The “thaw” that occurred in the socialist camp after the death of Stalin (1953) affected Hungary especially deeply. In July 1953, the new government headed by I. Nagy took the path of abandoning the course of accelerated industrialization and Soviet-style collectivization. A revival of public life began in the country, and political prisoners were released. The “New Deal” was initially supported by the leadership of the USSR, but soon caused obvious concern in Moscow. As a result of the counter-offensive of pro-Soviet forces led by the first secretary of the central leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), M. Rakosi, in the spring of 1955, I. Nagy was removed from his post. The attempt at counter-reforms gave impetus to the formation of an internal party opposition, which intensified after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956). Its main forum was the discussion club of young intellectuals - the Petofi Circle. The USSR Ambassador to Hungary Yu. V. Andropov defended the interests of conservative forces in the Hungarian leadership. However, A. I. Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, who visited Budapest in July 1956, gave Moscow’s consent to Rakosi’s resignation.
In October, tensions increased and a demonstration of many thousands took place (October 6). A demonstration in support of reform forces in Poland that began on October 13 in Budapest developed into an armed uprising. Enter Soviet troops in Budapest, for the purpose of intimidation, on the night of October 24, he gave the uprising a clearly defined national character. Throughout Hungary, party-state structures were collapsing, power passed to spontaneously formed revolutionary committees and workers' councils, and a multi-party system was being revived. On October 24, I. Nagy again headed the government. He approached the rebels and recognized the legitimacy of the demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and the holding of free elections.

The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, was initially inclined to search for political means of resolving the conflict. But the Suez crisis at the end of October (the aggression of Great Britain, France and Israel against Egypt, which nationalized the Suez Canal) was perceived by Moscow as a symptom of the unacceptable weakening of Soviet influence in the world, thereby prompting the leadership of the CPSU to demonstrate military power in Hungary.
On October 31, a decision was made on a new military action. On November 1, as a sign of protest against the introduction of new troops from the USSR, I. Nagy proclaims Hungary’s withdrawal from the Organization Warsaw Pact and appeals to the UN for the protection of sovereignty. On November 4, his government was overthrown as a result of the Soviet offensive on Budapest. The fighting with the participation of 17 Soviet divisions continued until November 10-11. As a result of the Hungarian events, about 3 thousand people died (about 2 thousand 400 Hungarians and about 600 military personnel of the Soviet Army). More than 190 thousand Hungarians emigrated. I. Nagy and some ministers from his government were convicted and executed (1958). The government that replaced it, J. Kadar, formed in Moscow, restored the one-party system with the support of the USSR.

The actions of the USSR in Hungary were condemned by the world community, which at the same time dissociated itself from a number of violent actions committed by the rebels. The Hungarian events showed the limits of Khrushchev’s “thaw”, the inability of the USSR leadership to make a decisive break with Stalin’s methods of foreign policy.

The fear of developments following the “Hungarian model” in the event of loss of control over the progress of reforms formed the “Hungarian syndrome” in the minds of the Soviet partyocracy, which narrowed the field of activity for reforming socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself.

On October 23, 1956, an armed uprising began in the Hungarian People's Republic, known as the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, or the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

The impetus for these events was personnel changes in the government of the republic. Or rather, the change of heads of state.

Until July 1953, the Hungarian Workers' Party and at the same time the government was headed by Matthias Rakosi, nicknamed "Stalin's best student."

After the death of the Soviet leader, Moscow decided that Rakosi was too fanatical, which did not contribute to the popularization of the Soviet model of building the future. In his place, the Hungarian communist Imre Nagy was appointed, who carried out a number of popular measures to improve the socio-economic situation in the country. In particular, to “improve the lives of the people,” taxes were reduced, salaries were increased, and land use principles were liberalized.

Nagy lasted in power for less than two years; according to the generally accepted version, an overly independent and democratic politician again did not suit Moscow.

Destroyed buildings due to unrest in central Budapest during the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet-backed communist regime in 1956. © Laszlo Almasi/Reuters

András Hegedüs was replaced in his place, and Nagy was removed from his post and expelled from the party. Hegedüs led the country along the previous Stalinist course, which caused discontent among large sections of the population, who already considered Hungary’s socialist course a mistake. There were demands for alternative elections and the return to power of Imre Nagy.

The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Labor Party, who remained “Stalin’s best student” Matthias Rakosi. He was replaced by Ernő Görö (former Minister of State Security).

The mutilated corpse of a state security officer hanged upside down. Budapest, 1956.

The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznan uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia.

Student demonstration in Hungary.

The subversive work of Western intelligence services also played a role. MI6 documents, declassified 40 years later, admitted that since 1954, anti-Soviet dissidents had been transported across the border to Austria, into the British zone of occupation, where they were trained in military and subversive warfare. Also, since 1955, American intelligence has been preparing detachments of Hungarian emigrants for secret actions in their country.

Soviet soldiers! We are fighting for our homeland, for Hungarian freedom! Do not shoot!

On October 23, a demonstration began, in which about a thousand people took part, including students and members of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags and banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc.

Hungarian uprising of 1956.

Radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Ernő Görö, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

Central radio station in Budapest after shelling. © Laszlo Almasi/Reuters

In response to this, a large group of demonstrators stormed the broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the program demands of the demonstrators be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units AVH defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21 hours. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.

Thanks to the efforts of provocateurs, the protests grew into real riots. The crowd turned their weapons against their communist opponents and the neutral Soviet army stationed in the country. Numerous victims appeared.

The new Hungarian government turned for support to the UN and NATO states, which did not dare to provide direct military assistance, given the enormous military power of the Soviet Union, with which there were tacit agreements.

The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel and then NATO members Great Britain and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops.

Hungarian freedom fighters in Budapest near a Soviet tank.

On October 31, Nikita Khrushchev said at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee: “If we leave Hungary, this will encourage the American, British and French imperialists. They will understand [this] as our weakness and will attack.” It was decided to create a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government” led by Janos Kadar and carry out a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. The plan for the operation, called “Whirlwind,” was developed under the leadership of the USSR Minister of Defense Georgy Zhukov. The USSR Ambassador to Hungary at that time was Yuri Andropov.

By November 8, after fierce fighting, the last centers of resistance of the rebels were destroyed. Members of Imre Nagy's government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. On November 10, workers' councils and student groups approached the Soviet command with a ceasefire proposal. Armed resistance ceased.

After November 10, until mid-December, the workers' councils continued their work, often entering into direct negotiations with the command of Soviet units. However, by December 19, 1956, the workers' councils were dispersed by state security agencies and their leaders were arrested.

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian secret services and their Soviet colleagues arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”

Reconstruction of the Hungarian uprising in modern times. © Laszlo Balogh/Reuters

Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, ​​where they were hiding, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and fighting on both sides, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 people were injured between October 23 and December 31, 1956.

The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 people missing, 1540 wounded.

Imre Nagy's grave. © Laszlo Balogh/Reuters

In the official historiography of socialist Hungary, the rebellion was called “counter-revolutionary”.

October 23 became a public holiday in Hungary, established in memory of two revolutions - 1956 and 1989.

Introduction

Hungarian uprising of 1956 (October 23 - November 9, 1956) (in the communist period of Hungary known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Soviet sources as the Hungarian counter-revolutionary uprising of 1956) - armed uprisings against the regime of people's democracy in Hungary, accompanied by massacres of communists from the VPT , employees of the State Security Administration (AVH) and internal affairs (about 800 people).

The Hungarian uprising was one of the important events of the Cold War period, demonstrating that the USSR was ready to maintain the inviolability of the Warsaw Pact (WPT) with military force.

1. Prerequisites

The uprising, which in the USSR and Hungary until 1991 was called a counter-revolutionary revolt, in modern Hungary - a revolution, was largely caused by the difficult economic situation of the local population.

In World War II, Hungary took part on the side of the fascist bloc, its troops participated in the occupation of the territory of the USSR, and three SS divisions were formed from Hungarians. In 1944-1945, Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. But it was on the territory of Hungary, in the area of ​​Lake Balaton, in the spring of 1945 that Nazi troops launched the last counteroffensive in their history.

After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Small Farmers received a majority. However, the coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, which was headed by the Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave half the seats in the cabinet to the winning majority, while key posts remained with the Hungarian Communist Party.

The communists, with the support of Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by communists. The Matthias Rakosi regime was established in Hungary. Collectivization was carried out, a policy of forced industrialization was launched, for which there were no natural, financial and human resources; Mass repressions carried out by AVH began against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime and many other opponents of the new government.

Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to up to a quarter of GDP.

On the other hand, the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU gave rise to attempts at liberation from communists in all Eastern European states, one of the most striking manifestations of which was the rehabilitation and return to power of the Polish reformer Wladyslaw Gomulka in October 1956.

An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955, neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of a peace treaty, allied occupation forces were withdrawn (Soviet troops had been stationed in Hungary since 1944).

A certain role was played by the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI6, which trained numerous cadres of “people's rebels” at its secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary

2. Strengths of the parties

More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).

