When they say that it is impossible to talk about the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, they mean that occupation is the temporary occupation of territory during military operations, and in this case there were no military actions, and very soon Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became Soviet republics. But at the same time, they deliberately forget about the simplest and most fundamental meaning of the word “occupation.”

According to the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 and the Soviet-German Friendship and Border Treaty of September 28, 1939, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia fell into the “Soviet sphere of interests.” In late September and early October, mutual assistance treaties with the USSR were imposed on these countries, and Soviet military bases were established in them.

Stalin was in no hurry to annex the Baltic states. He considered this issue in the context of a future Soviet-German war. Already at the end of February 1940, in a directive to the Soviet Navy, Germany and its allies were named as the main opponents. In order to free his hands by the time the German offensive began in France, Stalin hastily ended the Finnish war with a compromise Moscow Peace and transferred the liberated troops to the western border districts, where Soviet troops had an almost tenfold superiority over the 12 weak German divisions remaining in the east. In the hope of defeating Germany, which, as Stalin thought, would get stuck on the Maginot Line, just as the Red Army got stuck on the Mannerheim Line, it was possible to postpone the occupation of the Baltic states. However, the rapid collapse of France forced the Soviet dictator to postpone his campaign to the west and turn to the occupation and annexation of the Baltic countries, which neither England and France, nor Germany, busy finishing off France, could now prevent.

As early as June 3, 1940, Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Baltic states were withdrawn from the subordination of the Belarusian, Kalinin and Leningrad military districts and were subordinated directly to the People's Commissar of Defense. However, this event can be considered both in the context of preparations for the future military occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and in connection with plans for an attack on Germany that had not yet been completely abandoned - troops stationed in the Baltic states were not supposed to participate in this attack, at least for first stage. Soviet divisions against the Baltic states were deployed at the end of September 1939, so special military preparations for the occupation were no longer required.

On June 8, 1940, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vladimir Dekanozov and the Estonian envoy to Moscow August Rey signed a secret agreement on the general administrative conditions for the presence of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of Estonia. This agreement confirmed that the parties “will proceed from the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty” and that movements of Soviet troops across Estonian territory are carried out only with prior notification by the Soviet command to the heads of the relevant military districts of Estonia. There was no mention of any introduction of additional troops in the agreement. However, after June 8, no longer doubting that the capitulation of France was a matter of a few days, Stalin decided to postpone the action against Hitler to the 41st year and engage in the occupation and annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as take away Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania .

On the evening of June 14, an ultimatum to send additional troops and form a pro-Soviet government was presented to Lithuania. The next day, Soviet troops attacked the Latvian border guards, and on June 16, the same ultimatums as those given to Lithuania were presented to Latvia and Estonia. Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn recognized the resistance as hopeless and accepted the ultimatums. True, in Lithuania, President Antanas Smetona advocated armed resistance to aggression, but was not supported by the majority of the cabinet and fled to Germany. From 6 to 9 Soviet divisions were introduced into each country (previously, each country had an infantry division and a tank brigade). There was no resistance offered. The creation of pro-Soviet governments on Red Army bayonets was presented by Soviet propaganda as “people's revolutions,” which were described as demonstrations with the seizure of government buildings organized by local communists with the help of Soviet troops. These “revolutions” were carried out under the supervision of representatives of the Soviet government: Vladimir Dekanozov in Lithuania, Andrei Vyshinsky in Latvia, and Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia.

When they say that it is impossible to talk about the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, they mean that occupation is the temporary occupation of territory during military operations, and in this case there were no military actions, and very soon Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became Soviet republics. But at the same time, they deliberately forget about the simplest and most fundamental meaning of the word “occupation” - the seizure of a given territory by another state against the will of the population inhabiting it and (or) the existing state power. A similar definition, for example, is given in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language by Sergei Ozhegov: “Occupation of foreign territory by military force.” Here, military force clearly means not only the war itself, but also the threat of using military force. It is in this capacity that the word “occupation” is used in the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal. In this case, what matters is not the temporary nature of the act of occupation itself, but its illegality. And fundamentally, the occupation and annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940, carried out by the USSR with the threat of force, but without direct military action, does not differ from the exact same “peaceful” occupation by Nazi Germany of Austria in 1938, the Czech Republic in 1939 and Denmark in 1940. The governments of these countries, like the governments of the Baltic countries, decided that resistance was hopeless and therefore they must submit to force in order to save their peoples from destruction. At the same time, in Austria, the overwhelming majority of the population since 1918 has been a supporter of the Anschluss, which, however, does not make the Anschluss, carried out in 1938 under the threat of force, a legal act. Likewise, the mere threat of force carried out during the accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR makes this accession illegal, not to mention the fact that all subsequent elections here until the end of the 1980s were an outright farce. The first elections to the so-called people's parliaments were held already in mid-July 1940, only 10 days were allotted for election campaigns, and voting could only be for the pro-communist “bloc” (in Latvia) and “unions” (in Lithuania and Estonia) of the “labor people." Zhdanov, for example, dictated the following remarkable instruction to the Estonian Central Election Commission: “Standing in defense of the existing state and public order, which prohibits the activities of organizations and groups hostile to the people, the Central Election Commission considers itself not entitled to register candidates who do not represent a platform or who have presented a platform that runs counter to the interests of of the Estonian state and people" (a draft written by Zhdanov is preserved in the archive). In Moscow, the results of these elections, in which the Communists received from 93 to 99% of the votes, were published before the local vote counting was completed. But the communists were forbidden to put forward slogans about joining the USSR, about the expropriation of private property, although at the end of June Molotov directly declared to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania that “Lithuania’s accession to the Soviet Union is a done deal,” and consoled the poor fellow that Lithuania the turn of Latvia and Estonia will certainly come. And the first decision of the new parliaments was precisely the appeal for admission to the USSR. On August 3, 5 and 6, 1940, the requests of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were granted.

Why did the Soviet Union defeat Germany in World War II? It would seem that all the answers to this question have already been given. Here is the superiority of the Soviet side in human and material resources, here is the resilience of the totalitarian system in conditions of military defeat, here is the traditional resilience and unpretentiousness of the Russian soldier and the Russian people.

In the Baltic countries, the entry of Soviet troops and subsequent annexation was supported only by part of the indigenous Russian-speaking population, as well as by the majority of Jews, who saw Stalin as protection from Hitler. Demonstrations in support of the occupation were organized with the help of Soviet troops. Yes, there were authoritarian regimes in the Baltic countries, but the regimes were soft, unlike the Soviet one, they did not kill their opponents and preserved freedom of speech to a certain extent. In Estonia, for example, in 1940 there were only 27 political prisoners, and local communist parties together numbered several hundred members. The bulk of the population of the Baltic countries did not support either the Soviet military occupation or, to an even greater extent, the liquidation of national statehood. This is proven by the creation of partisan detachments of the “forest brothers”, who, with the beginning of the Soviet-German war, launched active operations against the Soviet troops and were able to independently occupy some large cities, for example Kaunas and part of Tartu. And after the war, the movement of armed resistance to the Soviet occupation in the Baltics continued until the early 50s.

Original taken from nord_ursus in The Black Myth of the “Soviet Occupation” of the Baltic States

As is known, the current Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose fate in the 20th century was almost the same - currently adhere to the same historiographical policy regarding this period. The Baltic states count their de jure independence not from 1991, when they separated from the USSR, but from 1918, when they gained independence for the first time. The Soviet period - from 1940 to 1991 - is interpreted as nothing other than the Soviet occupation, during which there was also a “softer” German occupation from 1941 to 1944. The events of 1991 are interpreted as the restoration of independence. At first glance, everything is logical and obvious, but upon detailed study one can come to the conclusion that this concept is untenable.

