th century to 1795. Today, its territory includes Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

According to the most common version, the Lithuanian state was founded around 1240 by Prince Mindovg, who united the Lithuanian tribes and began to progressively annex the fragmented Russian principalities. This policy was continued by the descendants of Mindaugas, especially the great princes Gediminas (1316 - 1341), Olgerd (1345 - 1377) and Vytautas (1392 - 1430). Under them, Lithuania annexed the lands of White, Black and Red Rus', and also conquered the mother of Russian cities - Kyiv - from the Tatars.

The official language of the Grand Duchy was Russian (that’s what it was called in documents; Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists call it “Old Ukrainian” and “Old Belarusian”, respectively). Since 1385, several unions have been concluded between Lithuania and Poland. The Lithuanian gentry began to adopt the Polish language, the Polish culture, and move from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. The local population was subjected to oppression on religious grounds.

Several centuries earlier than in Muscovite Rus', in Lithuania (following the example of the possessions of the Livonian Order) it was introduced serfdom: Orthodox Russian peasants became the personal property of the Polonized gentry, who converted to Catholicism. Religious uprisings were raging in Lithuania, and the remaining Orthodox gentry cried out to Russia. In 1558, the Livonian War began.

During the Livonian War, suffering significant defeats from Russian troops, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1569 agreed to sign the Union of Lublin: Ukraine completely seceded from the principality of Poland, and the lands of Lithuania and Belarus that remained within the principality were included with Poland in the confederal Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, subordinating foreign policy of Poland.

The results of the Livonian War of 1558 - 1583 secured the position of the Baltic states for a century and a half before the start of the Northern War of 1700 - 1721.

The annexation of the Baltic states to Russia during the Northern War coincided with the implementation of Peter's reforms. Then Livonia and Estland became part of the Russian Empire. Peter I himself tried to establish relations with the local German nobility, descendants of German knights, in a non-military way. Estonia and Vidzeme were the first to be annexed - following the war in 1721. And only 54 years later, following the results of the third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia became part of the Russian Empire. This happened after Catherine II signed the manifesto of April 15, 1795.

After joining Russia, the Baltic nobility received the rights and privileges of the Russian nobility without any restrictions. Moreover, the Baltic Germans (mainly descendants of German knights from the Livonia and Courland provinces) were, if not more influential, then, in any case, no less influential than the Russians, a nationality in the Empire: numerous Catherine II dignitaries of the Empire were of Baltic origin. Catherine II carried out a number of administrative reforms regarding the management of provinces, the rights of cities, where the independence of governors increased, but actual power, in the realities of time, was in the hands of the local, Baltic nobility.


By 1917, the Baltic lands were divided into Estland (center in Reval - now Tallinn), Livonia (center in Riga), Courland (center in Mitau - now Jelgava) and Vilna provinces (center in Vilna - now Vilnius). The provinces were characterized by a highly mixed population: by the beginning of the 20th century, about four million people lived in the provinces, about half of them were Lutherans, about a quarter were Catholics, and about 16% were Orthodox. The provinces were inhabited by Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Germans, Russians, Poles; in the Vilna province there was a relatively high proportion of the Jewish population. IN Russian Empire the population of the Baltic provinces has never been subjected to any discrimination. On the contrary, in the Estland and Livonia provinces, serfdom was abolished, for example, much earlier than in the rest of Russia - already in 1819. Provided the local population knew the Russian language, there were no restrictions on admission to the civil service. The imperial government actively developed local industry.

Riga shared with Kiev the right to be the third most important administrative, cultural and industrial center of the Empire after St. Petersburg and Moscow. The tsarist government treated local customs and legal orders with great respect.

But the Russian-Baltic history, rich in traditions of good neighborliness, turned out to be powerless in the face of modern problems in relations between countries. In 1917 - 1920, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) gained independence from Russia.

But already in 1940, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the inclusion of the Baltic states into the USSR followed.

In 1990, the Baltic states proclaimed the restoration of state sovereignty, and after the collapse of the USSR, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania received both actual and legal independence.

Glorious story, what did Rus' receive? Fascist marches?


Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence after the 1917 Russian Revolution. But Soviet Russia and later the USSR never gave up trying to regain these territories. And according to the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, in which these republics were classified as part of the Soviet sphere of influence, the USSR received a chance to achieve this, which it did not fail to take advantage of. On September 28, 1939, the Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact was concluded. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent was introduced into Estonia. Stalin said to Selter upon his departure from Moscow: “With you it could turn out like with Poland. Poland was a great power. Where is Poland now?

