Kursk Bulge in brief about the battle

• Advance of the German army
• Advance of the Red Army
• General results
• About the Battle of Kursk even briefly
• Video about the Battle of Kursk

How did the Battle of Kursk begin?

• Hitler decided that it was at the location of the Kursk Bulge that a turning point in the seizure of territory should occur. The operation was called “Citadel” and was supposed to involve the Voronezh and Central fronts.
• But, in one thing, Hitler was right, Zhukov and Vasilevsky agreed with him, the Kursk Bulge was supposed to become one of the main battles and, undoubtedly, the main thing, of the ones now coming.
• This is exactly how Zhukov and Vasilevsky reported to Stalin. Zhukov was able to roughly estimate the possible forces of the invaders.

• German weapons were updated and increased in volume. Thus, a grandiose mobilization was carried out. The Soviet army, namely those fronts that the Germans were counting on, were approximately equal in their equipment.
• In some measures, the Russians were winning.
• In addition to the Central and Voronezh fronts (under the command of Rokossovsky and Vatutin, respectively), there was also a secret front - Stepnoy, under the command of Konev, about which the enemy knew nothing.
• The steppe front became insurance for two main directions.
• The Germans had been preparing for this offensive since the spring. But when they launched an attack in the summer, it was not an unexpected blow for the Red Army.
• The Soviet army also did not sit idle. Eight defensive lines were built at the supposed site of the battle.

Combat tactics on the Kursk Bulge

• It was thanks to the developed qualities of a military leader and the work of intelligence that the command of the Soviet army was able to understand the enemy’s plans and the defense-offensive plan came up just right.
• Defensive lines were built with the help of the population living near the battle site.
  The German side built a plan in such a way that the Kursk Bulge should help make the front line more even.
• If this succeeded, then the next stage would be to develop an offensive into the center of the state.

Advance of the German army

Advance of the Red Army

General results

Reconnaissance as an important part of the Battle of Kursk

About the Battle of Kursk even briefly
One of the largest battlefields during the Great Patriotic War was the Kursk Bulge. The battle is summarized below.

All fighting, which occurred during the Battle of Kursk, took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The German command hoped during this battle to destroy all Soviet troops representing the Central and Voronezh fronts. At that time they were actively defending Kursk. If the Germans had been successful in this battle, the initiative in the war would have returned to the Germans. In order to implement their plans, the German command allocated more than 900 thousand soldiers, 10 thousand guns of various calibers, and 2.7 thousand tanks and 2050 aircraft were allocated in support. New Tiger and Panther class tanks took part in this battle, as well as new Focke-Wulf 190 A fighters and Heinkel 129 attack aircraft.

The command of the Soviet Union hoped to bleed the enemy during its offensive, and then carry out a large-scale counterattack. Thus, the Germans did exactly what the Soviet army expected. The scale of the battle was truly enormous; the Germans sent almost their entire army and all available tanks to attack. However, the Soviet troops faced death, and the defensive lines were not surrendered. On the Central Front, the enemy advanced 10-12 kilometers; on Voronezh, the enemy’s penetration depth was 35 kilometers, but the Germans were unable to advance further.

The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was determined by the battle of tanks near the village of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12. This was the largest battle of tank forces in history; more than 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units were thrown into battle. On this day, German troops lost more than 400 tanks and the invaders were driven back. After this, Soviet troops launched an active offensive, and on August 23, the Battle of Kursk was over with the liberation of Kharkov, and with this event, the further defeat of Germany became inevitable.

Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad, where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.

The main idea of ​​the Citadel was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled guns. Hitler had no doubt about his success. But the General Staff of the Soviet Army developed a plan aimed at liberating Russian troops and defending the battle.

The battle received its interesting name in the form of the Battle of the Kursk Bulge due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.

Changing the course of the Great Patriotic War and deciding the fate of Russian cities such as Orel and Belgorod was entrusted to the armies “Center”, “South” and the task force “Kempf”. Detachments of the Central Front were assigned to the defense of Orel, and detachments of the Voronezh Front were assigned to the defense of Belgorod.

Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the destruction of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel area, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Fronts, switching to Operation Kutuzov. In three days, from July 16 to 18, the Central Front liquidated the Nazi group. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and were thus driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.

Results of the Battle of Kursk (briefly).

• a sharp turn in the course of events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the Nazis failed to carry out their Operation Citadel, at the global level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
• the fascists found themselves morally depressed, all confidence in their superiority disappeared.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk.

After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative into its own hands and continued to advance to the West, liberating Russian cities.

The beginning of the combat path of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

The defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 shook the fascist bloc to its core. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, Hitler's Germany faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat in all its inevitability. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and its prestige in the eyes of its allies was seriously shaken. In order to improve the internal political situation in Germany and prevent the collapse of the fascist coalition, the Nazi command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation on the central section of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive they hoped to defeat the group Soviet troops, located on the Kursk salient, to again seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in forces and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people by 1.1 times, in artillery by 1.7 times, in tanks by 1.4 times and in combat aircraft by 2 times.