In order to make the essence of the problem under consideration more clear, it is necessary to provide the background and circumstances of the formation of statehood of all three countries in 1918.

The independence of Latvia was proclaimed on November 18, 1918 in Riga, occupied by German troops, the independence of Estonia on February 24, 1918, and that of Lithuania on February 16, 1918. In all three countries, after this, there were civil wars for two years, or, in the tradition of the Baltic countries themselves, wars of independence. Each of the wars ended with the signing of an agreement with Soviet Russia, according to which it recognized the independence of all three countries and established a border with them. The agreement with Estonia was signed in Tartu on February 2, 1920, with Latvia in Riga on August 11, 1920, and with Lithuania in Moscow on July 12, 1920. Later, after Poland annexed the Vilna region, the USSR continued to consider it the territory of Lithuania.

Now about the events of 1939-1940.

To begin with, we should mention a document that modern Baltic historiography directly connects with the annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR, although it is only indirectly related to it. This is a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany, signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The treaty is also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Nowadays, it is customary to condemn not so much the pact itself as the secret protocol attached to it on the division of spheres of influence. According to this protocol, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of Poland (Western Belarus and Western Ukraine) moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR; later, when the Treaty of Friendship and Border was signed on September 28, 1939, Lithuania also moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Does this mean that the USSR has already planned to include the Baltic states into its composition? Firstly, neither the agreement itself nor the secret protocol contains anything out of the ordinary; this was a common practice of those years. Secondly, the clauses of the secret protocol that mention the division of spheres of influence only mention the following:

«

In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.

»

As we can see, there is no clause raising the question of the potential inclusion of territories of the Soviet sphere of influence into the USSR. At the same time, let us turn to another similar precedent - the division of spheres of influence in Europe between the USSR and Great Britain after the Second World War. As you know, for almost 50 years the sphere of influence of the USSR included the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the USSR did not seek to include them in its composition; moreover, it refused to admit Bulgaria to the Union. Consequently, the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR has nothing to do with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

But what influenced this decision of the Soviet government? This was influenced by the strong pro-German orientation of the authorities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, as a consequence, the potential threat of these countries turning into an outpost of Nazi Germany as a result of the voluntary admission by the authorities of these countries of German troops to their territory, in connection with which the Germans could attack not from Brest , as it happened on June 22, 1941, and from near Narva, Daugavpils, Vilnius. The border with Estonia passed 120 km from Leningrad, and there was a real threat of the fall of Leningrad in the first days of the war. I will give some facts that substantiate the fears of the Soviet leadership.

On March 19, 1939, Germany presented an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the transfer of the Klaipeda region. Lithuania agrees, and on March 22 an agreement is signed on the transfer of the city of Klaipeda (Memel) and the surrounding territory to Germany. According to the text of an internal memorandum from the chief of the German Foreign News Service Dertinger dated June 8, 1939, Estonia and Latvia agreed to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR - in accordance with secret articles from the non-aggression treaties between the Baltic countries and Germany. In addition, the “Directive on the unified preparation of the armed forces for the war of 1939-1940,” approved by Hitler, stated the following: The position of the limitrophe states will be determined solely by the military needs of Germany. “With the development of events, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophe states up to the border of old Courland and incorporate these territories into the empire» .

On April 20, 1939, in Berlin, the chief of staff of the Latvian army M. Hartmanis and the commander of the Kurzeme division O. Dankers, as well as the chief of the Estonian General Staff, Lieutenant General N. Reek, were present at the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Adolf Hitler. In addition, in the summer of 1939, the head of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder, and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris, visited Estonia.

In addition, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been members of an anti-Soviet and pro-German military alliance called the Baltic Entente since 1934.

In order to prevent the appearance of German troops in the Baltic states, the USSR first temporarily seeks from Germany to renounce its claims to these territories, and then seeks to station its troops there. A month after the signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty, the Soviet Union consistently concluded mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic countries. The agreement with Estonia was concluded on September 28, 1939, with Latvia on October 5, and with Lithuania on October 10. On the Soviet side, they were signed by Molotov, on the Baltic republics side - by their foreign ministers: Karl Selter (Estonia), Wilhelms Munters (Latvia) and Juozas Urbshis (Lithuania). According to the terms of these treaties, states were obliged to “to provide each other with all possible assistance, including military assistance, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any great European power.” The military assistance that the USSR provided to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consisted of supplying the armies of these countries with weapons and ammunition, as well as stationing a limited contingent of Soviet troops on their territory (20-25 thousand people for each country). This situation was mutually beneficial - the USSR could secure both its borders and the borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to the agreement with Lithuania, the USSR also transferred the Vilna region to Lithuania, as the former territory of Poland (as mentioned above, the USSR recognized it as the territory of Lithuania occupied by Poland), occupied by Soviet troops in September during the Polish operation. It is worth mentioning that when signing the agreements, the Soviet side exerted certain diplomatic pressure on the ministers of the Baltic countries. However, firstly, if we proceed from the realities of time, this is logical, because when a world war begins, any reasonable politician will act harshly towards unreliable neighbors, and secondly, even the fact of pressure that has taken place does not negate the legality of the signed agreements .

The deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of neighboring states with the consent of their governments, albeit as a result of diplomatic pressure, does not contradict the norms of international law. It follows from this that, from a legal point of view, the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR is not a consequence of the entry of Soviet troops into their territory. In accordance with this, it can be argued that the Soviet government has no plans for the Sovietization of the Baltic states. Any attempts to prove the existence of such plans among the Soviet leadership, as a rule, come down to lengthy discussions about the “imperial essence” of Russia and the USSR. Of course, I cannot exclude the possibility of Stalin’s intentions to annex the Baltic states to the USSR, however, it is impossible to prove their existence. But there is evidence to the contrary. Stalin's words from a private conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Georgiy Dimitrov: “We think that in the mutual assistance pacts (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) we have found the form that will allow us to bring a number of countries into the orbit of influence of the Soviet Union. But for this you need to endure - strictly observe their internal regime and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization".

However, in the spring of 1940 the situation changed. Supporters of the thesis about the “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states prefer to take events in the Baltic states out of their historical context and not consider what was happening in Europe at that time. And the following happened: on April 9, 1940, Nazi Germany occupied Denmark with lightning speed and without resistance, after which within 10 days it established control over most of Norway. On May 10, the troops of the Third Reich occupy Luxembourg, after 5 days of military operation the Netherlands capitulate, and on May 17 Belgium surrenders. Within a month, France came under German control. In this regard, the Soviet government expresses fears about the possibility of Germany quickly opening an eastern front, that is, an attack on the Baltic countries, and then, through their territory, on the USSR. The contingent of Soviet troops located in the Baltic states at that time was not enough to successfully confront the Wehrmacht. In the fall of 1939, when Soviet military bases were located in the Baltic countries, the USSR leadership did not count on such a turn of events. To fulfill the terms of the Mutual Assistance Treaties concluded in the fall of 1939, it was necessary to introduce an additional contingent of troops into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which would be able to resist the Wehrmacht, and, accordingly, thus provide assistance to the Baltic countries, which was provided for in the treaties. At the same time, the pro-German orientation of the authorities of these states continued, which essentially could be considered as non-compliance by these states with mutual assistance treaties. These states did not leave the Baltic Entente. In addition, Latvia and Estonia during the Soviet-Finnish War provided assistance to the Finnish army by intercepting Soviet radio signals (despite the fact that the RKKF ships participating in hostilities against Finland sailed into the Gulf of Finland from a naval base near the city of Paldiski in Estonia ). In connection with the above circumstances, the Soviet Union is taking rather tough, but completely justified actions towards its Baltic neighbors. On June 14, 1940, the USSR presented a note to Lithuania, in which it demanded in the form of an ultimatum to form within 10 hours a government friendly to the USSR, which would implement the Mutual Assistance Treaty and organize free passage of additional contingents of Soviet armed forces into the territory of Lithuania. The Lithuanian government agrees, and on June 15 additional Soviet units enter Lithuania. On June 16, similar demands were presented to Estonia and Latvia. Consent was also received, and on June 17, Soviet troops entered these countries. It was the introduction of additional troops in June 1940 that is considered to be the beginning of the “Soviet occupation.” However, the actions of the Soviet Union are absolutely legal, since they correspond to the provision written in mutual assistance treaties, according to which countries “undertake to provide each other with all possible assistance, including military assistance, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack by any great European power”. In June 1940, the threat of attack increased greatly, which meant that the troops assigned to assist in the event of a potential threat had to be increased accordingly! This circumstance justifies the actions of the Soviet government in sending ultimatums. As for whether these actions were an occupation (a number of politicians use the concept of “armed aggression” or even “attack”), the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, although not entirely voluntary, gave consent to the deployment of additional troops. In this case, they had a choice - they could not accept the ultimatums and offer resistance to the Red Army. Or they might not even provide it - in this case, it would still have turned out that the Red Army entered their territory without consent. Then we could still talk about the Soviet occupation. But it turned out differently. Troops were admitted with official consent. Consequently, there can be no talk of occupation.