2.1. Soviet units and formations that took part in the Hungarian events

Special building:

• 2nd Guards Mechanized Division (Nikolaev-Budapest)

  11th Guards Mechanized Division (after 1957 - 30th Guards Tank Division)

  17th Guards Mechanized Division (Yenakievo-Danube)

  33rd Guards Mechanized Division (Kherson)

  128th Guards Rifle Division (after 1957 - 128th Guards Motorized Rifle Division)

7th Guards Airborne Division

• 80th Parachute Regiment

  108th Parachute Regiment

31st Guards Airborne Division

• 114th Parachute Regiment

  381st Parachute Regiment

8th Mechanized Army of the Carpathian Military District (after 1957 - 8th Tank Army)

38th Army of the Carpathian Military District

• 13th Guards Mechanized Division (Poltava) (after 1957 - 21st Guards Tank Division)

  27th Mechanized Division (Cherkasy) (after 1957 - 27th Motorized Rifle Division)

In total, the following took part in the operation:

personnel - 31550 people

tanks and self-propelled guns - 1130

guns and mortars - 615

anti-aircraft guns - 185

• cars - 3830

3. Beginning

The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Labor Party, Matthias Rakosi, who was replaced by Ernő Gerő (former Minister of State Security).

The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznan uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the Petőfi Circle began to actively operate, in which the most pressing problems facing Hungary were discussed.

On October 16, 1956, some university students in Szeged organized an organized exit from the pro-communist “Democratic Youth Union” (the Hungarian equivalent of the Komsomol) and revived the “Union of Students of Hungarian Universities and Academies,” which existed after the war and was dispersed by the government. Within a few days, branches of the Union appeared in Pec, Miskolc and other cities.

Finally, on October 22, students from the Budapest University of Technology (at that time the Budapest University of Construction Industry) joined this movement and formulated a list of 16 demands to the authorities (the immediate convening of an extraordinary party congress, the appointment of Imre Nagy as prime minister, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country , destruction of the monument to Stalin, etc.) and planned for October 23 a protest march from the monument to Bem (Polish general, hero of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848) to the monument to Petőfi.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon a demonstration began, in which about a thousand people took part - including students and members of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. On the squares of Jasai Mari, on the Fifteenth of March, on the streets of Kossuth and Rakoczi, radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were put forward for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Erne Gere, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

In response to this, a large group of demonstrators stormed the broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the program demands of the demonstrators be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units AVH defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21:00. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.

Fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels and not to interfere with their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the headquarters for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.

At 11 p.m., based on the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin moving to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops “in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative work.” Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest at 6 a.m. and began fighting with the rebels.

On the night of October 23, 1956, the leadership of the Hungarian communist party it was decided to appoint Imre Nagy as Prime Minister, who had already held this post in 1953-1955, distinguished by his reformist views, for which he was repressed, but shortly before the uprising he was rehabilitated. Imre Nagy was often accused of sending a formal request to Soviet troops to help suppress the uprising without his participation. His supporters claim that this decision was made behind his back by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Ernő Gerő and former Prime Minister András Hegedüs, and Nagy himself was opposed to the involvement of Soviet troops.

On the night of October 24, about 6,000 Soviet army troops, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, and 156 guns were brought into Budapest. In the evening they were joined by units of the 3rd Rifle Corps of the Hungarian People's Army (HPA). Some of the Hungarian military personnel and police went over to the side of the rebels.

Members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov, KGB Chairman I. A. Serov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Army General M. S. Malinin arrived in Budapest.

In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, joining the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, resulting in 61 people killed and 284 wounded on both sides.

Ernő Gerő was replaced as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party by Janos Kadar and went to the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Szolnok. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio, addressing the warring parties with a proposal to cease fire.

Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that “the government condemns the views that view the current anti-popular movement as a counter-revolution.” The government announced a ceasefire and the start of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Imre Nagy abolished the AVH. The fighting in the streets stopped, and for the first time in the past five days, silence reigned on the streets of Budapest. Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. It seemed that the revolution had won.

József Dudas and his militants seized the editorial office of the newspaper Szabad nep, where Dudas began publishing his own newspaper. Dudas announced the non-recognition of the government of Imre Nagy and the formation of his own administration.

In the morning, all Soviet troops were withdrawn to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left virtually without power. Some prisons associated with the repressive AVH were captured by the rebels. The security offered virtually no resistance and partially fled.

Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. Locally, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils that were not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.

Béla Kiray's guards and Dudas' troops executed communists, AVH employees and Hungarian military personnel who refused to submit to them. In total, 37 people died as a result of lynchings.

The uprising, having achieved certain temporary successes, quickly radicalized - there were murders of communists, employees of the AVH and the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and shelling of Soviet military camps.

By order of October 30, Soviet military personnel were prohibited from returning fire, “succumbing to provocations,” and leaving the unit’s location.

There were recorded cases of murders of Soviet military personnel on leave and sentries in various cities of Hungary.

The Budapest City Committee of the VPT was captured by the rebels, and over 20 communists were hanged by the crowd. Photos of hanged communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the whole world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.

There was little Nagy could do. The uprising spread to other cities and spread... The country quickly fell into chaos. Railway communications were interrupted, airports stopped operating, shops, shops and banks were closed. The rebels scoured the streets, catching state security officers. They were recognized by their famous yellow boots, torn into pieces or hung by the legs, sometimes castrated. The captured party leaders were nailed to the floors with huge nails, with portraits of Lenin placed in their hands.

On October 30, the government of Imre Nagy decided to restore the multi-party system in Hungary and create a coalition government of representatives of the VPT, the Independent Party of Smallholders, the National Peasant Party and the reconstituted Social Democratic Party. It was announced that free elections would be held.

4. Re-entry of Soviet troops

The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel and then NATO members Great Britain and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops.

On October 31, Khrushchev at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee said: “If we leave Hungary, this will encourage the American, British and French imperialists. They will understand our weakness and will attack.” It was decided to create a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government” headed by J. Kadar and conduct a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. Plan of the operation, called " Vortex", was developed under the leadership of the USSR Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov.

On November 1, the Hungarian government, when Soviet troops were ordered not to leave the units’ locations, decided to terminate the Warsaw Pact by Hungary and presented a corresponding note to the USSR Embassy. At the same time, Hungary turned to the UN asking for help in protecting its neutrality. Measures were also taken to protect Budapest in the event of a “possible external attack.”

In Tekel near Budapest, right during the negotiations, the new Minister of Defense of Hungary, Lieutenant General Pal Maleter, was arrested by the USSR KGB.

Early in the morning of November 4, new Soviet military units began entering Hungary under the overall command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the Soviet Operation Whirlwind began. Officially, Soviet troops invaded Hungary at the invitation of the government hastily created by János Kádar. The main objects in Budapest were captured. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio:

Units of the "Hungarian national guard"and individual army units tried to resist the Soviet troops to no avail.

Soviet troops carried out artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent mopping-up operations with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the suburbs of Budapest, where local councils managed to lead more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.

Fights in the streets.

5. The end

By November 8, after fierce fighting, the last centers of resistance of the rebels were destroyed. Members of Imre Nagy's government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. On November 10, workers' councils and student groups approached the Soviet command with a ceasefire proposal. Armed resistance ceased.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov “for the suppression of the Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion” received the 4th star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Ivan Serov in December 1956 received the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

After November 10, until mid-December, the workers' councils continued their work, often entering into direct negotiations with the command of Soviet units. However, by December 19, 1956, the workers' councils were dispersed by state security agencies and their leaders were arrested.

Hungarians emigrated en masse - almost 200,000 people (5% of the total population) left the country, for whom refugee camps had to be created in Austria in Traiskirchen and Graz.

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian secret services and their Soviet colleagues arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”

Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, ​​where they were hiding, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.

After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were ceremonially reburied in July 1989. Since that time, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.

6. Losses of the parties

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and hostilities on both sides, during the period from October 23 to December 31, 1956, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 were injured.

The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.

7. Consequences

The Hungarian events had a significant impact on the internal life of the USSR. The party leadership was frightened by the fact that the liberalization of the regime in Hungary led to open anti-communist protests and, accordingly, the liberalization of the regime in the USSR could lead to the same consequences. On December 19, 1956, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee approved the text of the Letter of the CPSU Central Committee “On strengthening the political work of party organizations among the masses and suppressing the attacks of anti-Soviet, hostile elements.” It said:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to appeal to all party organizations ... in order to attract the attention of the party and mobilize communists to strengthen political work among the masses, to resolutely fight to suppress the attacks of anti-Soviet elements, which have recently, due to some aggravation of international situation, intensified their hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state " Further, it was said about the recent “ intensification of the activities of anti-Soviet and hostile elements " First of all, this " counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people ", conceived under the sign " false slogans of freedom and democracy " using " discontent of a significant part of the population caused by serious mistakes made by the former state and party leadership of Hungary.

also stated:

Recently, among individual literary and art workers, slipping from party positions, politically immature and philistine-minded, there have been attempts to question the correctness of the party line in the development of Soviet literature and art, to move away from the principles of socialist realism to the position of unidealized art, and demands have been put forward to “liberate” literature and art from the party leadership, to ensure “freedom of creativity”, understood in the bourgeois-anarchist, individualistic spirit.

A direct consequence of this letter was a significant increase in 1957 in the number of people convicted “for counter-revolutionary crimes” (2948 people, which is 4 times more than in 1956). Students who made any critical statements on this topic were expelled from the institutes.

There is still no consensus in Hungary regarding the assessment of the events of 1956. As Russian media have repeatedly reported, in 2006, during the celebration of the 50th anniversary, many residents of the country (about 50%), primarily in remote and rural areas, still perceive them as a fascist rebellion inspired by milestone. This happens, in particular, because the country's rural residents received a lot from the nationalization of landowners' lands as a result of the communists coming to power. And many of the organizers of the rebellion, including Imre Nagy, constantly called for the return of the land to the previous owners. It is also worth recalling that the Hungarian workers’ squads played an active role in suppressing the rebellion.