On October 2, 1939, Soviet-Latvian negotiations began. The USSR demanded access to the sea from Latvia through Liepaja and Ventspils. As a result, on October 5, a mutual assistance agreement was signed for a period of 10 years, which provided for the deployment of a 25,000-strong contingent to Latvia Soviet troops. And on October 10, the “Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian Republic and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania” was signed with Lithuania.


On June 14, 1940, the Soviet government presented an ultimatum to Lithuania, and on June 16 - to Latvia and Estonia. In basic terms, the meaning of the ultimatums was the same - the governments of these states were accused of gross violation of the terms of the Mutual Assistance Treaties previously concluded with the USSR, and a demand was put forward to form governments capable of ensuring the implementation of these treaties, as well as to allow additional contingents of troops into the territory of these countries. The terms were accepted.

Riga. The Soviet Army enters Latvia.

On June 15, additional contingents of Soviet troops were sent to Lithuania, and on June 17 - to Estonia and Latvia.
Lithuanian President A. Smetona insisted on organizing resistance to Soviet troops, however, having received a refusal from most of the government, he fled to Germany, and his Latvian and Estonian colleagues - K. Ulmanis and K. Päts - cooperated with the new government (both were soon repressed) , like Lithuanian Prime Minister A. Merkys. In all three countries, friendly to the USSR, but not communist governments were formed, headed, respectively, by J. Paleckis (Lithuania), I. Vares (Estonia) and A. Kirchenstein (Latvia).
The process of Sovietization of the Baltic countries was monitored by authorized representatives of the USSR government - Andrei Zhdanov (in Estonia), Andrei Vyshinsky (in Latvia) and Vladimir Dekanozov (in Lithuania).

New governments have lifted bans on activities communist parties and holding demonstrations and called early parliamentary elections. In the elections held on July 14 in all three states, the victory was won by the pro-communist Blocs (Unions) of the working people - the only electoral lists admitted to the elections. According to official data, in Estonia the turnout was 84.1%, with 92.8% of the votes cast for the Union of Working People, in Lithuania the turnout was 95.51%, of which 99.19% voted for the Union of Working People, in Latvia the turnout was 94.8%, 97.8% of the votes were cast for the Working People's Bloc.

The newly elected parliaments already on July 21-22 proclaimed the creation of the Estonian SSR, Latvian SSR and Lithuanian SSR and adopted the Declaration of Entry into the USSR. On August 3-6, 1940, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, these republics were admitted to the Soviet Union.

The delegation of the Estonian State Duma returns from Moscow with the good news of the republic’s admission to the USSR, August 1940.

Vares is received by his comrades: in uniform - the chief political instructor of the Defense Forces, Keedro.

August 1940, delegation of the newly elected Estonian State Duma in the Kremlin: Luus, Lauristin, Vares.

On the roof of the Moscow hotel, the Prime Minister of the government formed after the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940, Vares and Foreign Minister Andersen.

Delegation at Tallinn Station: Tikhonova, Luristin, Keedro, Vares, Sare and Ruus.

Thälmann, the couple Lauristin and Ruus.

Estonian workers at a demonstration demanding accession to the USSR.

Welcoming Soviet ships in Riga.

The Latvian Seimas welcomes the demonstrators.

Soldiers at a demonstration dedicated to the Soviet annexation of Latvia

Rally in Tallinn.

Welcoming delegates of the Estonian Duma in Tallinn after the annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union.

On June 14, 1941, the internal affairs bodies of the USSR, with the support of the Red Army and communist activists, deported 15,424 people from Latvia. 10,161 people were displaced and 5,263 were arrested. 46.5% of the deportees were women, 15% were children under 10 years old. The total number of deceased victims of deportation was 4884 people (34% of the total), of which 341 people were shot.

Employees of the NKVD of Estonia: in the center - Kimm, on the left - Jacobson, on the right - Riis.

One of the NKVD transport documents about the deportation of 1941, for 200 people.

Memorial plaque on the building of the Estonian government - the highest officials of the Estonian state who died during the occupation.

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia gained independence after the 1917 Russian Revolution. But Soviet Russia and later the USSR never gave up trying to regain these territories. And according to the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, in which these republics were classified as part of the Soviet sphere of influence, the USSR received a chance to achieve this, which it did not fail to take advantage of.

Implementing the Soviet-German secret agreements, Soviet Union back in the fall of 1939, he began preparing for the annexation of the Baltic countries. After the Red Army occupied the eastern voivodeships in Poland, the USSR began to border on all the Baltic states. Soviet troops were moved to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. At the end of September, these countries were asked in the form of an ultimatum to conclude treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR. On September 24, Molotov told Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter, who arrived in Moscow: “The Soviet Union needs to expand its security system, for which it needs access to the Baltic Sea... Do not force the Soviet Union to use force in order to achieve its goals.”