Before the deployment of troops, additional agreements were concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries, in which the procedure for the entry and location of Soviet military units was determined, and officers of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armies participated in the coordination of troops. On June 17 at 22:00, President of Latvia Karlis Ulmanis addressed the people of Latvia by radio, where he announced that the entry of Soviet troops was taking place "with the knowledge and consent of the government, which follows from the friendly relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union". Acting President of Lithuania Antanas Merkys similarly notified Lithuanians.

Proponents of the opposite point of view prefer to draw a parallel here with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The scheme is the same: on the evening of March 14, 1939, Hitler presented the President of Czechoslovakia Emil Hacha with an ultimatum demanding that he sign an act on the liquidation of the independence of Czechoslovakia by 6 a.m. on March 15. At the same time, Hakha was confronted with a fact: at night, German troops would cross the border with Czechoslovakia. The president was under pressure and threatened with execution if he refused. Reich Minister of Aviation Hermann Goering threatened to wipe Prague off the face of the earth with carpet bombing. Four hours later, Emil Gakha signed the agreement. BUT!.. Firstly, the ultimatum was presented when the German troops had already received the order to cross the border, and the Soviet troops did not receive the order until a response to the ultimatum followed. Secondly, when Gakha signed the agreement, German troops had already crossed the border. The difference, I think, is obvious.

The population of the Baltic states, whose pro-Soviet sentiments were extremely strong, greeted the Soviet troops with jubilation. These sentiments, thanks to the events that took place, intensified; rallies for joining the USSR were held in a number of cities. Modern Baltic politicians who falsify history prefer to claim that these demonstrations were allegedly organized and financed by the “occupiers,” and that the population as a whole allegedly resisted.

Demonstrations in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn. July 1940

On July 14-15, 1940, early parliamentary elections were held in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to their results, the candidates of the "Unions of Working People" received: in Estonia - 93% of the votes, in Latvia - 98%, in Lithuania - 99%. The elected new parliaments transformed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into Soviet socialist republics on July 21, and on July 22 signed declarations of accession to the USSR, which were reviewed and approved by the Soviet Union on August 6.

Here, supporters of the concept of occupation draw a parallel with the occupation (Anschluss) of Austria in March 1938. They say that a plebiscite was held there in exactly the same way, and the majority of the population voted for reunification with Germany, but this does not cancel the fact of occupation. But meanwhile, they do not take into account the significant difference that German troops entered Austria on March 12, 1938 without any consent of the government of this country, and the plebiscite, in which 99.75% voted for the Anschluss (German. Anschlüß- reunion), was held on April 10. Thus, the plebiscite can be considered illegitimate, since it was held at a time when the occupation of Austria by German troops had already been carried out. The fundamental difference from the Soviet troops already stationed in the Baltic states is that the governments of the Baltic countries gave their consent to their deployment, even after diplomatic pressure. Moreover, according to the instructions for Soviet troops in the Baltic states, contacts of the Red Army soldiers with the population were limited, and they were strictly prohibited from supporting any third-party political forces. It follows from this that the Soviet troops present on the territory of these three countries could not influence the political situation. But the mere fact of their presence does not change anything. After all, using the same standard, one can call into question the legal status of the pre-war Baltic states, since they were proclaimed in the presence of the troops of the Kaiser's Germany.

In short, the USSR government never planned to include the Baltic states into the USSR. The plan was only to include it in the Soviet orbit of influence and make the Baltic states allies of the USSR in a future war. In October 1939, the Soviet leadership considered it sufficient to station Soviet troops there so that German troops would not be stationed there later, or rather, so that if German troops invaded there, they would have to fight them there. And in June 1940 it was necessary to take more serious measures - to increase the number of troops and force the authorities of these countries to change their political course. With this, the Soviet government completed its task. The new governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have already completely voluntarily signed declarations of joining the USSR, with the existing support for the pro-Soviet course by the majority of the population.

Supporters of the occupation thesis often try to prove the opposite by the presence of war plans with Estonia and Latvia already in the summer of 1939 and the fact of the concentration of Soviet troops near the border, sometimes citing the Estonian phrasebook for interrogating prisoners of war as an argument. Yes, there really were such plans. There was a similar plan for the war with Finland. But, firstly, the goal was not to implement these plans, the plans themselves were developed in case it was not possible to resolve the situation peacefully (as happened in Finland), and secondly, the military action plans were not aimed at joining the Baltic states to USSR, and to change the political course there through military occupation - if this plan had come true, then, of course, one could talk about Soviet occupation.

Of course, the actions of the USSR in June 1940 were very harsh, and the actions of the authorities of the Baltic countries were not entirely voluntary. But, firstly, this does not cancel the legality of the entry of troops, and secondly, in the legal status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the period from 1940 to 1991, they could not de jure be in a state of occupation, since even after the entry of troops into in these states their legitimate authority continued to operate. The personnel of the government was changed, but the power itself did not change; talk that the “people's governments” were puppets and were carried out on Red Army bayonets is nothing more than a historical myth. These same legitimate governments made decisions to join the USSR. A mandatory sign by which a territory can have the legal status of occupied is the power brought by the bayonets of the occupying army. In the Baltic states there was no such power, but legitimate governments continued to operate. But in the same Czechoslovakia, this scheme took place - on March 15, 1939, when German troops crossed the German-Czechoslovak border, the territory of the Czech Republic (Slovakia became an independent state) by Hitler’s personal decree was declared a German protectorate (Bohemia and Moravia), that is Germany declared its sovereignty over this territory. The Reich Protectorate became the occupation power of the Czech Republic brought by the German army. Formally, Emil Haha still continued to be the current president, but was subordinate to the Reich Protector. The difference with the Baltic states is again obvious.

So, the concept of Soviet occupation is based on the fact that there was diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union. But, firstly, this was not the only case of the use of diplomatic pressure, and secondly, it does not cancel the legality of the actions taken. The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, both in October 1939 and June 1940, themselves allowed Soviet troops to be stationed on the territories of their countries, and already in July 1940, the new legally elected governments voluntarily decided to join the USSR. Consequently, there was no Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries in 1940.

Moreover, it did not exist in 1944, when the Baltic republics were already the territory of the USSR, and Soviet troops liberated them from Nazi occupation.