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HUNGARY. 1956

Brief historical and geographical information Hungary - a country in the middle reaches of the Danube. In ancient times, its territory was part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dacia. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Avar Khaganate formed there, which was defeated in the 8th century. Charlemagne, and in the 9th century. The Great Moravian Empire of the Western Slavs arose. In 896, tribes of Hungarians (Magyars) migrated to these lands from the southern Russian steppes under the leadership of Prince Arpad, who founded the dynasty. This year is considered the date of the “finding of a homeland” by the Hungarians and the beginning of their statehood, recognized by the King of Germany and Italy, Arnulf. In 1241 the country was devastated by the Mongols, then a threat arose from Ottoman Empire . The death of the Hungarian king Louis (Lajos) II in the battle with the Turks at Mohács in 1526 led to the division of the kingdom between the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Sultanate. By 1711, the entire country came under the rule of the Habsburgs, which remained part of their empire until the beginning of the 20th century. Defeat in the First World War led to the establishment in November 1918 of an independent democratic republic, which was established in 1919 a short time

replaced by the communist government of Bela Kun. From 1920 to 1944, Hungary (nominally a monarchy) was ruled by regent Miklós Horthy, who received dictatorial powers. During World War II, Hungary sided with Germany and its allies, after whose defeat it was occupied by the USSR. It was declared a republic in 1946 and became a one-party communist state in 1949.

As you know, at the final stage of World War II, not without the help of I.V. Stalin at the head of the Hungarian Working People's Party (HWP) and the country was a group of former Comintern leaders led by the “true Stalinist” Matthias Rakosi, who returned to their homeland from Moscow emigration. According to Henry A. Kissinger, a foreign policy adviser to American presidents in the 1950s and 1960s, back in the 1930s, Rakosi was literally ransomed by Stalin from a Budapest prison in exchange for Hungarian banners taken as trophies by the Tsarist troops in 1849.

After several years of their leadership of the country, serious signs of a socio-political crisis appeared in Hungary, expressed in dissatisfaction with the authorities, methods of government, and copying the experience of the USSR without taking into account national characteristics.

The political situation in the country was also aggravated by economic problems - wage cuts, rising prices and, against this background, a falling standard of living of the population. The forced industrialization and campaign to create agricultural cooperatives launched by the country's leadership sparked popular protest against socialist forms of management. The Soviet leadership, which closely followed the developments in Hungary, assessed the catastrophic consequences of M. Rakosi's rule, and took emergency measures to normalize the situation in the country. The Hungarian leaders, summoned to Moscow, were subjected to severe criticism at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held on June 13, 1953 - for mistakes made, usurpation of power, repression and a difficult socio-economic situation.

The result of the meeting was the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), who was tasked with proclaiming changes, which included a number of transformations to mitigate totalitarian pressure on society, reforms in the economy and democratization of the existing political system.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to briefly characterize Imre Nagy, who became main figure in the events that soon followed.

Imre Nagy was born on June 7, 1896 in the city of Kaposvár in the family of storekeeper József Nagy and housekeeper Rosalia Scharinger. He studied at a higher commercial school, from where he joined the Austro-Hungarian army in 1915. In July 1916, during the Brusilov breakthrough, he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Russians. He was in camps near Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude), in auxiliary work in Baikal villages, and in Irkutsk. In March 1918 he joined the international Red Guard detachment, in which he served until September of the same year. Here he was accepted into the Hungarian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b). According to some information, he took part in the suppression of the rebellion by the White Cossacks in Verkhneudinsk, battles with the Whites near Irkutsk. The scale of this participation and Nagy’s personal contribution are unknown. In September 1918, the detachment , in which he was located, laid down his arms, and Nagy, along with other former prisoners of war, was returned to his former place of residence, where he worked before the defeat of Kolchak. With the arrival of the Reds in Irkutsk, Nagy became active and joined the Hungarian Red Guard squad, and in the summer of 1920. from March 1921 to March 1921, he served in the special department of the Irkutsk Cheka. In those years, with a shortage of competent personnel, “internationalist fighters” were considered “reliable comrades”, ready to carry out any order. They were not connected by national ties with the local population, and did not differ in relation to them. them with excessive sentimentality and therefore willingly enrolled in ordinary work in the security forces. This is how the “internationalist” period in the life of Imre Nagy ends.

In 1921, after a short stay in Moscow, Nagy was sent by the Hungarian section of the Comintern to work underground in Hungary. There is little information about this period of his life in Russian archives. Nevertheless, several interesting facts are known. In particular, about the patronage of his closest associates in the underground struggle in Hungary, N. Tiriner and A. Molnar, to the Comintern, after his return to Moscow in 1929. In fact, they turned out to be provocateurs and agents of the Hungarian police, “surrendering” their comrades in the revolutionary movement. Nagy survived, which gave rise to unkind rumors in the circles of the Hungarian emigration. Perhaps these rumors were the reason for Nadia’s refusal to join the GPU staff. In addition, in the archival materials there are documents indicating that the security officers were unpleasantly impressed by Nagy’s “persistent attempts to get a job as a staff member of the GPU.” Instead of enlisting in the cadre, Nadya was offered to become a secret agent (secret informant), to which he agreed on January 17, 1933. Quite a lot of material has been preserved about his work on organs. There is, for example, a document indicating that in 1939 Nagy proposed that the NKVD “develop” 38 Hungarian political emigrants, including F. Münnich. In another list, he names 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Germans, and Italians he knows, with whom, if necessary, he could “work.”

According to reports from Nadya (pseudonym - “Volodya”), several groups of political emigrants, consisting of members of the Hungarian, German and other communist parties, were convicted. All of them were accused of “anti-Soviet”, “terrorist” and “counter-revolutionary” activities (cases “Agrarians”, “Incorrigible”, “Agony of the Doomed” and others). Another document (June 1940) indicates that Nagy “gave materials” on 15 arrested “enemies of the people” who worked at the International Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of "Volodya" led to the arrest of the famous scientist E. Varga, a number of leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party (B. Varga-Vago, G. Farkas, E. Neumann, F. Gabor and others). Some of them were shot, some were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and exile. In a letter from the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov to the CPSU Central Committee “On archival materials about the activities of Imre Nagy in the USSR,” prepared in June 1989, it was noted: “From the available archival materials it does not follow that Nagy collaborated with the NKVD under duress. Moreover , the documents directly indicate that “Volodya” shows great interest and initiative in his work, and is a qualified agent.”

But let's return to the events of the 1950s.

As a result of the decisions of the June (1953) plenum of the CR HPT, the first signs of a “thaw” appeared in the public life of Hungary. Actions for the rehabilitation of illegally convicted people began, and the activities of public organizations intensified. However, the democratization process could not develop to its full potential. Taking advantage of the economic difficulties on the newly begun path of transition to market forms of economic management, Rakosi, who remained the first secretary of the CR VPT, and his entourage undertook a counter-maneuver. The Prime Minister was accused of "seriously violating the principle of collegiality." The government crisis provoked a split in society, which resulted in a confrontation between reformers and conservatives, a confrontation between supporters of the “modernization” of the socialist system and dictatorship, and a rivalry between Nagy and Rakosi. As a result, Nagy was removed from the post of prime minister in April 1955, and expelled from the party in December. A new cold snap has arrived. However, attempts to restore the previous methods of governing the country gave rise to new resistance. The intelligentsia actively supported the reforms. The first publications of Hungarian writers appeared in the press criticizing the principles of party membership in literature, the interference of party functionaries in creative activity writers and artists. Various public associations began to form, acquiring an increasingly pronounced political character. The Hungarian Writers' Union became the center of discontent and resistance to the regime. In the Petofi circle, created in the summer of 1956, under the guise of literary discussions, criticism was carried out of the socio-political system that existed in the country. This happened against the backdrop of intensified ideological campaigns by the West: Radio Free Europe and Voice of America engaged in active propaganda, calling on Hungarians to openly oppose the ruling regime.

All this contributed to the formation of a government opposition around Nagy, who was expelled from the party but was seeking his political rehabilitation.

External factors also added fuel to the fire.

In May - June 1955, a significant event took place: Soviet leaders arrived in Belgrade on an official visit, including to meet with I. Tito. The reconciliation with Tito had far-reaching political consequences. Moscow's rehabilitation of the Yugoslav "apostate" automatically absolved many people who were repressed during the campaign against "Titoism" from guilt. This had a strong impact even on those who sincerely believed in the ideals of socialism in Eastern Europe. In these states, including Hungary, a campaign has begun to rehabilitate those who suffered for “Titoism.”

And finally, an important reason for the development of the movement for “liberal reforms” was the speech of N.S., which exposed the Stalinist regime. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956). Despite its “secrecy,” it became widely known in Eastern European countries in a matter of weeks, thanks to the operational work of American intelligence agencies. Criticism of the recent past, condemnation of the cult of personality, mistakes and crimes aroused quite strong, overt or hidden, anti-Soviet sentiments in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

The consequence of this was a large-scale demonstration on June 28-29, 1956 in Poland in Poznan with calls for “Freedom!”, “Bread!”, “God!”, “Down with Communism!” The demonstration escalated into street clashes, troops from the voivodeship security department intervened, opening fire on the demonstrators, and then the army. As a result, more than 70 people died and about 500 were injured.