On September 25, Stalin informed the German ambassador, Count Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg, that “the Soviet Union will immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of August 23.”

Treaties of mutual assistance with the Baltic states were concluded under the threat of the use of force.

On September 28, a Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact was concluded. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent was introduced into Estonia. Stalin said to Selter upon his departure from Moscow: “With you it could turn out like with Poland. Poland was a great power. Where is Poland now?

On October 5, a mutual assistance pact was signed with Latvia. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent entered the country.

And on October 10, the “Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian Republic and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania” was signed with Lithuania. When Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšis stated that the proposed terms of the treaty amounted to the occupation of Lithuania, Stalin countered that “The Soviet Union does not intend to threaten the independence of Lithuania. Vice versa. The Soviet troops brought in will be a genuine guarantee for Lithuania that the Soviet Union will protect it in the event of an attack, so that the troops will serve the security of Lithuania itself.” And he added with a grin: “Our garrisons will help you suppress the communist uprising if it happens in Lithuania.” 20 thousand Red Army soldiers also entered Lithuania.

After Germany defeated France with lightning speed in May 1940, Stalin decided to expedite the annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia. On June 4, strong groups of Soviet troops, under the guise of exercises, began to advance to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. On June 14, Lithuania, and on June 16 - Latvia and Estonia, were presented with ultimatums of similar content with the demand to allow significant Soviet military contingents into their territory, 9-12 divisions in each country, and to form new, pro-Soviet governments with the participation of communists, although the number Communist parties consisted of 100-200 people in each of the republics. The pretext for the ultimatums was provocations allegedly carried out against Soviet troops stationed in the Baltics. But this excuse was sewn with white thread. It was alleged, for example, that the Lithuanian police kidnapped two Soviet tank crews, Shmovgonets and Nosov. But already on May 27, they returned to their unit and stated that they had been kept in the basement for a day, trying to obtain information about the Soviet tank brigade. At the same time, Nosov mysteriously turned into Pisarev.

The ultimatums were accepted. On June 15, Soviet troops entered Lithuania, and on June 17 - into Latvia and Estonia. In Lithuania, President Antanas Smetana demanded to reject the ultimatum and provide armed resistance, but, not receiving the support of the majority of the cabinet, he fled to Germany.

From 6 to 9 Soviet divisions were introduced into each country (previously, each country had an infantry division and a tank brigade). There was no resistance offered. The creation of pro-Soviet governments on Red Army bayonets was presented by Soviet propaganda as “people's revolutions,” which were described as demonstrations with the seizure of government buildings, organized by local communists with the help of Soviet troops. These “revolutions” were carried out under the supervision of representatives of the Soviet government: Vladimir Dekanozov in Lithuania, Andrei Vyshinsky in Latvia, and Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia.

The armies of the Baltic states could not really provide armed resistance to Soviet aggression either in the fall of 1939, or even more so in the summer of 1940. In three countries, in the event of mobilization, 360 thousand people could be put under arms. However, unlike Finland, the Baltic states did not have their own military industry, nor did they even have sufficient stocks of small arms to arm so many people. If Finland could also receive supplies of weapons and military equipment through Sweden and Norway, then the route to the Baltic states through the Baltic Sea was closed by the Soviet fleet, and Germany complied with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and refused assistance to the Baltic states. In addition, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not have border fortifications, and their territory was much more accessible to invasion than the forested and swampy territory of Finland.

The new pro-Soviet governments held elections to local parliaments according to the principle of one candidate from an indestructible bloc of non-party members per seat. Moreover, this bloc in all three Baltic states was called the same - “Union of Working People”, and the elections were held on the same day - July 14. People in civilian clothes present at the polling stations took note of those who crossed out candidates or threw empty ballots into ballot boxes. Nobel laureate Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz, who was in Lithuania at that time, recalled: “In the elections it was possible to vote for the only official list of “working people” - with the same programs in all three republics. They had to vote because each voter had a stamp in their passport. The absence of a stamp certified that the owner of the passport was an enemy of the people who had evaded the elections and thereby revealed his enemy nature.” Naturally, the communists received more than 90% of the votes in all three republics - in Estonia 92.8%, in Latvia 97%, and in Lithuania even 99%! Turnout was also impressive - 84% in Estonia, 95% in Latvia and 95.5% in Lithuania.

It is not surprising that on July 21-22, three parliaments approved the declaration of Estonia's accession to the USSR. By the way, all these acts contradicted the constitutions of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which stated that issues of independence and changes political system can only be decided by a popular referendum. But Moscow was in a hurry to annex the Baltic states and did not pay attention to formalities. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR satisfied the appeals written in Moscow for the admission of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the Union in the period from August 3 to 6, 1940.