In addition, modern Baltic historiography mentions repressions against the inhabitants of the newly formed Baltic Soviet republics and, in particular, their deportation to Siberia on June 14, 1941. The greatest lie in this historiography lies, firstly, in the inflated figures, traditional in relation to Stalinist repressions, and secondly, in the allegations of the alleged genocide of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. In reality, in May 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree "On measures to cleanse the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs from anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements." Of all the Baltic republics combined, about 30 thousand people were deported. Considering that the population of all three republics at that time was about 3 million, the number of deportees is approximately 1%. Moreover, it should be taken into account that although there were, of course, innocent people among those deported, far from the full number and not even the majority of those deported were “anti-Soviet elements”; among them there were also commonplace criminals who, even before 1940, were kept in prisons of the independent Baltic states, and in 1941 were simply transferred to other places. In addition, it should be taken into account that the deportation was carried out immediately before the war (8 days before its start) and was carried out to prevent cooperation of “anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements” with the enemy during a possible Nazi occupation of the territory. The deportation of one percent of the population, among whom, moreover, there were many ethnic Russians (since there were many Russians in the pre-war Baltic states), can only be called a genocide of the Baltic peoples if one has an overly rich imagination. The same, however, applies to larger-scale deportations carried out in 1949, when about 20 thousand people were taken from each republic. Predominantly those who were deported were those who “distinguished themselves” during the war by direct collaboration with the Nazis.

Another common misconception regarding the Baltic states is that during the Great Patriotic War, the majority of the Baltic states collaborated with the Germans, and the majority of residents of the Baltic cities greeted the Germans with flowers. In principle, we cannot judge how large a number of people were happy about the arrival of the “German liberators,” but the fact that on the streets of Vilnius, Riga and other cities there were people joyfully greeting them and throwing flowers does not mean that they were the majority. Moreover, there were no fewer people who greeted the Red Army just as joyfully in 1944. There are, however, other facts. During the years of Nazi occupation, on the territory of the Baltic republics, as well as on the territory of the occupied Belarusian SSR, there was a partisan movement numbering about 20 thousand people in each republic. There were also Baltic divisions of the Red Army: the 8th Infantry Estonian Tallinn Corps, the 130th Infantry Latvian Order of Suvorov Corps, the 16th Infantry Lithuanian Klaipeda Red Banner Division and other formations. During the war, 20,042 members of Estonian formations, 17,368 participants of Latvian formations and 13,764 participants of Lithuanian military formations were awarded military orders and medals.

Already against the background of the above facts, the assertion about the predominance of sentiments of cooperation with the Nazis among the Baltic states becomes untenable. The movements of the Baltic “forest brothers,” which existed until the end of the 1950s, were not so much national as they were criminal in nature, naturally diluted with nationalism. And often civilians of the Baltic republics, and more often of the Baltic nationalities, died at the hands of the forest brothers.

In addition, the Baltic republics within the USSR in no way occupied the position of occupied ones. They were governed by national authorities consisting of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians; citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania automatically received Soviet citizenship in August 1940, and the armies of these states became part of the Red Army. Throughout the Soviet period, the population of the Baltic peoples increased and their national culture developed. In addition, the Baltic republics occupied a privileged position in the “Evil Empire”. Huge investments were made in the economy and tourism sector (Jurmala and Palanga were considered one of the best resorts in the entire Union). In particular, for a ruble of their own funds, the Baltic republics received approximately 2 rubles at the expense of the RSFSR. The Latvian SSR with a population of 2.5 million people received almost 3 times more funds from the budget than the Voronezh region with the same population. In the villages of the RSFSR, per 10 thousand hectares of arable land there were an average of 12.5 km of paved roads, and in the Baltic states - almost 70 km, and the Vilnius-Kaunas-Klaipeda highway was considered the best road in the Soviet Union.In Central Russia, per 100 hectares of agricultural land, the cost of fixed production assets was 142 thousand rubles, and in the Baltics - 255 thousand rubles. It was the Baltic republics and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Moldavian and Georgian SSRs that had the highest standard of living in the entire Soviet Union. It must be said that in the 1990s, a huge number of factories in the Baltic countries were closed and destroyed (in Russia, of course, too, but this is a separate conversation) under the pretext that “we don’t need Soviet monsters.” The oil shale processing plant in Kohtla-Järve, the machine-building plant in Pärnu (partially functioning) came under the knife, most of the buildings of the Riga Carriage Works were closed(Rīgas Vagonbūves Rūpnīca), which supplied electric trains and trams to the entire Soviet Union, the Riga Electrical Engineering Plant VEF (Valsts Elektrotehniskā Fabrika), built before the revolution and significantly expanded during the Soviet years, is in decline; the Riga Bus Factory collapsed in 1998 and has not yet been restored. RAF (Rīgas Autobusu Fabrika); Other infrastructure facilities also suffered, for example, a sanatorium built in Soviet times in Jurmala was abandoned.

In addition, there is another interesting circumstance that makes the concept of “restoring independence” untenable. Namely, the independence of Lithuania - on March 11, 1990, Estonia - on August 20, 1991, and Latvia - on August 21, 1991 - was proclaimed respectively by the parliaments of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian SSR. From the point of view of the existing concept, these parliaments were local bodies of occupation power. If this is so, then the legal status of the current Baltic states can be called into question. It turns out that indirectly the current Baltic authorities call themselves occupiers in the recent past, and directly they deny any legal continuity from the Soviet republics.

Thus, we can conclude that the concept of “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states is artificial and far-fetched. At the moment, this concept is a convenient political tool in the hands of the authorities of the Baltic countries, where mass discrimination of the Russian population is carried out on this basis. In addition, it is also a tool for issuing large invoices to Russia with compensation demands. In addition, Estonia and Latvia demand (now unofficially) from Russia the return of part of the territories: Estonia - Zanarovye with the city of Ivangorod, as well as the Pechora district of the Pskov region with the city of Pechory and the ancient Russian city, and now the rural settlement of Izborsk, Latvia - Pytalovsky district of the Pskov region areas. As justification, the borders under the 1920 treaties are cited, although they are not currently in force, since they were denounced in 1940 by the declaration of accession to the USSR, and the border changes were carried out already in 1944, when Estonia and Latvia were republics of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion: the concept of “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states has little in common with historical science, but is, as stated above, just a political tool.

Hello! In the blog “Fighting Myths” we will analyze the events of our history, surrounded by myths and falsifications. These will be small reviews dedicated to the anniversary of a particular historical date. Of course, it is impossible to conduct a detailed study of events within the framework of one article, but we will try to outline the main issues, show examples of false statements and their refutations.

In the photo: Railway workers rock Weiss, a member of the plenipotentiary commission of the State Duma of Estonia, after returning from Moscow, where Estonia was admitted to the USSR. July 1940

71 years ago, on July 21-22, 1940, the parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania transformed their states into Soviet socialist republics and adopted the Declaration of Accession to the USSR. Soon the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted laws that approved the decisions of the Baltic parliaments. Thus began a new page in the history of the three states of Eastern Europe. What happened over the course of several months in 1939-1940? How to evaluate these events?

Let's consider the main theses used by our opponents in discussions on this topic. Let us emphasize that these theses are not always outright lies and deliberate falsification - sometimes it is just an incorrect formulation of the problem, a shift in emphasis, or involuntary confusion in terms and dates. However, as a result of the use of these theses, a picture emerges that is far from the true meaning of events. Before you can find the truth, you need to expose the lies.

1. The decision to annex the Baltic states to the USSR was spelled out in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and/or the secret protocols to it. Moreover, Stalin planned to annex the Baltic states long before these events. In a word, these two events are interconnected, one is a consequence of the other.

Examples.

"In fact, if you do not ignore the obvious facts, then of course, it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that sanctioned the occupation of the Baltic states and the occupation of the eastern territories of Poland by Soviet troops. And it’s surprising that the secret protocols to this treaty are mentioned so often here, because, strictly speaking, the role of this treaty is clear even without them.”
Link .