In Hungary, anti-Soviet sentiments began to manifest themselves at first in seemingly insignificant episodes - refusals in stores to sell goods to Soviet military personnel and members of their families, insults on city streets. Then they began to become more and more aggressive. In the dormitory of Soviet officers in Szombathely, the windows were broken with stones at night. At one of the railway crossings, a group of Soviet soldiers were thrown pieces of coal from a passing train. Commandant of Budapest Colonel M.Ya. Kuzminov reported that unknown persons called the commandant’s office by phone, threatened and warned that the Russians would face bloody retribution for everything they had done. Such incidents were increasingly gaining momentum.

The events in Poland met with warm support in Hungary. The situation was not softened by the forced reshuffling in the leadership of the Hungarian People's Republic: on July 18, 1956, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Patriarchate, the resignation of Rakosi was accepted, who immediately, together with his wife, Soviet citizen F.F. Kornilova, went to the USSR for “treatment”. His faithful ally Erne Gere was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT. Four new members were nominated to the central leadership, including János Kádár and two candidates, while 14 members and candidates were co-opted to the Central Committee. However, these changes, as it turned out later, resulted only in a tactical combination that changed little in essence.

In mid-October, student unrest began in Hungary. In Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, Szombathely and Pecs, they demanded to abandon Stalinist methods of governing the country and to stop studying Marxism-Leninism in universities and institutes.

On October 22, at the Budapest Polytechnic University, 16-point demands were formulated - the convening of a party congress, the removal of Stalinists from the leadership, the expansion of socialist democracy, the return of I. Nagy to the post of prime minister, and the reduction of taxes on peasants. They were supplemented by calls for a multi-party system, holding free elections, restoring old state symbols, canceling military training and Russian language lessons, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

On October 23 at 15.00 a large student demonstration began in Budapest, which was gradually joined by representatives of all segments of the population. The number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand. The authorities were at a loss. The Minister of Internal Affairs L. Pirosha first banned it, then, when the demonstration took on an unprecedented mass character, he allowed it. However, already during the first clashes with law enforcement forces, the nature of the demonstration changed, and anti-government slogans appeared. According to eyewitnesses, well-organized groups of people began to stand out in the crowd. At 19:00, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT, Erne Gere, spoke on the radio. But instead of trying to find some kind of compromise, he branded the speech as “counter-revolutionary” and “nationalist” and threatened reprisals. According to opinion. V. Musatov, who worked for a long time at the Soviet embassy in Budapest, and then in the Central Committee apparatus, where he dealt with issues of relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, he did this on purpose, “wanting to suppress the uprising in one fell swoop.” One way or another, Gere’s statement only further aggravated the situation. I. Nagy, who spoke at the request of the demonstrators at a rally in front of parliament, could not calm the passions. The unrest continued to gain momentum. Shouts began to be heard in the crowd: “We don’t need tunics!”, “Down with the red star!”, “Down with the communists!” Demonstrators tore down images state emblem from the national flags of Hungary, they burned red flags. The apotheosis of the unrest was the dismantling of the giant statue of Stalin, which was then broken into small pieces and disassembled for souvenirs. Anti-Semitic slogans also occupied not the least place. The significant number of Jews in the country's leadership, which, according to demonstrators, was primarily to blame for Hungary's problems, caused popular discontent throughout the country.

By evening, the situation in the capital became tense. The uprising began. The rebels were opposed by parts of the state security and army. Even with the beginning of armed uprisings, units of the Budapest garrison were ordered to occupy the most important objects in the city. But there were few troops in the city. Thus, in a report addressed to the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, it was reported that the total number of troops involved was only about 2,500 people. At the same time, the Hungarian People's Republic government did not give permission to open fire, so units and subunits set out without ammunition. As a result, they were unable to resist. Some units were disarmed by the rebels, who by the evening seized the editorial office and printing house of the central party newspaper, the weapons depot and cartridge factory, the Western Station and threatened to seize the buildings of the Party Central Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways.

Serious events unfolded near the building of the Hungarian Radio Center, where a crowd of demonstrators arrived, demanding access to radio broadcasts and, for the time being, restrained by the police and state security forces (ABH). A delegation of students was allowed into the building to negotiate with the director. However, soon a false rumor spread among the demonstrators remaining on the street that one of the delegates had allegedly been killed. The crowd became agitated and there were calls to storm the building. Regarding how subsequent events developed, the opinions of contemporaries were divided.

According to one version, shortly after 21:00, some of the security guards threw fans with tear gas out of the window of the radio center, and one or two minutes later, state security officers opened fire on the crowd. Then white ambulances appeared. But instead of doctors, state security officers dressed in white coats jumped out of the cars. An angry crowd attacked them and took away their weapons. Units of the Hungarian army were sent to help the ABH, but the soldiers, after some hesitation, went over to the side of the crowd.

According to another version, from 21.00 the rebels began to fire at the Radio Center building, and only when several of its guards were killed and wounded did state security officers receive permission to open fire.

This is how one of the radio security commanders describes the siege of the Center:

“About 6-6.30, groups of demonstrators appeared on Sándora Brody Street. The crowd grew continuously and behaved more and more aggressively. They did not follow the call to disperse, so in order to disperse them, we drove a wedge into the crowd and used grenades with tear gas.

Figure 141

Rioters on the streets of Budapest

Later we started firing warning shots, as a result of which we managed to clear Sándor Brody Street twice. But, since the crowd saw that we were only shooting in the air, they returned and never dispersed.

The first single shots with live ammunition were fired by demonstrators from Sandor Brody Street and almost simultaneously from the National Museum - through the Palace Garden - at 19:30. They shot at the windows, near which many people were standing at the time.

The first shots killed several people immediately. By the time we received the order to open fire, there were over twenty dead among the guards.

When we opened fire, the street was empty again for some time, but by this time the rebels had occupied the houses and roofs located opposite and were firing from there. Shooting was carried out from machine guns not only from Sándora Brody Street, but also from the roofs of houses located on Szentkyrái Street...”

One way or another, shortly after midnight the Radio Center was captured by attackers.

At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of state of emergency and setting a curfew. City residents were prohibited from going out onto the streets at night until 7 a.m. and holding rallies and meetings. The rebels were asked to stop the armed struggle and lay down their arms. And the day before, on the afternoon of October 23, Gere telephoned to Moscow with a request to send Soviet troops, who were in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact, to Budapest. At night, the plenum of the CC of the VPT formed a new government headed by Imre Nagy, who, being present at the meeting of the Central Committee, did not object to the invitation of Soviet troops. Moreover, speaking on the radio on October 25, he acknowledged their inevitability of intervention in the current situation. However, when the troops had already entered the capital, he rejected the request of the USSR Ambassador to sign the corresponding letter. Former head of government Hegedüs did it instead. The text of the appeal read: “On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, I ask the government of the Soviet Union to send Soviet troops to Budapest to help eliminate the unrest that has arisen in Budapest, to quickly restore order and create conditions for peaceful creative work.” The letter was backdated to October 24; it arrived in Moscow on October 28.

At this time, quite strange events were happening in Budapest. Some researchers explain them by the confusion of the authorities and the confusion that reigned in various government departments, including law enforcement agencies. Others are convinced that these were planned provocations, betrayal and direct intervention of Western intelligence services. We are talking primarily about weapons that ended up in large quantities in the hands of the rebels. Western media claimed that all of it was captured in battles with regular units of the Hungarian and Soviet armies or taken from the police. At the same time, according to many eyewitnesses of the events, already on the first day of the rebellion, trucks appeared on the streets and squares of the city, from which machine guns and rifles were distributed to everyone. Looking ahead, we note that during the period of the fighting and after its end in November 1956, more than 44 thousand small arms were confiscated from the rebels and the population, including 11 thousand 500 machine guns and about 2 thousand machine guns, 62 guns, of which 47 anti-aircraft. Moreover, about 2 thousand small arms were foreign-made in the post-war period.

How did the rebels get these weapons? Indeed, some of the small arms were taken from Hungarian military personnel, and some were seized from weapons depots captured by the rebels. But there were other “sources”. For example, it is known that I. Nagy, immediately after heading the government, demanded that the party activists be armed. Weapons were delivered to district committees, the police and large enterprises. However, from there it somehow fell into the hands of the rebels. The same thing happened when the Hungarian government decided to arm the workers.

At first, the Ministry of Defense searched for weapons for a long time, but when they were found, they again fell into the hands of the rebels in considerable quantities.

And “miracles” happened to the rebels. Thus, during the fighting, about 300 people were captured and disarmed. They were handed over to the Hungarian police. But a few days later the detainees were again captured with weapons in their hands.

Figure 142

A tank captured by the rebels. 1956

It later became known that all the detainees were released by order of the Budapest police chief Sandor Kopachi, and the weapons were returned to them.

On October 23 at 23.00, having received an order from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, units of the Special Corps were alerted and moved to Budapest. They had to make a 75-120 kilometer march. The calculation was for a demonstration of force. The operational group of the headquarters of the Special Corps, led by Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko also went to the capital, where with great difficulty she reached the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.

It should be said that the plan of action for the troops of the Special Corps to maintain and restore order in Budapest and on the territory of Hungary was developed by the corps headquarters and worked out on the map back in July 1956. It received the code name "Compass".