At first, many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians saw the Red Army as protection against German aggression. The workers were glad to see the opening of enterprises that had been idle due to the World War and the resulting crisis. However, soon, already in November 1940, the population of the Baltic states was completely ruined. Then local currencies were equated to the ruble at sharply reduced rates. Also, the nationalization of industry and trade led to inflation and shortages of goods. The redistribution of land from wealthier peasants to the poorest, the forced relocation of farmers to villages and repressions against the clergy and intelligentsia caused armed resistance. Detachments of “forest brothers” appeared, so named in memory of the rebels of 1905.

And already in August 1940, the deportations of Jews and other national minorities began, and on June 14, 1941, it was the turn of the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. 10 thousand people were deported from Estonia, 17.5 thousand people from Lithuania and 16.9 thousand people from Latvia. 10,161 people were displaced and 5,263 were arrested. 46.5% of the deportees were women, 15% were children under 10 years of age. The total number of deceased victims of deportation was 4884 people (34% of the total), of which 341 people were shot.

The Soviet Union's seizure of the Baltic countries was fundamentally no different from Germany's seizure of Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia in 1939, and Luxembourg and Denmark in 1940, also carried out peacefully. The fact of occupation (meaning the seizure of territory against the will of the population of these countries), which was a violation of international law and an act of aggression, was recognized as a crime at the Nuremberg trials and was blamed on the main Nazi war criminals. As in the case of the Baltic states, the Anschluss of Austria was preceded by an ultimatum to create a pro-German government in Vienna led by the Nazi Seyss-Inquart. And it already invited German troops to Austria, which had not previously been in the country at all. The annexation of Austria was carried out in such a form that it was immediately incorporated into the Reich and divided into several Reichsgau (regions). Similarly, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after short period occupation were included in the USSR with the rights of union republics. The Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway were turned into protectorates, which did not prevent us from talking about these countries as occupied by Germany during the war and after it. This formulation was also reflected in the verdict of the Nuremberg trials of the main Nazi war criminals in 1946.

Unlike Nazi Germany, whose consent was guaranteed by the secret protocol of August 23, 1939, most Western governments regarded the occupation and annexation as illegal and continued to recognize the existence of an independent Republic of Latvia de jure. Already on July 23, 1940, US Deputy Secretary of State Samner Welles condemned the “dishonorable processes” by which “the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics ... were deliberately destroyed in advance by one of their more powerful neighbors.” Non-recognition of occupation and annexation continued until 1991, when Latvia regained its independence and full independence.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia consider the entry of Soviet troops and the subsequent annexation of the Baltic countries to the USSR as one of Stalin’s many crimes.

Plan
Introduction
1 Background. 1930s
2 1939. War begins in Europe
3 Mutual Assistance Pacts and Treaty of Friendship and Borders
4 Entry of Soviet troops
5 Ultimatums of the summer of 1940 and the removal of the Baltic governments
6 Entry of the Baltic states into the USSR
7 Consequences
8 Modern politics
9 Opinion of historians and political scientists

Bibliography
Annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR

Introduction

Annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR (1940) - the process of including the independent Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and most of the territory of modern Lithuania - into the USSR, carried out as a result of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Treaty of Friendship and Border by the USSR and Nazi Germany in August 1939, the secret protocols of which recorded the delimitation of the spheres of interest of these two powers in Eastern Europe.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consider the actions of the USSR to be occupation followed by annexation. The Council of Europe in its resolutions characterized the process of the Baltic states joining the USSR as occupation, forced incorporation and annexation. In 1983, the European Parliament condemned it as an occupation, and subsequently (2007) used such concepts as “occupation” and “illegal incorporation” in this regard.

The text of the preamble to the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania 1991 contains the lines: “ referring to the past events and actions that prevented the full and free exercise by each High Contracting Party of its state sovereignty, being confident that the elimination by the USSR of the consequences of the 1940 annexation violating the sovereignty of Lithuania will create additional conditions trust between the High Contracting Parties and their peoples»

The official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry is that the accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR complied with all norms of international law as of 1940, and also that the entry of these countries into the USSR received official international recognition. This position is based on the de facto recognition of the integrity of the borders of the USSR as of June 1941 at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences by the participating states, as well as on the recognition in 1975 of the inviolability of European borders by the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

1. Background. 1930s

In the period between the two world wars, the Baltic states became the object of the struggle of the great European powers (England, France and Germany) for influence in the region. In the first decade after Germany's defeat in World War I, there was a strong Anglo-French influence in the Baltic states, which was subsequently hampered by the growing influence of neighboring Germany from the early 1930s. The Soviet leadership, in turn, tried to resist him. By the end of the 1930s, the Third Reich and the USSR had actually become the main rivals in the struggle for influence in the Baltic states.