“As a professional, I began to study the history of the Second World War in more or less depth in the mid-80s, working on the now notorious, but then almost unstudied and classified the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocols accompanying it, which decided the fate of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1939".
Afanasyev Yu.N. Another war: History and memory. // Russia, XX century. Under general ed. Yu.N. Afanasyeva. M., 1996. Book. 3. Link.

“The USSR received from Germany the possibility of freedom of action for further “territorial and political transformations” in the sphere of Soviet influence. Both aggressive powers were of the same opinion on August 23 that "sphere of interest" means the freedom to occupy and annex the territories of their respective states. The Soviet Union and Germany divided their spheres of interest on paper in order to “make the division also a reality.”<...>
"The government of the USSR, which needed treaties on mutual assistance with the Baltic states in order to destroy these states, did not think to be satisfied with the existing status quo. It took advantage of the favorable international situation created by Germany's attack on France, Holland and Belgium to completely occupy the Baltic states in June 1940."
Link .

A comment.

The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its significance in international politics of the 30s. XX century - a very complex topic that requires separate analysis. Nevertheless, we note that most often the assessment of this event is unprofessional in nature, coming not from historians and lawyers, but sometimes from people who have not read this historical document and do not know the realities of international relations of that time.

The realities of the time are that the conclusion of non-aggression treaties was a common practice of those years, which did not imply allied relations (and this pact is often called the “alliance treaty” of the USSR and Germany). The conclusion of secret protocols was also not an extraordinary diplomatic move: for example, the British guarantees to Poland in 1939 contained a secret protocol according to which Great Britain would provide military assistance to Poland only in the event of an attack by Germany, but not by any other country. The principle of dividing a region into spheres of influence between two or more states, again, was very widespread: it is enough to recall the delimitation of spheres of influence between the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition at the final stage of the Second World War. So it would be wrong to call the conclusion of the agreement on August 23, 1939 criminal, immoral, and even more so illegal.

Another question is what was meant by the sphere of influence in the text of the pact. If you look at Germany’s actions in Eastern Europe, you will notice that its political expansion did not always involve occupation or annexation (for example, as in the case of Romania). It is difficult to say that the processes in the same region in the mid-40s, when Romania came into the sphere of influence of the USSR, and Greece into the sphere of influence of Great Britain, led to the occupation of their territory or forced annexation.

In a word, the sphere of influence implied a territory in which the opposite side, in accordance with its obligations, was not supposed to pursue an active foreign policy, economic expansion, or support for certain political forces beneficial to it. (See: Makarchuk V.S. Sovereign-territorial status of the Western Ukrainian lands during the period of the Other World War (1939 - 1945): historical and legal research. Kiev, 2007. P. 101.) This, for example, happened after the Second World War, when Stalin, according to agreements with Churchill, did not support the Greek communists, who had a great chance of winning the political struggle.

Relations between Soviet Russia and independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania began to develop in 1918, when these states gained independence. However, the Bolsheviks' hopes for victory in these countries by communist forces, including with the help of the Red Army, did not materialize. In 1920, the Soviet government concluded peace treaties with the three republics and recognized them as independent states.

Over the next twenty years, Moscow gradually built a “Baltic direction” of its foreign policy, the main goals of which were to ensure the security of Leningrad and prevent a possible military enemy from blockading the Baltic Fleet. This explains the turn in relations with the Baltic states that occurred in the mid-30s. If in the 20s. The USSR was convinced that the creation of a single bloc of three states (the so-called Baltic Entente) was not beneficial for it, because this military-political alliance can be used by the countries of Western Europe for a new invasion of Russia, then after the Nazis came to power in Germany, the USSR insists on creating a system of collective security in Eastern Europe. One of the projects proposed by Moscow was a Soviet-Polish declaration on the Baltic states, in which both states would guarantee the independence of the three Baltic countries. However, Poland rejected these proposals. (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltics and the Kremlin. 1940-1953. M., 2008. P. 18-28.)

The Kremlin also tried to achieve guarantees of independence of the Baltic countries from Germany. Berlin was asked to sign a protocol in which the governments of Germany and the USSR would promise to “constantly take into account in their foreign policy the imperative of maintaining the independence and inviolability” of the Baltic states. However, Germany also refused to meet the Soviet Union halfway. The next attempt to reliably ensure the security of the Baltic countries was the Soviet-French project of the Eastern Pact, but it was not destined to come to fruition. These attempts continued until the spring of 1939, when it became obvious that Great Britain and France did not want to change their tactics of “appeasing” Hitler, embodied by that time in the form of the Munich Agreements.

The change in the attitude of the USSR towards the Baltic countries was very well described by the head of the Bureau of International Information of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party /b/ Karl Radek. He stated the following in 1934: “The Baltic states created by the Entente, which served as a cordon or bridgehead against us, today are for us the most important wall of protection from the West.” So, to talk about the goal of “returning territories”, “restoring the rights of the Russian Empire” is only possible by resorting to speculation - the Soviet Union has been seeking neutrality and independence of the Baltic states for quite a long time for the sake of its security. The arguments presented as arguments about the “imperial”, “power” turn in Stalinist ideology that occurred in the mid-30s can hardly be transferred to the sphere of foreign policy; there is no documentary evidence of this.

By the way, this is not the first time in Russian history when a security issue was not resolved by joining neighbors. The “divide and conquer” recipe, despite its apparent simplicity, could sometimes be extremely inconvenient and unprofitable. For example, in the middle of the 18th century. representatives of the Ossetian tribes sought a decision from St. Petersburg on their inclusion in the empire, because Ossetians were subjected to pressure and raids from the Kabardian princes for a long time. However, the Russian authorities did not want a possible conflict with Turkey, and therefore did not accept such a tempting offer. (For more details, see Degoev V.V. Rapprochement along a complex trajectory: Russia and Ossetia in the middle of the 18th century. // Russia XXI. 2011. No. 1-2.)

Let's return to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or rather, to the text of paragraph 1 of the secret protocol: “In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania’s interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both parties.” (Link.) On September 28, 1939, by an additional agreement, Germany and the USSR will adjust the border of their spheres of influence, and in exchange for the Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship of Poland, Germany will not lay claim to Lithuania. So, we are not talking about any annexation, we are talking about spheres of influence.

By the way, on these same days (namely September 27), Ribbentrop, the head of the German foreign policy department, in a conversation with Stalin asked: “Does the conclusion of a pact with Estonia mean that the USSR intends to slowly penetrate into Estonia, and then into Latvia?” Stalin replied: “Yes, that means. But temporarily the existing state system, etc., will be preserved there.” (Link.)

This is one of the few pieces of evidence that suggests that the Soviet leadership has intentions to “Sovietize” the Baltic states. As a rule, these intentions were expressed in specific phrases by Stalin or representatives of the diplomatic corps, but intentions are not plans, especially when it comes to words thrown out during diplomatic negotiations. There is no evidence in archival documents of a connection between the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and plans to change the political status or “Sovietization” of the Baltic republics. Moreover, Moscow prohibits plenipotentiaries in the Baltic states not only from using the word “Sovietization”, but also from communicating with left-wing forces in general.

2. The Baltic states pursued a policy of neutrality; they would not fight on the side of Germany.

Examples.

"Leonid Mlechin, writer: Please tell me, witness, there is a feeling that the fate of your country, as well as Estonia and Latvia, was sealed in 1939-40. Either you become part of the Soviet Union, or part of Germany. And there wasn’t even a third option. Do you agree with this point of view?
Algimantas Kasparavičius, historian, political scientist, researcher at the Institute of History of Lithuania: Of course I don't agree, because before the Soviet occupation, until 1940, all three Baltic countries, including Lithuania, professed a policy of neutrality. And they tried to defend their interests and their statehood in just such a neutral way during the war that began.”
Judgment of time: The accession of the Baltic states to the USSR - loss or gain? Part 1. // Channel Five. 08/09/2010. Link .