According to the plan, the restoration of order in Budapest was entrusted to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General S.V. Lebedeva. It was supposed to move out from Kecskemét and take under protection the main objects of the Hungarian capital. It determined the priority targets, as well as the forces and means to hold them.

17th Guards Mechanized Division Major General A.V. Krivosheeva was supposed to cover the border with Austria and ensure public order in the points of permanent deployment - in the cities of Gyor, Keszeg, Kermend, Szombathely. Units of the division stationed in Haimashkar formed a reserve and were intended for use in Budapest.

The remaining formations and units of the corps were instructed to ensure public order in their permanent deployment points, as well as to hold and defend military camps, airfields, warehouses and other important facilities.

The special instructions indicated: the procedure for the operation of units and subunits in the city, tasks for the protection and defense of objects, the procedure for interaction with units of the VNA and some other issues. The procedure for using weapons was specifically stipulated.

After revision on July 20, 1956, corps commander Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko approved a new version of the Special Corps action plan, according to which corps units were given 3 to 6 hours to establish control over the most important objects of the country and Budapest. After agreement with Moscow, the new plan received the code name “Volna”.

At the time when units of the Special Corps advanced to the capital, confusion and confusion reigned in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense. Information about the actions of the rebels, Hungarian units and the police was received very contradictory. Minister of Defense I. Bata and Chief of the General Staff L. Toth were in panic. By that time, there were about 7 thousand Hungarian soldiers and 50 tanks in Budapest, dispersed across many objects. At the same time, no one knew the location and number of forces located in a particular area, how reliable they were and how many military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. In such a situation, the Soviet command could not count on the interaction and assistance of the Hungarian army.

The first to enter Budapest at 4 a.m. on October 24 were the 37th Tank Regiment, led by the deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Colonel Bichan, and the motorcycle battalion of Lieutenant Colonel G. Dobrunov. The regiment was given the task of taking under guard the buildings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Union, the parliament, the Soviet embassy, ​​bridges over the Danube and liberating the Radio House captured by the rebels. However, even upon entering the city, Soviet units came under unexpected fire from the rebels. As a result of the attack, several people died, including the company commander of the motorcycle battalion, Captain Petrochenkov. Despite the losses, our soldiers, obeying the order, did not open fire.

The main forces of the division (5th mechanized regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, 6th mechanized regiment of Colonel Mayakov, 87th heavy tank-self-propelled regiment of Colonel Nikovsky) approached Budapest only at 5 o’clock. The regiments immediately entered the battle and in a short time cleared a number of important objects from armed groups, including train stations, bridges, and began, together with the previously arrived regiments, to protect the buildings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Union, parliament, ministries of defense and foreign affairs, the Soviet embassy, ​​banks , warehouses and airfield. By this time, the group of Soviet troops in Budapest numbered about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks, 1236 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns.

In the second half of the same day, the 83rd tank and 56th mechanized regiments of the 17th Guards Mechanized Division of Major General A. Krivosheev approached the city, which were tasked with maintaining order in the western part of the city - Buda and guarding the bridge over the Danube .

Figure 143

The crew of the BTR-152 armored personnel carrier from the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, which participated in the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

Four VNA divisions began operating in the city together with Soviet units (7th mechanized division, 8th, 27th rifle and 5th mechanized division of the 3rd rifle corps). On October 24-26, by order of General Durko, a rebel detachment of 340 people was destroyed by Hungarian units in Kucskemet. During the operation in Sabadsalas, 7 rebels were killed and 40 wounded. At the same time, a number of units of the 8th mechanized regiment of the Hungarian army, construction and anti-aircraft units of the capital's garrison, individual officers and cadets of the military academy and schools went over to the side of the rebels.

By the end of October 24, the troops of the Special Corps had largely managed to complete their assigned tasks. However, as subsequent events showed, the forceful action taken led to a toughening of the rebels' resistance. The situation became more complicated the very next day - October 25. According to Mikoyan and Suslov, who arrived in Budapest on October 24 to clarify the situation in the country, the Hungarian capital was rocked by two events. The first was an incident near parliament, when during a rally, targeted fire was opened on unarmed demonstrators and Soviet soldiers from the roofs and attics of nearby houses, and one tank was burned. Among the dead is the regiment commander, Major V.P. Bachurin. He was killed by a burst from a heavy machine gun during a peaceful conversation with demonstrators. In response to the provocation, Soviet units and Hungarian state security officers also responded with fire. To this day there is no exact answer as to who carried out this provocation. According to one version, Hungarian security officers started shooting from the rooftops. According to others, it is a group of armed rebels. One way or another, as a result of the shootout, more than 60 Hungarians were killed (according to later data - over 200 people).

Lieutenant General E.I. Malashenko recalls this incident as follows:

“Many approached the tanks standing here, climbed onto them and stuck banners into the barrels of the guns.

Figure 144

Participant in Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956

From the attics of buildings located on the square opposite the parliament, fire was opened on demonstrators and Soviet military personnel. Two Hungarian tanks accompanying the demonstrators fired several shots and disappeared. The commander of one of our units was killed.

Soviet soldiers and state security officers guarding parliament returned fire on the roofs of the buildings from which the shots were fired. There was panic on Lajos Kossuth Square. With the first shots, people began to scatter in search of cover. When the shooting died down, many hurried to leave the square. Twenty-two demonstrators were killed and many were wounded. Several of our military personnel and Hungarian police were killed..."

It is not known, as noted above, who was the instigator of this provocation, but what is certain is that it was a consequence of I. Nagy’s decision to lift the curfew. It was adopted several hours before the incident at Parliament, without the consent of the Soviet command.

The second event was a shootout near the Central Committee building - Soviet tank crews covering the building mistakenly opened fire on a suitable Hungarian security company, mistaking it for a rebel detachment; 10 Hungarians were killed.

Perhaps it was this incident that served as the reason for publications claiming that many Soviet military personnel sympathized with the rebels and even provided them with armed assistance. For example, the Austrian newspaper Bild Telegraph on October 31, 1956 wrote:

“Members of the AVO (Hungarian security officers) began to shoot at unarmed demonstrators... Suddenly the turrets of three Soviet tanks turned from 12 to 3 - as they say in the language of tank crews, and three tank commanders commanded in Russian: “Fire!” - but not at the demonstrators, but into the security officers of Hungary. Communist security officials fell under the shells of tanks of the Soviet army. This was the greatest heroism in the history of this Soviet military unit and the complete collapse of the official communist ideology...”

Reacting to the aggravation of the situation, the Soviet command took measures to increase the number of troops in the Hungarian capital.

On October 25, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division of Major General G.I. approached Budapest. Obaturov (from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania) and the 128th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel N.A. Gorbunova (from the Carpathian Military District). Both divisions became part of the Special Corps. Thus, the total number of troops operating in Budapest was brought to 20 thousand people.

Nevertheless, rebel resistance, especially in the center of the capital, continued to grow. In this regard, the 33rd Division was tasked with “clearing the armed forces” from the central part of the city, where the rebels had established strongholds (in the Kebanya sector, Yllei Street, areas adjacent to the Danube, the Kilian barracks and the cinema area " Corwin"). By this time, the rebels were already armed with not only small arms, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank grenades and petrol bottles.

It should be noted that some units of the 33rd Division suffered losses immediately upon entering the city. A tank and an armored personnel carrier containing the commanders of two regiments were shot down, and the headquarters radio stations were destroyed. The division's artillery regiment on Ferenczi Avenue was ambushed and almost completely lost the second division. Regiment commander E.N. Khanovich was mortally wounded. How this happened was described in his memoirs by the former instructor of the political department of the Special Corps, Colonel V.I. Fomin:

"The head of its column (33rd division, - A. O.), following in marching order, according to the Hungarians, appeared on the outskirts of the city at about six o’clock in the evening. The division commander, Major General Obaturov, arrived to General Lashchenko for instructions much earlier. He arrived in a staff car, dressed, like the driver, in a soldier’s uniform: a raincoat, a cap on his head. The Hungarian guards asked me to help check the documents of a soldier who claimed that he was a general, but did not show his ID. I accompanied the division commander to the corps commander. And in the evening it became known about an attack on a convoy of armed groups in the area of ​​Prater Square and on Yllei Street. Having let the tanks pass, the rebels took the division's artillery, which was moving with the gun barrels uncovered, and the rear units under crossfire. Many soldiers and officers died, including the artillery regiment commander. He never had time to give the command “to fight.” The division got lost in the city and lost control. General Obaturov, as Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Colonel G.D. later told me. Dobrunov, then commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized division, found himself in a very difficult situation. It was necessary for an experienced intelligence officer, who knew Budapest well, to help the division commander in plotting the location of his units on the city plan issued back in 1945! But all the troops of the Special Corps were supplied with such plans in 1956, which, in the absence of officers who knew the language and the Hungarian capital, created great difficulties in orientation on its streets: in eleven years not only the names of many streets and squares changed, but also their configuration" .

Already in the city, the tank of regiment commander Litovtsev (number “072”) was hit by a direct hit from a shell. Of the entire crew of the vehicle, only Colonel Litovtsev managed to escape.