In December 1933, the governments of France and the USSR put forward a joint proposal to conclude an agreement on collective security and mutual assistance. Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were invited to join this treaty. The project, called "Eastern Pact", was seen as a collective guarantee in case of aggression by Nazi Germany. But Poland and Romania refused to join the alliance, the United States did not approve of the idea of ​​a treaty, and England put forward a number of counter conditions, including the rearmament of Germany.

In the spring and summer of 1939, the USSR negotiated with England and France on joint prevention of Italian-German aggression against European countries and on April 17, 1939, invited England and France to undertake obligations to provide all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European countries located between the Baltic and the Black Seas and bordering the Soviet Union, as well as to conclude for a period of 5-10 years an agreement on mutual assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states (USSR, England and France).

Failure "Eastern Pact" was caused by differences in the interests of the contracting parties. Thus, the Anglo-French missions received detailed secret instructions from their general staffs, which defined the goals and nature of the negotiations - a note from the French general staff said, in particular, that along with a number of political benefits that England and France would receive in connection with by joining the USSR, this would allow it to be drawn into the conflict: “it is not in our interests for it to remain outside the conflict, keeping its forces intact.” The Soviet Union, which considered at least two Baltic republics - Estonia and Latvia - as a sphere of its national interests, defended this position in the negotiations, but did not meet with understanding from its partners. As for the governments of the Baltic states themselves, they preferred guarantees from Germany, with which they were bound by a system of economic agreements and non-aggression treaties. According to Churchill, “The obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these very border states experienced of Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and simultaneously include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most vehement opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation."

Simultaneously with negotiations with Great Britain and France, the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 intensified steps towards rapprochement with Germany. The result of this policy was the signing of a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR on August 23, 1939. According to the secret additional protocols to the treaty, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and eastern Poland were included in the Soviet sphere of interests, Lithuania and western Poland - in the German sphere of interests); by the time the treaty was signed, the Klaipeda (Memel) region of Lithuania was already occupied by Germany (March 1939).

2. 1939. Beginning of the war in Europe

The situation worsened on September 1, 1939 with the outbreak of World War II. Germany launched an invasion of Poland. On September 17, the USSR sent troops into Poland, declaring the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932, no longer in force. On the same day, states that had diplomatic relations with the USSR (including the Baltic states) were handed a Soviet note stating that “in relations with them the USSR will pursue a policy of neutrality.”

The outbreak of war between neighboring states gave rise to fears in the Baltics of being drawn into these events and prompted them to declare their neutrality. However, during the hostilities, a number of incidents occurred in which the Baltic countries were also involved - one of them was the entry of the Polish submarine Orzel into the port of Tallinn on September 15, where it was interned at the request of Germany by the Estonian authorities, who began dismantling her weapons. However, on the night of September 18, the crew of the submarine disarmed the guards and took it out to sea, while six torpedoes remained on board. The Soviet Union claimed that Estonia had violated neutrality by providing shelter and assistance to the Polish submarine.

On September 19, Vyacheslav Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, blamed Estonia for this incident, saying that the Baltic Fleet was tasked with finding the submarine, since it could threaten Soviet shipping. This led to the de facto establishment of a naval blockade of the Estonian coast.

On September 24, Estonian Foreign Minister K. Selter arrived in Moscow to sign a trade agreement. After discussing economic problems, Molotov moved on to problems of mutual security and proposed “ conclude a military alliance or mutual assistance agreement, which would at the same time provide the Soviet Union with the right to have strongholds or bases for the fleet and aviation on the territory of Estonia" Selter tried to avoid the discussion by citing neutrality, but Molotov stated that " The Soviet Union needs to expand its security system, for which it needs access to the Baltic Sea. If you do not wish to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with us, then we will have to look for other ways to guarantee our security, perhaps steeper, perhaps more complex. Please do not force us to use force against Estonia».

3. Mutual assistance pacts and the Treaty of Friendship and Borders

As a result of the actual division of Polish territory between Germany and the USSR, the Soviet borders moved far to the west, and the USSR began to border on the third Baltic state - Lithuania. Initially, Germany intended to turn Lithuania into its protectorate, but on September 25, 1939, during Soviet-German contacts “on the settlement of the Polish problem,” the USSR proposed to begin negotiations on Germany’s renunciation of claims to Lithuania in exchange for the territories of the Warsaw and Lublin voivodeships. On this day, the German Ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Ministry, in which he said that he had been summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin pointed out this proposal as a subject for future negotiations and added that if Germany agreed, “the Soviet Union would immediately will take on the solution of the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of August 23 and expects full support from the German government in this matter.”