A comment.

In the spring of 1939, Germany finally occupied Czechoslovakia. Despite the obvious contradiction to the Munich agreements, Great Britain and France limited themselves to diplomatic protests. However, these countries, together with the USSR, Poland, Romania and other states of Eastern Europe, continued to discuss the possibility of creating a collective security system in this region. The most interested party was, naturally, the Soviet Union. Its fundamental condition was the neutrality of Poland and the Baltic states. However, these countries were against guarantees from the USSR.

This is how Winston Churchill wrote about it in his work “The Second World War”: “The negotiations seemed to have reached a hopeless dead end. Accepting the English guarantee (for assistance in case of war - Note), the governments of Poland and Romania did not want to accept a similar commitment in the same form from the Russian government. The same position was adhered to in another important strategic region - in the Baltic states. The Soviet government clarified that it would accede to the mutual guarantee pact only if Finland and the Baltic states were included in the general guarantee.

All four of these countries have now refused such a condition and, out of horror, would probably refuse to agree to it for a long time. Finland and Estonia even argued that they would consider as an act of aggression a guarantee that was given to them without their consent. On the same day, May 31, Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany. Thus, Hitler was able to easily penetrate into the depths of the weak defenses of the belated and indecisive coalition directed against him." (Link.)

Thus, one of the last opportunities for collective resistance to Hitler’s expansion to the East was destroyed. At the same time, the governments of the Baltic states willingly cooperated with Germany, never ceasing to talk about their neutrality. But isn't this an obvious indicator of a policy of double standards? Let's look once again at the facts of cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Germany in 1939.

At the end of March this year, Germany demanded that Lithuania transfer the Klaipeda region to it. Just two or three days later, the German-Lithuanian agreement on the transfer of Klaipeda was signed, according to which the parties assumed an obligation not to use force against each other. At the same time, rumors appeared about the conclusion of a German-Estonian treaty, according to which German troops received the right of passage through Estonian territory. It was unknown how true these rumors were, but subsequent events increased the Kremlin’s suspicions.

On April 20, 1939, the chief of staff of the Latvian army M. Hartmanis and the commander of the Kurzeme division O. Dankers arrived in Berlin to participate in the celebrations dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Hitler, and were personally received by the Fuhrer, who presented them with awards. The Chief of the Estonian General Staff, Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek, also arrived for Hitler's anniversary. Following this, Estonia was visited by the head of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder, and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. This was a clear step towards military cooperation between the countries.

And on June 19, the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow August Ray, at a meeting with British diplomats, said that USSR assistance would force Estonia to take the side of Germany. What is this? Blind faith in the sincerity of treaties with Germany after the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and even more so after the annexation of a small part of the Baltic lands (i.e. the Klaipeda region)? The reluctance to cooperate (and at that time we were talking only about cooperation) with the Soviet Union, apparently, was much stronger than the fear of losing one’s own sovereignty. Or, perhaps, the reluctance to cooperate was so strong that their own sovereignty was not a value for part of the political elite.

On March 28, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Litvinov presented statements to the Estonian and Latvian envoys in Moscow. In them, Moscow warned Tallinn and Riga that allowing “political, economic or other domination of a third state, granting it any exclusive rights or privileges” could be considered by Moscow as a violation of previously concluded agreements between the USSR, Estonia and Latvia. (Link.) Sometimes some researchers view these statements as an example of Moscow’s expansionist aspirations. However, if you pay attention to the foreign policy of the Baltic countries, this statement was a completely natural action of a state concerned about its security.

At the same time, in Berlin on April 11, Hitler approved the “Directive on the uniform preparation of the armed forces for war for 1939-1940.” It stated that after the defeat of Poland, Germany should take control of Latvia and Lithuania: “The position of the limitrophe states will be determined solely by the military needs of Germany. As events develop, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophe states to the border of old Courland and include these territories in the empire.” . (Link.)

In addition to the above facts, modern historians make assumptions about the existence of secret treaties between Germany and the Baltic states. This is not just guesswork. For example, the German researcher Rolf Amann discovered in the German archives an internal memorandum from the chief of the German Foreign News Service Dörtinger dated June 8, 1939, which states that Estonia and Latvia agreed to a secret article requiring both countries to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR. The memorandum also stated that Estonia and Latvia were warned of the need to intelligently apply their policy of neutrality, which required the deployment of all defensive forces against the “Soviet threat.” (See Ilmjärv M. Hääletu alistumine. Eesti, Läti ja Leeedu välispoliitilise orientatsioni kujunemine ja iseseisvuse kaotus 1920. aastate keskpaigast anneksioonini. Tallinn, 2004. lk. 558.)

All this suggests that the “neutrality” of the Baltic states was only a cover for cooperation with Germany. And these countries deliberately cooperated, hoping with the help of a powerful ally to protect themselves from the “communist threat.” It is hardly necessary to say that the threat from this ally was much more terrible, because threatened real genocide against the Baltic peoples and the loss of all sovereignty.

3. The annexation of the Baltic states was violent, it was accompanied by mass repressions (genocide) and military intervention by the USSR. These events can be considered "annexation", "forced incorporation", "illegal incorporation".

Examples.

“Because - yes, indeed, there was a formal invitation, or rather, there were three formal invitations, if we talk about the Baltic states. But the point is that these invitations were made already when Soviet troops were stationed in these countries, when all three Baltic countries were flooded with NKVD agents, when in fact repressions against the local population were already being carried out... And, of course, it must be said that this action was prepared well by the Soviet leadership, because in fact everything was completed by the year 1940, and governments were created already in July 1940.”
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Interview with historian Alexey Pimenov. // Russian service of the Voice of America. 05/08/2005. Link .

"We did not support forced incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR", US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the three Baltic foreign ministers yesterday."
Eldarov E. The USA does not recognize the occupation?! // News today. 06/16/2007. Link .

“The Soviet side also confirmed its aggressive position and decision not to comply with international law and to use force at the Moscow negotiations with representatives of Latvia during the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement, which began on October 2, 1939. The next day, Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters informed government: J. Stalin told him that “because of the Germans we can occupy you,” and also threateningly pointed out the possibility of the USSR taking “territory with a Russian national minority.” The Latvian government decided to capitulate and agree to the demands of the Soviet Union, allowing its troops into its territory."<...>
“Given the aspects of international law, treaties that were concluded on mutual assistance between such unequally powerful parties (power and small and weak states) are difficult to evaluate as legitimate. Several opinions have been expressed in the historical and legal literature on how one could characterize concluded basic agreements between the USSR and the Baltic states. Some authors believe that these agreements, in accordance with international law, are not valid from the moment of their signing, because they were simply imposed on the Baltic states by force".
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .

A comment.

"Annexation is the forcible annexation of the territory of another state (all or part) to a state. Before the Second World War, not every annexation was considered illegal and invalid. This is due to the fact that the principle prohibiting the use of force or the threat of its use, which became one of the main principles of modern international law, was first enshrined in 1945 in the UN Charter,” writes Doctor of Law S.V. Chernichenko.

Thus, speaking about the “annexation” of the Baltic states, we are again faced with a situation where modern international law does not work in relation to historical events. After all, the expansion of the British Empire, the USA, Spain and many other states that at one time annexed territory that belonged to other countries can just as easily be called annexation. So even if we call the process of annexation of the Baltic states annexation, then considering it illegal and invalid (which is what a number of researchers, journalists and politicians want to achieve) is legally incorrect, because the corresponding laws simply did not exist.