In total, on October 25-26, the 33rd Mechanized Division lost 130 troops on the streets of Budapest, without taking part in any of the actions against the rebel armed groups. Other units also suffered losses, in particular, on October 24 alone, more than 40 soldiers and officers of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division died at the hands of militants. At the same time, there were not isolated cases of violation of the bodies of the dead, as well as atrocities and bullying by the rebels towards captured Soviet soldiers. So, according to the memoirs of L.V. Petukhova, in the village of Dunakesi, 20 km north of Budapest, the rebels attacked a convoy of Soviet fuel tankers. The fuel trucks slipped through, two drivers were injured, and a shell hit the security car. Group senior captain G.I. Miseenkov and ten guard soldiers were shell-shocked and taken prisoner. The guards were immediately shot, and the captain was demanded that he voluntarily go over to the side of the rebels. G.I. Miseenkov refused. Then, while he was still alive, they cut off his arm to the elbow, his leg to the knee, doused him with diesel fuel and set him on fire.

According to the former senior instructor of the OK political department for special propaganda, retired colonel Vitaly Fomin, the large losses in the first days were largely explained by the morale of the personnel of the Soviet troops. “Brought up on respect for the sovereignty and independence of the fraternal people,” recalled V. Fomin, “our soldiers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Just yesterday they were welcome guests at industrial enterprises, production cooperatives and state farms. Now they had to meet with the people of Budapest far from in a friendly atmosphere, they were clearly not ready for this, as well as for opening fire first. And in this case, the instructions from the corps command not to do this were unnecessary.

Figure 145

The crew of the T-34/85 tank from the 33rd GMD after the suppression of the mutiny. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

As for the order to avoid provocations, it turned out to be even more difficult to fulfill. As subsequent events showed, extremists and terrorists of all stripes widely used the friendly feelings of Soviet military personnel towards Hungarian citizens for their insidious purposes."

On the morning of October 28, an assault on the center of the capital was planned together with units of the 5th and 6th Hungarian mechanized regiments. However, just before the start of the assault, the Hungarian units received an order from their command not to participate in hostilities. This was explained by the fact that the rebels were allegedly ready to lay down their arms. Indeed, Imre Nagy negotiated with the leaders of the armed groups Laszlo Ivankovic, Gergely Pogranac and others and accepted their demands. Following this, he telephoned the Ministry of Defense and warned that if the Corvin was stormed, he would resign. As a result, the operation was disrupted. From that moment on, units of the VNA, at the request of the government of I. Nagy, did not provide resistance to the rebels, and did not receive orders to conduct actions against the rebels. A Revolutionary Military Council was created in Budapest, consisting of Major General B. Kiraly, L. Kahn, I. Kovacs, Colonel P. Maleter and others.

On the same day at 5 p.m. 20 minutes. Budapest time, I. Nagy spoke on the radio with a declaration of the new government. The Hungarian leadership condemned the previous assessment of the uprising as a counter-revolution, recognizing it as a “broad national democratic movement” that united the entire Hungarian people in the struggle for national independence and sovereignty. The declaration outlined a program for the speedy satisfaction of fair social demands of workers, announced the dissolution of troops and state security agencies and an agreement reached between the Hungarian and Soviet governments on the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. Regarding the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, the declaration stated: “The Hungarian government will take the initiative of negotiations on relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union - in particular, on the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces located on the territory of Hungary - in the spirit of Hungarian-Soviet friendship, based on the principles equality of socialist countries and national independence."

Figure 146

Soviet tank on the street of Budapest. 1956

Soviet representatives Mikoyan and Suslov made the following conclusion about the behavior of Nagy and his supporters: “The most dangerous thing is that, having morally corrupted the state security cadres - the most persistent fighters - with their declaration, they have not yet been able to do anything in return, which the reaction is taking advantage of.” In the West, on the contrary, the text of the Declaration evoked positive responses.

I. Nagy's statement on October 28 became a turning point in the development of October events. Defenders of the constitutional order were demoralized. The party activists, who defended public buildings, ministries and district committees, received an order from the Hungarian government to immediately surrender all available weapons. The most disciplined communists carried it out, and later many of them paid for it with their lives.

The government’s decision to abolish state security agencies effectively placed all employees of the Hungarian intelligence services outside the law. Thus, the head of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Orban, told the Soviet adviser that “he will gather officers and will make his way into the USSR.” Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Dean, fearing a massacre of organ workers and their families, decided to “create a detachment of employees and move to the Soviet border with weapons,” and if he failed, then “guerrilla underground and beat the enemies.” The regional department of state security in the city of Szabolcs went to Romania, and employees of the Debrecen department approached the Soviet border in the Uzhgorod area and asked the border guards to let them into the USSR. Large groups State security workers also concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, awaiting entry into this country.

An overestimation of the nature of events also put an end to the presence of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital. The consequence was a violent campaign against Soviet military personnel.

On October 30, Nagy's government demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Budapest.

At this time, an active search for a way out of the increasingly deteriorating situation continued in Moscow. Back on October 28, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Marshal Zhukov proposed to refrain from suppressing the center of resistance in the Budapest Kilian barracks and in the Corvin cinema, located in residential areas, and called for political flexibility.

Figure 147

Officers of the 128th Guards Rifle Division in positions near Budapest. November 1956

Khrushchev offered to support the new Hungarian government and help it in the provinces. He was supported by Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov. Voroshilov, Molotov and Bulganin had a different opinion.

As a result of this meeting, the “Declaration of the USSR Government on the fundamentals of development and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries” was adopted. The Declaration said: “As recent events have shown, the need has arisen to make an appropriate statement about the position of the Soviet Union in the relations of the USSR with other socialist countries, primarily in the economic and military fields.” This Declaration was already broadcast on October 30, and the next day it was published in the press.

On the evening of October 30, the withdrawal of troops from the city began. Due to the continued attacks on Soviet military personnel, the withdrawal of troops was carried out under the protection of tanks. They were “interspersed” in transport columns with guns deployed to the right and left. This kind of “herringbone” made it possible to suppress the machine-gun nest of the rebels at any moment. And they did not even spare the ambulances transporting the wounded from the Soviet hospital in Budapest. In one of them, a paramedic was killed and the soldiers he was accompanying were wounded again.

Nevertheless, by the end of the day, all Soviet formations and units were withdrawn from the city and concentrated 15-20 kilometers from Budapest. The headquarters of the Special Corps was deployed at the airfield in Tekele, the location of one of its aviation units. In areas where troops were concentrated, equipment and weapons were put in order, ammunition, fuel and food were stocked.

It would seem that political methods of exiting the conflict arose.

However, by this moment the situation in Moscow had changed one hundred and eighty degrees. The documents known to date do not allow us to definitively answer the question about the reasons that forced N.S. Khrushchev sharply reconsidered his views on the Hungarian events. Obviously there are several of them.

In our opinion, external factors played the main role. The Suez crisis at the end of October (October 30-31, Israeli, British and French troops began military operations against Egypt) was perceived in the Kremlin as a symptom of the unacceptable weakening of Soviet influence in the world. This prompted the Soviet leadership to demonstrate military power in Hungary. If we leave Hungary, it will encourage the Americans, the British and the French. They will regard this as our weakness and will attack..., reasoned N.S. Khrushchev. Moreover, the anti-Egyptian action of the three countries, which, by the way, was not supported by the United States and was condemned by many Western, and not only left, politicians, became the external background against which the Soviet action in Hungary could cause a more lenient attitude. In addition, the states of Eastern Europe were, following the results of World War II, a recognized zone of influence of the USSR and members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Therefore, direct confrontation there with the West seemed unlikely. The United States and NATO, considering the events in Hungary a purely internal affair of the Soviet bloc, did not make any serious efforts to put pressure on the USSR. According to the former Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany F.-I. Strauss, “there was no question of military intervention by NATO.” Moreover, the US government, using various diplomatic channels, managed to bring to the attention of the Kremlin its determination to maintain complete neutrality regarding possible Soviet actions in Hungary. And American President Eisenhower himself was busy with the election campaign.

No less significant, in our opinion, reasons lay in the unbalanced, impulsive character of N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the struggle for power in the CPSU Central Committee that began after Stalin’s death. Thus, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR V. Micunovich said that during a meeting with Tito, which took place incognito on November 2-3, 1956 on the island of Brijuni, Khrushchev said that the USSR could not allow the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. This is due to the fact that there are many people in the Soviet Union who would take all this something like this: under Stalin, everyone was obedient and there were no riots. And since these... (here Khrushchev used a strong expression in relation to the Soviet leaders) came to power, the collapse began, Hungary is leaving... And everything happens precisely at the moment when the Soviet leadership began a campaign to condemn Stalin.

According to Khrushchev, as V. Michunovich recalled, the Soviet army would be the first to say something like this.

The course of events in Hungary had a certain influence on the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders: the intensified rampant terror and, in particular, the defeat of the Budapest city party committee, as a result of which the secretary of the city committee, Imre Meze, was mortally wounded and 24 Hungarian soldiers who defended him were brutally killed.

On November 1, Prime Minister Imre Nagy handed Andropov a note demanding that he begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the same day, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers of Hungary was held, which unanimously adopted a resolution on the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the Declaration of Neutrality of Hungary. I. Nagy addressed the United Nations with a message in which he asked for the help of the four great powers to protect Hungarian neutrality. In the evening at 19:45, Imre Nagy addressed the Hungarian people on the radio with a speech in which he announced the Declaration of Neutrality. He concluded his speech with the words:

“We call on our neighbors, both near and far, to respect the unchangeable decision of the Hungarian people. There is no doubt that our people are as united in this decision as, perhaps, never before throughout their history.

Millions of Hungarian workers! Preserve and strengthen, with revolutionary determination, selfless labor and the restoration of order, a free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary."