The situation in the Baltic states themselves was alarming and contradictory. Against the background of rumors about the impending Soviet-German division of the Baltic states, which were refuted by diplomats of both sides, part of the ruling circles of the Baltic states was ready to continue rapprochement with Germany, while many others were anti-German and counted on the USSR’s help in maintaining the balance of power in the region and national independence, while the leftist forces operating underground were ready to support joining the USSR.

In chapter

In big politics there is always a plan A and a plan B. It often happens that there are both “B” and “D”. In this article we will tell you how in 1939 Plan “B” was drawn up and implemented for the Baltic republics to join the USSR. But plan “A” worked, which gave the desired result. And they forgot about plan B.

1939 Anxious. Prewar. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty with a secret annex was signed. It shows the zones of influence of Germany and the USSR on a map. The Soviet zone included Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The USSR had to decide on its decisions regarding these countries. As usual, there were several plans. The main one implied that, through political pressure, Soviet military bases would be deployed in the Baltic countries - troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet, and then local leftist forces would achieve elections to local parliaments, which would announce the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR. But in case of an unforeseen event, a plan “B” was developed. It is more intricate and complex.

"Pioneer"

The Baltic Sea is rich in all kinds of accidents and disasters. Before the beginning of the autumn of 1939, we can mention cases of accidents and deaths of Soviet ships in the Gulf of Finland: the hydrographic vessel "Azimut" on 08/28/1938 in Luga Bay, the submarine "M-90" on 10/15/1938 near Oranienbaum, the cargo ship "Chelyuskinets" on 03/27/1939 near Tallinn. In principle, the situation at sea during this period could be considered calm. But since mid-summer, a new, alarming factor has appeared - reports from captains of Sovtorgflot ships (the name of the organization that operated civilian ships of the USSR in the pre-war period) about mines allegedly floating in the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, there were sometimes reports that the mines were of the “English” type. Even military sailors do not undertake to report about a sample of a mine when they find it at sea, but here the report comes from civilian sailors! In the 20s and early 30s, the appearance of mines in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland was repeatedly reported. But then mines of the Russian, German or English type from the First World War and Civil War were discovered in a timely manner and immediately destroyed, but for some reason these could not be found. The captain of the ship “Pioneer”, Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev, took the lead in the fictitious reports.

July 23, 1939 The following happened: at 22.21. The patrol ship "Typhoon" standing on patrol on the line of the Shepelevsky lighthouse received a message by semaphore and signal from the captain of the m/v "Pioneer", located in the Gulf of Finland: - "Two warships of the battleship type were spotted in the area of ​​​​the Northern village of Gogland Island." (Hereinafter, extracts from the “Watch Log of the Operational Duty Headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet” [RGA Navy. F-R-92. Op-1. D-1005,1006]). At 22.30, the commander of the Typhoon asks the Pioneer: - “Tell the time and course of the battleships of unknown origin you noticed.” At 22.42. the captain of the Pioneer repeats the previous text, and the connection is interrupted. The Typhoon commander transmitted this information to fleet headquarters and, at his own peril and risk (after all, there was no command for this), organizes a search for unknown battleships near Finnish territorial waters and, of course, finds nothing. We will understand a little later why this performance was performed.

To understand the process and the people involved in it, let’s talk about the captain of the ship “Pioneer” Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev. This is the son of the first Russian submariner Mikhail Nikolaevich Beklemishev, born in 1858. birth, one of the designers of the first Russian submarine “Dolphin” (1903) and its first commander. Having connected his service with submarines, he retired in 1910. with the rank of “major general in the fleet.” Then he taught mine engineering at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute and worked as a technical consultant at St. Petersburg factories. Left out of work after the October Revolution of 1917, he entered the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding, but was fired. In 1924 he became the commander of the experimental vessel Mikula, regularly commanding it between repeated arrests, and retired in 1931. In 1933, as the highest rank of the tsarist navy (general), he was deprived of his pension. The old sailor died of a heart attack in 1936. (E.A. Kovalev “Knights of the Deep”, 2005, p. 14, 363). His son Vladimir followed in his father’s footsteps and became a sailor, only in the merchant fleet. His collaboration with Soviet intelligence services is likely. In the 1930s, merchant seamen were among the few who freely and regularly visited foreign countries, and Soviet intelligence often used the services of merchant seamen.