The same can be said about specific mutual assistance pacts concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries in September - October 1939: September 28 with Estonia, October 5 with Latvia, October 10 with Lithuania. They were concluded, of course, under strong diplomatic pressure from the USSR, but strong diplomatic pressure, very often applied in conditions of constant military threat, does not make these pacts illegal. Their content was almost the same: the USSR had the right to lease military bases, ports and airfields agreed upon with the states and introduce a limited contingent of troops into their territory (20-25 thousand people for each country).

Can we consider that the presence of NATO troops on the territories of European countries limits their sovereignty? Of course you can. One can also say that the United States, as the leader of NATO, is going to use these troops to put pressure on the political forces of these countries and change the political course there. However, you must admit that this would be a very dubious assumption. The statement about treaties between the USSR and the Baltic states as the first step towards the “Sovietization” of the Baltic states seems to us to be the same dubious assumption.

Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic states were given the strictest instructions regarding behavior towards the local population and authorities. Contacts of the Red Army soldiers with local residents were limited. And Stalin, in a confidential conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G. Dimitrov, said that the USSR needed to “strictly observe them (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - Note) internal mode and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization." (See USSR and Lithuania during the Second World War. Vilnius, 2006. Vol. 1. P. 305.) This suggests that the factor of military presence was not decisive in relations between states, and therefore, the process was not annexation and military takeover. It was precisely the agreed entry of a limited number of troops.

By the way, sending troops into the territory of a foreign state in order to prevent it from going over to the enemy’s side was used more than once during the Second World War. The joint Soviet-British occupation of Iran began in August 1941. And in May 1942, Great Britain occupied Madagascar to prevent the Japanese from capturing the island, although Madagascar belonged to Vichy France, which maintained neutrality. In the same way, the Americans occupied French (i.e. Vichy) Morocco and Algeria in November 1942. (Link.)

However, not everyone was happy with the current situation. The left forces in the Baltic states clearly counted on the help of the USSR. For example, demonstrations in support of the mutual assistance pact in Lithuania in October 1939 turned into clashes with the police. However, Molotov telegraphed to the plenipotentiary and the military attaché: “I categorically forbid interfering in inter-party affairs in Lithuania, supporting any opposition movements, etc.” (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltics and the Kremlin. P. 60-61.) The thesis about the fear of world public opinion is very doubtful: Germany, on the one hand, France and Great Britain, on the other, at that time entered the Second World War, and it is unlikely that any of them wanted the USSR to join the other side of the front. The Soviet leadership believed that by sending in troops it had secured the northwestern border, and only strict compliance with the terms of the agreements would ensure, in turn, compliance with these agreements on the part of the Baltic neighbors. It was simply unprofitable to destabilize the situation by military takeover.

We also add that Lithuania, as a result of the mutual assistance pact, significantly expanded its territory, including Vilna and the Vilna region. But despite the impeccable behavior of the Soviet troops noted by the Baltic authorities, in the meantime they continued cooperation with Germany and (during the “Winter War”) with Finland. In particular, the radio intelligence department of the Latvian army provided practical assistance to the Finnish side, forwarding intercepted radiograms from Soviet military units. (See Latvijas arhivi. 1999. Nr. 1. 121., 122. lpp.)

The allegations about mass repressions carried out in 1939-1941 also look unfounded. in the Baltic states and began, according to a number of researchers, in the fall of 1939, i.e. before the Baltic states joined the USSR. The facts are that in June 1941, in accordance with the May resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On measures to cleanse the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs from anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements", the deportation of approx. 30 thousand people from the three Baltic republics. It is often forgotten that only some of them were deported as “anti-Soviet elements,” while others were banal criminals. It must also be taken into account that this action was carried out on the eve of the war.

However, more often the mythical NKVD order No. 001223 “On operational measures against anti-Soviet and socially hostile elements”, which wanders from one publication to another, is cited as evidence. It was first mentioned... in the book "Die Sowjetunion und die baltische Staaten" ("The Soviet Union and the Baltic States"), published in 1941 in Kaunas. It is not difficult to guess that it was written not by painstaking researchers, but by employees of Goebbels’ department. Naturally, no one was able to find this NKVD order in the archives, but its mention can be found in the books “These Names Are Accused” (1951) and “The Baltic States, 1940-1972” (1972), published in Stockholm, as well as in numerous modern literature up to the study of E.Yu. Zubkova “The Baltics and the Kremlin” (see this edition, p. 126).

By the way, in this study, the author, considering Moscow’s policy in the annexed Baltic lands for one pre-war year (from the summer of 1940 to June 1941), over the course of 27 pages of the corresponding chapter, writes only two paragraphs (!) about repressions, one of which is a retelling of the myth mentioned above. This shows how significant the repressive policies of the new government were. Of course, it brought fundamental changes in political and economic life, the nationalization of industry and large property, the elimination of capitalist exchange, etc. Part of the population, shocked by these changes, switched to resistance: this was expressed in protests, attacks on the police and even sabotage (arson of warehouses, etc.). What did the new government need to do so that this territory, taking into account the not overwhelming but still existing social resistance, would not become easy “prey” for the German occupiers, who were planning to start a war soon? Of course, to fight “anti-Soviet” sentiments. That is why, on the eve of the war, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR appeared on the deportation of unreliable elements.

4. Before the inclusion of the Baltic states into the USSR, communists came to power in them, and the elections were rigged.

Examples.

"Illegal and illegal change of government occurred on June 20, 1940. Instead of the cabinet of K. Ulmanis, a Soviet puppet government headed by A. Kirchenstein came, which was officially called the government of the Latvian people.”<...>
“In the elections held on July 14 and 15, 1940, only one list of candidates nominated by the “Bloc of Working People” was allowed. All other alternative lists were rejected. It was officially reported that 97.5% of the votes were cast for the mentioned list. The election results were falsified and did not reflect the will of the people. In Moscow, the Soviet news agency TASS gave information about the mentioned election results twelve hours before the start of the vote count in Latvia."
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .

"July 1940 In the elections in the Baltics, the Communists received: Lithuania - 99.2%, Latvia - 97.8%, Estonia - 92.8%."
Surov V. Icebreaker-2. Mn., 2004. Ch. 6.

Plan
Introduction
1 Background. 1930s
2 1939. War begins in Europe
3 Mutual Assistance Pacts and Treaty of Friendship and Borders
4 Entry of Soviet troops
5 Ultimatums of the summer of 1940 and the removal of the Baltic governments
6 Entry of the Baltic states into the USSR
7 Consequences
8 Modern politics
9 Opinion of historians and political scientists

Bibliography
Annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR

Introduction

Annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR (1940) - the process of including the independent Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and most of the territory of modern Lithuania - into the USSR, carried out as a result of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Treaty of Friendship and Border by the USSR and Nazi Germany in August 1939, the secret protocols of which recorded the delimitation of the spheres of interest of these two powers in Eastern Europe.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consider the actions of the USSR to be occupation followed by annexation. The Council of Europe in its resolutions characterized the process of the Baltic states joining the USSR as occupation, forced incorporation and annexation. In 1983, the European Parliament condemned it as an occupation, and subsequently (2007) used such concepts as “occupation” and “illegal incorporation” in this regard.

The text of the preamble to the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania 1991 contains the lines: “ referring to the past events and actions that prevented the full and free exercise by each High Contracting Party of its state sovereignty, being confident that the elimination by the USSR of the consequences of the 1940 annexation violating the sovereignty of Lithuania will create additional conditions of trust between the High Contracting Parties and their peoples »

The official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry is that the accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR complied with all norms of international law as of 1940, and also that the entry of these countries into the USSR received official international recognition. This position is based on the de facto recognition of the integrity of the borders of the USSR as of June 1941 at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences by the participating states, as well as on the recognition in 1975 of the inviolability of European borders by the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

1. Background. 1930s

In the period between the two world wars, the Baltic states became the object of the struggle of the great European powers (England, France and Germany) for influence in the region. In the first decade after Germany's defeat in World War I, there was a strong Anglo-French influence in the Baltic states, which was subsequently hampered by the growing influence of neighboring Germany from the early 1930s. The Soviet leadership, in turn, tried to resist him. By the end of the 1930s, the Third Reich and the USSR had actually become the main rivals in the struggle for influence in the Baltic states.