I. Nagy's appeal was perceived by the rebels as a call to intensify the struggle. On November 3, a renewed Hungarian government was formed, in which the communists received only three minor ministerial portfolios.

The declaration of neutrality, the appeal to Western countries for help and the deprivation of power from the Communists left no doubt in Moscow that this was a matter of literally about the loss of Hungary. This was already a blow to the entire socialist camp. Hungary's withdrawal from the eastern military alliance would mark the collapse of its entire defense system. And the reaction came immediately.

The leadership of Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev. Preparations have begun for a military operation to restore order in Hungary. code name"Vortex".

Meanwhile, around Budapest, the rebels hastily created a defensive belt, reinforced with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. Outposts with tanks and artillery appeared in settlements adjacent to the city.

Figure 148

Soviet officers from the 33rd GMD who distinguished themselves during Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

The most important objects were occupied by armed detachments, and squads of military personnel and the National Guard patrolled the streets. The number of personnel of the Hungarian units in Budapest reached 50 thousand people. In addition, more than 10 thousand people were part of the “national guard”, armed groups and detachments. The rebels had about 100 tanks.

Meanwhile, negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, which began on November 3, continued in the parliament building. The USSR delegation was headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General M.S. Mlinin, Hungarian - General P. Maleter. The Soviet side conducted them formally, trying to gain time and misinform the Hungarian leadership.

The discussion of specific issues related to the withdrawal of units of the Soviet army, late in the evening of November 3, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, was moved to the Soviet military base Tekel. Members of the Hungarian delegation took part here in a gala dinner hosted for them by Soviet military representatives. It was almost midnight when the reception was interrupted by the arrival of the head of Soviet state security, General I.A. Serova. Accompanied by NKVD officers, he entered the hall and ordered the entire Hungarian delegation to be detained. The military leadership of Nagy's government was beheaded. The arrests were made by the Minister of Defense, General Pal Meleter, the Chief of the General Staff, General Istvan Kovacs, the Chief of Operations, Colonel Miklos Szuch and Ferenc Erdei.

At 5:15 a.m. on November 4, on the waves of Szolnok radio (according to some sources, the broadcast was broadcast from the Soviet city of Uzhgorod), an appeal was heard from the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, allegedly created in Szolnok, headed by J. Kadar. This message took the form of an open letter, which was signed by Kadar and three other former members of Imre Nagy's government. They stated that they left the government of Imre Nagy on November 1 because the government was unable to fight the “counter-revolutionary danger.” To "suppress fascism and reaction" they formed the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, on the same waves, Kadar announced new line-up government. He argued that "reactionary elements wanted to overthrow the socialist social system in Hungary and restore the rule of the landowners and capitalists." Kadar further said that the new government appealed to the command of the Soviet troops to “help our people defeat the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution, restore the people's socialist system, restore order and tranquility in our country.”

All political formalities were observed, and Soviet troops began the operation to restore order in Budapest and other cities of Hungary. It should be noted here that the decision to provide “joint military assistance” to Hungary was supported by the highest political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, the defeat of the forces of the armed opposition rested entirely with the Soviet troops.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, called "Whirlwind", the Soviet divisions had to solve the following tasks:

2nd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the north-eastern and central part of Budapest, seize bridges over the Danube River, the buildings of parliament, the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Defense, the Nyugati station, the police headquarters and block the military camps of the Hungarian units, preventing the rebels from approaching Budapest by roads from the north and east.

33rd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the south-eastern and central parts of Budapest, capture bridges over the Danube River, the Central Telephone Station, the Corwin stronghold, Keleti station, the Kossuth radio station, the Csepel factory, the arsenal, blockade the barracks of Hungarian military units and prevent the rebels from approaching Budapest along the roads from the southeast.

The 128th Guards Rifle Division will capture the western part of Budapest (Buda), capture the Central Air Defense Command Post, Moscow Square, Gellert Mountain and the fortress, block the barracks and prevent the rebels from approaching the city from the west.

Disarm the Hungarian units. At the same time, the disarmament of units that do not offer resistance should be carried out directly in military camps.

To capture the most important objects, one at a time was created in all divisions - two special forward detachments as part of an infantry battalion, as well as 150 paratroopers of the 108th Guards. PDP on armored personnel carriers, reinforced with 10-12 tanks. In these detachments were responsible officers of the KGB of the USSR K.E. Grebennik, P.I. Zyryanov, A.M. Korotkov and others. They were supposed to capture members of Imre Nagy's government and the leaders of the armed uprising.

In addition, to capture bridges across the Danube River and other important objects, detachments were formed in the regiments as part of a rifle company, reinforced with tanks, guns and sapper units.

The heavy tank-self-propelled regiment of the 11th mechanized division was assigned to the 33rd mechanized division of General G.I. Obaturova, who had to perform the most difficult tasks.

In total, the following units participated in the operation to restore order in Hungary: units of the Special Corps (2nd Nicholas-Budapest Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 17th Enakievo-Danube Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Mechanized Divisions, 177th and 195th Guards Aviation Divisions); 8th Mechanized Army (31st Tank Vistula Red Banner Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov, 11th Rivne Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 32nd Berdichev Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Guards Mechanized, 61st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division); 38th Combined Arms Army (70th Glukhovskaya Order of Lenin twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 128th Turkestan Red Banner Guards Riflemen, 27th Cherkasy Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 390th Guards Poltava Order of Lenin and twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, mechanized, 60th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division); Separate mechanized army (33rd Guards Kherson Red Banner twice Order of Suvorov mechanized division); 35th Guards Kharkov Twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Mechanized Division of the Odessa Military District; 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions; 1st Guards Railway Brigade and other units. They were armed with more than 3,000 tanks.

Before the start of the operation, Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was communicated to all personnel of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

COMMANDER-CHIEF OF THE UNITED ARMED FORCES

Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October, in our brotherly Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose up in rebellion with the goal of destroying the people's democratic system, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the working people and restoring the old landowner-capitalist order in it.

Events have shown that the active participation of former Horthyists in this adventure leads to the revival of fascism in Hungary and creates a direct threat to our Fatherland and the entire socialist camp. We must not forget that in the last war, Horthy Hungary opposed our homeland together with Hitler’s Germany.

In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact concluded between the countries of the socialist camp, obliging us to take “coordinated measures necessary to strengthen their defense capabilities in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection from possible aggression", Soviet troops began to fulfill allied obligations.

There is no doubt that the working class and working peasantry of the Hungarian People's Republic will support us in this just struggle.

The task of the Soviet troops is to provide fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in defeating the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of a revival of fascism.

I ORDER:

All personnel of the Soviet troops, with full consciousness of their military duty, must show persistence and firmness in carrying out the tasks set by the command. Provide assistance to local authorities in their efforts to restore public order and establish normal life in the country.

To hold high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier, to strengthen fraternal friendship with the working people of Hungary, to respect their national traditions and customs.

I express my firm confidence that the soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Soviet troops will fulfill their military duty with honor.

Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev

The text of the order is unusual and therefore requires some clarification. Its content does not meet the most basic requirements for combat orders.

Documents of this kind reflect conclusions from an assessment of the situation and the enemy, the plan of action and combat missions of formations and units, indicate the demarcation lines between active forces, issues of interaction, ammunition consumption, troop readiness time, and more. In order No. 1, these components are completely absent. What's the matter? Obviously, it is a purely propaganda document, aimed mainly at the world community. The troops acted according to the rules prescribed by the combat regulations in accordance with another order of Marshal I.S. Koneva. Its real content was communicated to a narrow circle of people in the strictest confidence. This is confirmed by archival documents - reports from commanders to higher management about the work done to carry out the order of Marshal I.S. Konev No. 01.

Retired Lieutenant General E. I. Malashenko spoke in his memoirs about how Operation Whirlwind proceeded:

“On October 4 at 6 o’clock, at the signal “Thunder”, which meant the beginning of Operation Whirlwind, the formed detachments to capture objects and the main forces of the three divisions of the Special Corps in columns along their routes simultaneously from different directions rushed to the city and, having overcome resistance on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital, by 7 o'clock they rushed into Budapest.

Formations of the armies of generals A. Babajanyan and X. Mamsurov began active actions to restore order and restore authorities in Debrecen, Miskolc, Győr and other cities.

Airborne units disarmed Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries blocking the airfields of Soviet aviation units in Veszprém and Tekel.

Imre Nagy and part of his entourage left parliament, having previously announced on the radio that “the government is in its place,” and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. General Bela Kiraly gave the order to conduct military operations, moved his headquarters to Mount Janos, from where he tried to control the Hungarian units and armed units of the “national guard”.

Units of the 2nd Guards Division at 7:30 am. They captured bridges across the Danube, parliament, the buildings of the Central Committee of the Party, the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs, the City Council and the Nyugati station. In the parliament area, a security battalion was disarmed and three tanks were captured.

Colonel Lipinsky's 37th Tank Regiment disarmed approximately 250 officers and "national guards" during the capture of the Ministry of Defense building.

The 87th Heavy Self-Propelled Tank Regiment captured the arsenal in the Fot area and also disarmed the Hungarian tank regiment.

During the day of the battle, units of the division disarmed up to 600 people, captured about 100 tanks, two artillery depots, 15 anti-aircraft guns and a large number of small arms.

Units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, without initially encountering resistance, captured an artillery depot in Pestszentlerinets, three bridges across the Danube, and also disarmed units of the Hungarian rifle regiment, which had gone over to the side of the rebels.