The “adventures” of “Pioneer” did not end there. On September 28, 1939, at about 2 a.m., when the ship entered the Narva Bay, its captain simulated the landing of the Pioneer on the rocks near Vigrund Island and gave a pre-prepared radiogram “about an attack on the ship by an unknown submarine.” The imitation of the attack served as the last trump card in the negotiations between the USSR and Estonia “On measures to ensure the safety of Soviet waters from sabotage actions by foreign submarines hiding in the Baltic waters” (Pravda newspaper, September 30, 1939, No. 133). The submarine is mentioned here for a reason. The fact is that after Germany attacked Poland, the Polish submarine ORP „Orzeł” (Eagle) broke into Tallinn and was interned. On September 18, 1939, the crew of the boat tied up the Estonian sentries and the Orzeł headed towards the exit of the harbor at full speed and escaped from Tallinn. Since there were two Estonian guards hostage on the boat, Estonian and German newspapers accused the Polish crew of killing both of them. However, the Poles landed the sentries near Sweden, gave them food, water and money to return to their homeland, and then left for England. The story then received wide resonance and became a clear reason for the scenario of a “torpedo attack” on the Pioneer. The fact that the attack on the ship was not real and the Pioneer was not damaged can be judged by subsequent events. The powerful rescue tug Signal, which had been expecting the SOS signal in advance, immediately went to the Pioneer, and the rescuer, the diving base ship Trefolev, left the harbor on September 29, 1939 at 03.43 on assignment and stood in the Great Kronstadt roadstead. The ship, allegedly removed from the rocks, was brought to Neva Bay. At 10.27 on September 30, 1939, “Signal” and “Pioneer” anchored in the Eastern Kronstadt roadstead. But for some this was not enough. At 06.15, the towed “Pioneer” again “discovers” (!) a floating mine in the area of ​​the Shepelevsky lighthouse, which is reported to the patrol minesweeper T 202 “Buy”. An order was given to the Operational Duty Officer of the Water District (OVR) to warn all ships about a floating mine in the area of ​​the Shepelevsky Lighthouse. At 09.50, the operational duty officer of the OVR reports to Fleet Headquarters that the “sea hunter” boat sent to search for the mine has returned, no mine was found. On October 2, 1939, at 20.18, the Pioneer transport began to be towed from the Eastern roadstead to Oranienbaum. If the Pioneer had really hastily thrown itself onto one of the stone banks near the rocky island of Vigrund, it should have received damage to at least one or two sheets of plating of the underwater part of the hull. The ship had only one large hold, and it would have immediately filled with water, causing serious damage to the ship. Only good weather, a wound plaster and pumping out water by the rescue ship could save him. Since nothing of the kind happened, it is clear that the ship was not sitting on the rocks. Since the ship was not even brought into any of the Kronstadt or Leningrad docks for inspection, we can conclude that it was only on the stones in the TASS Report. Subsequently, according to the scenario, the motor ship “Pioneer” was not required, and it worked safely in the Baltic for some time, and in 1940, “Pioneer” was handed over to the crew that arrived from Baku and sent (out of sight) along the Volga to the Caspian Sea. After the war, the ship was in operation by the Caspian Shipping Company until July 1966.

"Metalist"

The newspaper “Pravda” No. 132 dated September 28, 1939 published a TASS message: “On September 27, at about 6 o’clock in the evening, an unknown submarine in the Narva Bay area torpedoed and sunk the Soviet steamer “Metallist”, with a displacement of up to 4000 tons. From the steamship’s crew of 24 people, 19 people were selected by Soviet patrol vessels, the remaining 5 people were not found.” "Metalist" was not a merchant ship. She was a so-called “coal miner” - an auxiliary vessel of the Baltic Fleet, a military transport, and carried the flag of the Navy’s auxiliary vessels. "Metalist" was mainly assigned to the two Baltic battleships "Marat" and "October Revolution" and, until both battleships were converted to liquid fuel, supplied them with coal during voyages and maneuvers. Although he also had other tasks. For example, in June 1935, Metalist provided coal for the transition of the Red Horn floating workshop from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet. By the end of the 30s, the Metalist, built in 1903 in England, was outdated and of no particular value. They decided to donate them. In September 1939, "Metalist" stood in the Leningrad commercial port, waiting for coal to support the operations of the Baltic Fleet. We must remember that this was a period when, for foreign policy reasons, the fleet was put on high alert. On September 23, the vessel that had just been placed for loading received an order from the Operational Duty Officer at the Fleet Headquarters: “Send the Metalist transport from Leningrad.” Then several days passed in confusion. The ship was driven in anticipation of something from Oranienbaum to Kronstadt and back.