In December 1933, the governments of France and the USSR put forward a joint proposal to conclude an agreement on collective security and mutual assistance. Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were invited to join this treaty. The project, called "Eastern Pact", was seen as a collective guarantee in case of aggression by Nazi Germany. But Poland and Romania refused to join the alliance, the United States did not approve of the idea of ​​a treaty, and England put forward a number of counter conditions, including the rearmament of Germany.

In the spring and summer of 1939, the USSR negotiated with England and France on joint prevention of Italian-German aggression against European countries and on April 17, 1939, invited England and France to undertake obligations to provide all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European countries located between the Baltic and the Black Seas and bordering the Soviet Union, as well as to conclude for a period of 5-10 years an agreement on mutual assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states (USSR, England and France).

Failure "Eastern Pact" was caused by differences in the interests of the contracting parties. Thus, the Anglo-French missions received detailed secret instructions from their general staffs, which defined the goals and nature of the negotiations - a note from the French general staff said, in particular, that along with a number of political benefits that England and France would receive in connection with by joining the USSR, this would allow it to be drawn into the conflict: “it is not in our interests for it to remain outside the conflict, keeping its forces intact.” The Soviet Union, which considered at least two Baltic republics - Estonia and Latvia - as a sphere of its national interests, defended this position in the negotiations, but did not meet with understanding from its partners. As for the governments of the Baltic states themselves, they preferred guarantees from Germany, with which they were bound by a system of economic agreements and non-aggression treaties. According to Churchill, “The obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these very border states experienced of Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and incidentally include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most vehement opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation."

Simultaneously with negotiations with Great Britain and France, the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 intensified steps towards rapprochement with Germany. The result of this policy was the signing of a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR on August 23, 1939. According to the secret additional protocols to the treaty, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and eastern Poland were included in the Soviet sphere of interests, Lithuania and western Poland - in the German sphere of interests); by the time the treaty was signed, the Klaipeda (Memel) region of Lithuania was already occupied by Germany (March 1939).

2. 1939. Beginning of the war in Europe

The situation worsened on September 1, 1939 with the outbreak of World War II. Germany launched an invasion of Poland. On September 17, the USSR sent troops into Poland, declaring the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932, no longer in force. On the same day, states that had diplomatic relations with the USSR (including the Baltic states) were handed a Soviet note stating that “in relations with them the USSR will pursue a policy of neutrality.”

The outbreak of war between neighboring states gave rise to fears in the Baltics of being drawn into these events and prompted them to declare their neutrality. However, during the hostilities, a number of incidents occurred in which the Baltic countries were also involved - one of them was the entry of the Polish submarine Orzel into the port of Tallinn on September 15, where it was interned at the request of Germany by the Estonian authorities, who began dismantling her weapons. However, on the night of September 18, the crew of the submarine disarmed the guards and took it out to sea, while six torpedoes remained on board. The Soviet Union claimed that Estonia had violated neutrality by providing shelter and assistance to the Polish submarine.

On September 19, Vyacheslav Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, blamed Estonia for this incident, saying that the Baltic Fleet was tasked with finding the submarine, since it could threaten Soviet shipping. This led to the de facto establishment of a naval blockade of the Estonian coast.

On September 24, Estonian Foreign Minister K. Selter arrived in Moscow to sign a trade agreement. After discussing economic problems, Molotov moved on to problems of mutual security and proposed “ conclude a military alliance or mutual assistance agreement, which would at the same time provide the Soviet Union with the right to have strongholds or bases for the fleet and aviation on the territory of Estonia" Selter tried to avoid the discussion by citing neutrality, but Molotov stated that " The Soviet Union needs to expand its security system, for which it needs access to the Baltic Sea. If you do not wish to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with us, then we will have to look for other ways to guarantee our security, perhaps steeper, perhaps more complex. Please do not force us to use force against Estonia ».

3. Mutual assistance pacts and the Treaty of Friendship and Borders

As a result of the actual division of Polish territory between Germany and the USSR, the Soviet borders moved far to the west, and the USSR began to border on the third Baltic state - Lithuania. Initially, Germany intended to turn Lithuania into its protectorate, but on September 25, 1939, during Soviet-German contacts “on the settlement of the Polish problem,” the USSR proposed to begin negotiations on Germany’s renunciation of claims to Lithuania in exchange for the territories of the Warsaw and Lublin voivodeships. On this day, the German Ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Ministry, in which he said that he had been summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin pointed out this proposal as a subject for future negotiations and added that if Germany agreed, “the Soviet Union would immediately will take on the solution of the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of August 23 and expects full support from the German government in this matter.”

The situation in the Baltic states themselves was alarming and contradictory. Against the background of rumors about the impending Soviet-German division of the Baltic states, which were refuted by diplomats of both sides, part of the ruling circles of the Baltic states was ready to continue rapprochement with Germany, while many others were anti-German and counted on the USSR’s help in maintaining the balance of power in the region and national independence, while the leftist forces operating underground were ready to support joining the USSR.

On August 1, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov (People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR) at the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR made a speech that the workers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia joyfully received the news of their republics joining the Soviet Union...

Under what circumstances did the annexation of the Baltic countries actually take place? Russian historians claim that the annexation process took place on a voluntary basis, the final formalization of which took place in the summer of 1940 (based on an agreement by the highest bodies of these countries, which received great voter support in the elections).
This point of view is also supported by some Russian researchers, although they do not entirely agree that entry was voluntary.


Modern political scientists, historians, and researchers of foreign states describe those events as the occupation and annexation of independent states by the Soviet Union, that this entire process proceeded gradually and as a result of several correct military, diplomatic, and economic steps, the Soviet Union managed to carry out its plans. The approaching Second World War also contributed to this process. As for modern politicians, they talk about incorporation (a softer process of accession). Scientists who deny the occupation draw attention to the lack of military action between the USSR and the Baltic states. But in contrast to these words, other historians point to facts according to which military action is not always necessary for occupation and compare this seizure with the policy of Germany, which captured Czechoslovakia in 1939, and Denmark in 1940.


Historians also point to documentary evidence of violations of democratic norms during the parliamentary elections, which took place at the same time in all the Baltic states, in the presence of a large number of Soviet soldiers. In the elections, citizens of these countries could only vote for candidates from the Working People's Bloc, and other lists were rejected. Even Baltic sources agree that the elections were held with violations and do not reflect the opinion of the people at all.
Historian I. Feldmanis cites the following fact: the Soviet news agency TASS gave information about the election results 12 hours before the start of the vote count. He also supports his words with the opinion of Dietrich A. Leber (a lawyer, a former soldier of the sabotage and reconnaissance battalion Branderurg 800), that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were illegally annexed, from which it can be concluded that the solution to the issue of elections in these countries were predetermined.


According to another version, during the Second World War, in an emergency situation when France and Poland were defeated, the USSR, in order to prevent the Baltic countries from passing into German possession, put forward political demands to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which meant a change of power in these countries and in essence are also annexation. There is also an opinion that Stalin, despite military actions, was going to annex the Baltic countries to the USSR, but military actions simply made this process faster.
In the historical and legal literature one can find the opinions of authors that the basic agreements between the Baltic countries and the USSR are not valid (they contradict international norms), since they were imposed by force. Before the outbreak of World War II, not every annexation was considered invalid and controversial.