The Battle of Kursk ranks in the Great Patriotic War special place. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its ferocity and tenacity of struggle.

Wehrmacht goal: The general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk area. If successful, it was planned to expand the offensive front and regain the strategic initiative. To implement his plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike forces, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. Great hopes were placed on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter aircraft and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.

The goal of the Red Army: The Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy’s strike forces in defensive battles and then launch a counteroffensive.

The battle that began immediately took on a grand scale and was extremely tense. Our troops did not flinch. They faced avalanches of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented tenacity and courage. The advance of enemy strike forces was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to wedge into our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - 10-12 kilometers, on Voronezh - up to 35 kilometers. Hitler's Operation Citadel, the largest in the entire Second World War, finally buried world war oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka. It happened on July 12. 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it on both sides. This battle was won by Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks during the day of battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.

On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of Soviet troops. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of war. From that time on, artillery salutes constantly announced the glorious victories of Soviet weapons. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated.

Thus ended the Battle of the Kursk Arc of Fire. During it, 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. Nazi troops lost about 500 thousand people, 1,500 tanks, 3 thousand guns and 3,700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers who took part in the Battle of the Arc of Fire were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Red Army.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk.

UDTK on the Kursk Bulge. Orlovskaya offensive

The 30th Ural Volunteer received baptism of fire in the Battle of Kursk tank corps, part of the 4th Tank Army.

T-34 tanks - 202 units, T-70 - 7, BA-64 armored vehicles - 68,

self-propelled 122 mm guns - 16, 85 mm guns - 12,

M-13 installations - 8, 76 mm guns - 24, 45 mm guns - 32,

37 mm guns - 16, 120 mm mortars - 42, 82 mm mortars - 52.

The army, commanded by Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, arrived on the Bryansk Front on the eve of the fighting that began on July 5, 1943, and during the counter-offensive of Soviet troops it was brought into battle in the Oryol direction. The Ural Volunteer Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Semenovich Rodin had the task: advancing from the Seredichi area to the south, cut off enemy communications on the Bolkhov-Khotynets line, reach the area of ​​​​the village of Zlyn, and then straddle the Orel-Bryansk railway and highway and cut off the escape route of the Oryol group of Nazis to the west. And the Urals carried out the order.

On July 29, Lieutenant General Rodin assigned the task to the 197th Sverdlovsk and 243rd Molotov tank brigades: to cross the Nugr River in cooperation with the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MSBR), capture the village of Borilovo and then advance towards the village of Vishnevsky. The village of Borilovo was located on a high bank and dominated the surrounding area, and from the bell tower of the church it was visible for several kilometers in circumference. All this made it easier for the enemy to conduct defense and complicated the actions of the advancing corps units. At 20:00 on July 29, after a 30-minute artillery barrage and a volley of guards mortars, two tank motorized rifle brigades began crossing the Nugr River. Under the cover of tank fire, the company of Senior Lieutenant A.P. Nikolaev, as on the Ors River, was the first to cross the Nugr River, capturing the southern outskirts of the village of Borilovo. By the morning of July 30, the battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, with the support of tanks, despite stubborn enemy resistance, captured the village of Borilovo. All units of the Sverdlovsk brigade of the 30th UDTK were concentrated here. By order of the corps commander, at 10:30 the brigade began an offensive in the direction of height 212.2. The assault was difficult. It was completed by the 244th Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade, which was previously in the reserve of the 4th Army, brought into battle.

Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Petrovich Nikolaev, company commander of a motorized rifle battalion of the 197th Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

On July 31, in liberated Borilov, the heroically killed tank crews and machine gunners were buried, including tank battalion commanders: Major Chazov and Captain Ivanov. The massive heroism of the corps soldiers shown in the battles from July 27 to 29 was highly appreciated. In the Sverdlovsk brigade alone, 55 soldiers, sergeants and officers were awarded government awards for these battles. In the battle for Borilovo, Sverdlovsk medical instructor Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova accomplished a feat. She rescued the wounded and, replacing incapacitated artillerymen, brought shells to firing positions. A. A. Kvanskova was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and was subsequently awarded the Order of Glory III and II degrees for her heroism.

Guard Sergeant Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova assists the lieutenantA.A.Lysin, 1944.

Photo by M. Insarov, 1944. CDOOSO. F.221. OP.3.D.1672

The exceptional courage of the Ural warriors, their willingness to carry out a combat mission without sparing their lives, aroused admiration. But mixed with it was the pain of the losses suffered. It seemed that they were too large compared to the results achieved.

A column of German prisoners of war captured in battles in the Oryol direction, USSR, 1943.

Damaged German equipment during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, USSR, 1943.