To describe further events, we need to make a short digression. There are two layers in this description: the first is the actual events recorded in documents, the second is the memories of a former Finnish intelligence officer who published his memoirs in Switzerland after the war. Let's try to combine two layers. Finnish intelligence officer Jukka L. Mäkkela, fleeing the Soviet intelligence services, was forced after Finland left the war in 1944. go abroad. There he published his memoirs “Im Rücken des Feindes-der finnische Nachrichtendienst in Krieg”, They were published in German in Switzerland (publishing house Verlag Huber & Co. Frauenfeld). In them, among other things, J. L. Mäkkela recalled captain 2nd rank Arsenyev, captured in the fall of 1941 by the Finns in the Björkezund area, allegedly a former commander of the training ship “Svir”. (Not to be confused with Grigory Nikolaevich Arsenyev - Acting commander of the Island Naval Base on the island of Lavensaari, who died on May 18, 1945). The prisoner testified that in the fall of 1939 he was summoned to a meeting where he and another officer were given the task of simulating the sinking of the Metalist transport in the Narva Bay by an unknown submarine. “Unknown” was assigned to the submarine Shch-303 “Ruff”, which was being prepared for repairs and whose crew was being completed. The Metalist transport team will be “rescued” by patrol ships entering the bay. Other clarifications will be communicated before release. Sounds fantastic, doesn't it? Now let's look at what happened in Narva Bay. According to established practice in the Baltic Fleet, “Metalist” played the role of “enemy” and designated battleships and aircraft carriers. It was like that that time too. According to the terms of the exercise, "Metalist" anchored at a given point. This place was in the Narva Bay, within sight of the Estonian coast. This was an important factor. At 16.00 Moscow time, three patrol ships of the “bad weather” division appeared - “Whirlwind”, “Snow” and “Tucha”. One of them approached the transport, and a command was heard from its navigation bridge: “At Metalist, let off steam.” The crew should prepare to leave the ship." Abandoning everything, people ran to lower the boats. The patrolman who approached the board at 16.28 removed the crew. The “rescued”, except for Arsenyev, who was called to the bridge, were placed in a cockpit with the windows battened down over the armor. An orderly stood at the entrance, forbidding anyone to go out and have contact with the Red Navy. We were expecting a loud explosion, but it didn’t come.”

At 16.45, Metalist was again flown over by MBR-2 aircraft, reporting: “There is no team. A boat is flooded at the side. There's a mess on deck." Estonian observers did not record this flight of planes, and it was not reported that from 19.05 to 19.14 the “Snow” again moored to the “Metalist”. [RGA Navy. F.R-172. Op-1. D-992. L-31.]. At about 20.00, a “TASS message about the sinking of Metalist” appeared. Since Estonian observers (remember, “Metalist” was anchored in sight of the Estonian coast) did not record the same explosion, we can assume two options:

The ship was not sunk. For some reason, there was no torpedo salvo from the submarine. Not far from this place, the construction of a new naval base “Ruchi” (Kronstadt-2) was underway. Closed area, no strangers. “Metalist” could have been there for some time.

In his book “On the Distant Approaches” (published in 1971). Lieutenant General S.I. Kabanov (from May to October 1939, who was the Chief of Logistics of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and who, if not him, knew about the ships subordinate to the Logistics), wrote: that in 1941 the Metalist transport brought cargo for the Hanko garrison and was damaged by enemy artillery fire. In the 70s of the 20th century, S.S. Berezhnoy and the employees of the Research and Development Group of the General Staff of the Navy, who were connected to him, worked on compiling the reference book “Ships and Auxiliary Vessels of the Soviet Navy 1917-1928” (Moscow, 1981). They did not find any other information about “Metalist” in the archives of Leningrad, Gatchina and Moscow and came to the conclusion that this transport was left at Hanko on December 2, 1941, in a submerged state.

The possibility that Metalist was sunk is unlikely. Neither the sailors from the patrol ships heard the explosion, nor did the Estonian observers on the shore see it. The version that the ship was sunk without the help of explosives is unlikely.

“Maritime Collection”, No. 7 1991, publishing the column “From the chronicle of military operations of the Navy in July 1941”, stated: “On July 26, the Metalist TR was sunk by artillery fire on Hanko.”

A fact is also a radiogram transmitted by radio at 23.30. This was the message from the commander of the TFR “Sneg” to the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: “The place where the transport “Metalist” died: latitude - 59°34’, longitude - 27°21’ [RGA. F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-137.]

One more small nuance. Of course, he doesn’t say anything directly, but still. On the same day when the “Metalist” was “blown up” at 12.03, a staff boat of the “YAMB” type (a high-speed sea yacht) with the People’s Commissar of the Navy and the Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet left Kronstadt for the Gulf of Finland. [RGA VMF.F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-135.]. For what? To personally control the progress of the operation?

Conclusion

Everything that is described in this article is perceived as fantasy. But there are documents from the archive. They do not reveal a political intention; they reflect the movement of ships. The fleet operational duty logs reflect all events that occurred in the area of ​​responsibility and the movement of ships and vessels in it. And it is these movements, superimposed on political processes (reflected in the officialdom of those times - the Pravda newspaper) that allow us to draw conclusions. Our story has many unexpected twists and many secrets...