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict Soviet Union a major defeat and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed Citadel, were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to transition to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to advance in the area Kursk Bulge, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once was achieved.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

At this time, new combat aircraft entered service with the German Air Force: Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use of La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters by the Soviet Air Force took place.

On May 6-8, Soviet aviation with the forces of six air armies struck on a 1200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast Sea of ​​Azov. The targets for this strike were German Air Force airfields. On the one hand, this really made it possible to inflict some damage on both vehicles and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aviation suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.

In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railways, bridges, and places where Soviet forces were concentrated. It is worth noting that German aviation was often more successful. Claims about this were expressed by units of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops failed to achieve serious damage and disruption of the communication routes of the Red Army.

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this event was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the German troops suffered significant damage. However, apparently, it was not possible to cause much damage. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

Aviation was supposed to support Soviet troops in countering the artillery attack, but due to the dark time of day, all flights were canceled. At 2:30 on July 5, the aviation units received a readiness directive from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, fighter units had to be ready at dawn to repel possible Luftwaffe raids, and attack aircraft and bombers were required to be combat ready by 6:00 am.

Early in the morning, Soviet fighters began fighting German bombers and attack aircraft. In the Maloarkhangelsk area, German Ju-88s, operating under the cover of Focke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. The pilots of the 157th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost its unit commander, Hermann Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.

Until half past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel Luftwaffe attacks. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air has also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to fly in groups of 6-8 fighters: an organizational error made by the aviation command had an impact. This led to serious difficulties for the Red Army Air Force fighters. In general, during the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the mistakes mentioned above, the lack of experience of many Soviet pilots also had an impact.

On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps near Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st Bomber Division flew sorties until the afternoon, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan and other populated areas. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed Soviet positions. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by ground forces.

Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also at the same time to try to change the tactics of using aviation. They tried to send large groups of fighters ahead of the bombers to “clear” the airspace. Commanders of air divisions and regiments began to receive more initiative when planning operations. But during operations, pilots had to act in accordance with given goals, without being distracted from the plan.

In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army flew about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy losses, but did everything possible to provide adequate support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of fighting, the army command changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive attacks on concentrations of enemy equipment and manpower. These attacks had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoe. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

Air support for the Red Army units on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was provided by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. Early in the morning of July 5, German aircraft began bombing the battle formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. The sorties of fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite significant damage on the enemy, but the losses of Soviet troops were also high.

On July 6, German tanks launched an assault on the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among other Soviet units, the 291st Assault and 2nd Guards Assault Air Divisions of the 16th Air Army should be noted, which for the first time used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy equipment was described as "excellent".

The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th Army. However, here too the command tried to adjust the tactics of using aircraft, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible and strive with all its might to increase the efficiency of air force operations. Apparently, these measures achieved their goal. Increasingly, words began to appear in the reports of commanders of ground units that Soviet attack aircraft made it much easier to repel German tank and infantry attacks. The fighters also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Thus, it was noted that only the 5th Fighter Air Corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 downed enemy aircraft.

On July 10, bad weather set in on the Kursk Bulge. This sharply reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5s from the 193rd Fighter Regiment, who managed to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with a cover of six Bf.109s. Enemy planes randomly dropped bombs and began to retreat to their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. A heroic feat in this battle was performed by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went into the oncoming ram of a Messerschmitt and died.

On July 12, at the height of the Battle of Prokhorov, aircraft on both sides could provide only very limited support to ground units: weather conditions continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties on that day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. However, in the reports of German pilots there is no mention of those destroyed Soviet tanks. Subsequently, the superiority in the air on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the German 8th Air Corps had dropped to almost zero.

The idea of ​​attacking near Kursk and cutting off the bulge of the Soviet front that had formed here arose among Hitler and his military during the Wehrmacht counteroffensive near Kharkov in February-March 1943. This counteroffensive showed that the German army was still capable of seizing the strategic initiative. In addition, the Soviet command was afraid of repeating its mistake in the spring of 1942, when attempts to attack first led to a heavy defeat near Kharkov, which determined the unsuccessful course of the entire summer campaign of 1942. The Red Army has so far been very bad at conducting an offensive in the summer.

At the suggestion of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky this time was supposed to give the initiative of offensive actions to the enemy in advance, wear him down with stubborn defense and, after suffering heavy losses, launch a counterattack. It was no secret that the Germans would attack near Kursk.

This plan aroused objections from the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, who had to repel a German attack south of Kursk. In his opinion, giving the initiative to the enemy was inappropriate. The condition of the Soviet troops and the balance of forces at the front made it possible to launch an assault. Waiting for a German strike meant, Vatutin believed, wasting time. Vatutin proposed to strike the Germans first if they did not go on the offensive before the beginning of July. Stalin instructed the commanders of the Central and Reserve (Steppe) Fronts K.K. Rokossovsky and R.Ya. Malinovsky to present his thoughts on this issue. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky defended the previously proposed plan. The Soviet offensive was supposed to begin only after the German one had broken down.