The 108th Parachute Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division, with sudden actions, disarmed five Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries that were blocking the airfield in Tekele.

Figure 149

Soviet soldier killed on the street in Budapest. 1956

128th Guards Rifle Division Colonel N.A. Gorbunova, through the actions of forward detachments in the western part of the city, by 7 o'clock captured the Budaers airfield, capturing 22 aircraft, as well as the barracks of the communications school, and disarmed the mechanized regiment of the 7th mechanized division, which was trying to resist."

To quickly defeat the armed detachments in Budapest, on the instructions of Marshal I.S. Konev's Special Corps additionally received two tank regiments (100 tank regiments 31td and 128 tank regiments 66 Guards Infantry Division), the 80th and 381st parachute regiments of the 7th and 31st Guards. airborne division, rifle regiment, mechanized regiment, artillery regiment, as well as two divisions of heavy mortar and rocket brigades.

Most of these units were assigned to reinforce the 33rd Mechanized and 128th Rifle Guards Divisions.

Particularly difficult operations in Budapest were the battles to capture rebel strongholds in the center of the capital: the Corvin district, University Town, Moscow Square and the Royal Fortress. To suppress these pockets of resistance, significant forces of infantry, artillery and tanks were brought in, incendiary shells, flamethrowers, smoke grenades and bombs were used. The attack on a strong resistance center in Corvin Lane, which began on November 5 at 15:00, was preceded by massive artillery preparation, in which 11 artillery battalions took part, consisting of about 170 guns and mortars, as well as several dozen tanks. By evening, the 71st Guards Tank Regiment of Colonel Litovtsev and the 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Yanbakhtin captured the ruins of the former city quarter. During their assault, the crew of the "765" tank of the 71st Tank Regiment, 33rd Guards Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Guard Senior Sergeant A.M. distinguished themselves. Balyasnikova. At the height of the battle, his thirty-four burst into enemy positions at full speed, in the area where the rebel headquarters was located. Despite the damage to the vehicle (shells hit the track and engine), the tank crew continued to fight, throwing hand grenades at the enemy and shooting from personal weapons. These minutes allowed the infantry to support the attack and soon capture the fortification. For the courage and heroism shown during the battle, the commander of the guard tank, senior sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Ordinary crew members also received high awards: gunner Latyshev and loader Tokarev were awarded the Order of Glory III degree, driver R. Guk was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Figure 150

A damaged Soviet self-propelled artillery unit ISU-152K from the 128th self-propelled tank regiment. Budapest, November 1956

The commander of the tank platoon, Lieutenant S.S., was also awarded the Gold Star medal. Tsik, who led the assault group. For the battles in the Hungarian capital, the company commander of the 114th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 31st Guards Airborne Division (commander - Major General P. Ryabov), Captain Sharip Migulov, received his Order of Alexander Nevsky. This was the first and only award of such an order to officers after the end of the Great Patriotic War.

“In Budapest, I was wounded four times,” Migulov recalls, “I was shot in the leg, there was a shrapnel in the head, in the shoulder and in the side. The company went ahead. They let the company through. And I was in the rearguard. So they slashed at us. Noise, groans... All the guys around were killed, and I fell with a shot in my leg, but I noticed that they were shooting from the fourth floor. The grenade launcher was lying dead next to me. I reached for the grenade launcher, crawled behind a large tree, and about two floors fell on them. The fire stopped from there..."

And there were many such heroic episodes. For example, the feat of Lieutenant F.I. Shipitsyn, described in the newspaper "Red Star" for 1957.

"...It was November 6, 1956 on Zsigmond Moritz Square in Budapest. A group of fascist rebels, led by the Horthy general Bela Kiraly, hiding in the basements and attics of buildings, fired at Hungarian workers and soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army, who decided to knock the rebels out of their shelters. Soviet soldiers took part in the battle together with the Hungarian patriots... The tanks were accompanied by Hungarian officers who knew the location of the city well. Major Hafiek Laszlo was in the car with Lieutenant Fedor Shipitsyn. This crew included the driver-mechanic, Senior Sergeant Gross. gunner Sergeant Melin, loading private Ormankulov...

The counter-revolutionaries managed to set fire to the tank... The Hungarian officer was wounded in the shoulder by a tracer bullet. His clothes caught fire. Such a situation was created that it was necessary to immediately leave the burning tank. But Laszlo had no strength. Lieutenant Shipitsyn and Private Ormankulov rushed to help their Hungarian friend. With the assistance of Sergeant Melin, they opened the tank hatch and helped Hafiek Laszlo get out of the burning car. At this moment, the Hungarian comrade received several more wounds. Lieutenant Shipitsyn was also wounded. Private Ormankulov was struck to death by a machine-gun burst. Overcoming excruciating pain, Lieutenant Shipitsyn dragged the Hungarian officer to a ditch with water and extinguished the burning clothes on him. Then he took the seriously wounded Hungarian officer in his arms and wanted to hide him in a nearby house. However, Shipitsyn was able to take only a few steps - he received new wounds, and his strength left him. Bleeding, the Soviet officer fell to the ground dead. Hafiek Laszlo was left alone. Having regained consciousness for a minute, gathering his last strength, he crawled under the gate of the house and buried his face in the cold ground. So Laszlo lay there until dawn the next day. On the morning of November 7, two Hungarian workers picked him up in an unconscious state and sent him to safety...

For courage and bravery, Lieutenant Fyodor Ivanovich Shipitsyn was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin...".

Despite the stubborn resistance of the rebels, on November 7, parts of the division of General G.I. Obaturov took over the Kossuth radio station. In the area of ​​the pier, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division captured boats of the Danube Flotilla. Regiments of the 128th Guards Rifle Division stormed the Royal Fortress and Horthy Palace on Castle Hill. More than 1,000 people operated in the area of ​​the fortress; during their capture, 350 machine guns, the same number of rifles, several mortars, and a large number of pistols and grenades were seized. The troops of generals A.Kh. operated no less successfully in other cities and towns of Hungary. Babajanyan and Kh.U. Mamsurova.

On the same day, the new leadership of Hungary, headed by J. Kadar, was delivered to Budapest in a Soviet armored vehicle, accompanied by tanks.

Several pockets of resistance inside Budapest held out until November 8, and on the outskirts for several more days. On November 8, in the area of ​​the suburban working-class village of Chepel, where up to 700 people were armed with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the rebels managed to shoot down a Soviet Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. Its entire crew was killed: squadron commander Captain A. Bobrovsky, squadron navigator Captain D. Karmishin, squadron communications chief, Senior Lieutenant V. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the assault on Csepel, Soviet troops lost only three tanks is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew.

With the defeat of the armed detachments in Csepel and Buda, the fighting in Budapest was essentially completed.

By November 11, armed resistance was broken not only in the Hungarian capital, but throughout the country. The remnants of the armed units went underground. To eliminate groups hiding in the forests adjacent to Budapest, these areas were combed. The final liquidation of the remaining small groups and ensuring public order were carried out jointly with the created Hungarian officer regiments.

Following the results of the hostilities on December 18, 1956, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, more than 10 thousand Soviet military personnel were awarded orders and medals, 26 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 14 were posthumous: captain AA. Bobrovsky, private Yu.V. Burmistrov, senior lieutenant P.G. Volokitin, Sergeant I.M. Goryachev, senior lieutenant G.M. Gromnitsky, senior lieutenant M.S. Zinukov, captain D.D. Karmishin, senior lieutenant M.P. Karpov, Colonel S.N. Kokhanovich, junior sergeant A.I. Kuzmin, captain G.P. Moiseenkov, captain N.V. Mura-lion, Sergeant A.D. Soloviev, senior lieutenant V. Yartsev.

The total losses of Soviet troops during the fighting in Hungary amounted to 706 people killed (75 officers and 631 soldiers and sergeants of conscript service), 1,540 wounded, 51 people missing. A large number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were destroyed and damaged. Only units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, nine armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, four BM-13s, six anti-aircraft guns, 45 machine guns, 31 cars and five motorcycles in Budapest.

The losses of the Hungarian side were also significant. According to official Budapest, from October 23, 1956 to January 1957, until individual armed clashes between the rebels and the Hungarian authorities and Soviet troops ceased, 2,502 Hungarians were killed and 19,226 people were wounded. Other figures are given by the West German magazine "Stern" (1998. No. 9). According to him, during the Hungarian events, 2,700 local residents were killed and thousands were injured. The Soviet side lost 2,170 people, including 669 killed. In the first months after the suppression of the uprising, over 200 thousand people left Hungary (out of a total population of 10 million people), mainly young people of the most active and working age. As a result of subsequent trials (22 thousand cases), 400 people were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were interned. The fate of Imre Nagy was also tragic.

Figure 151

A soldier of the 128th Guards Rifle Division on the street of Budapest. November 1956

Even at the height of the fighting in Budapest, on November 4, he, with his remaining loyal ministers and members of their families, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. According to the agreement with the new government of Janos Kadar, everyone who wished to stay in Hungary was allowed to return home without hindrance, the rest could leave the country. Everyone was guaranteed immunity.

On the evening of November 22, Nagy and his associates agreed to leave the Yugoslav embassy. But Janos Kadar did not keep his word. When leaving the embassy, ​​the former Hungarian leaders were arrested by Soviet soldiers and a day later they were taken to Romania with the consent of his government. The entire action was agreed upon in advance with Moscow and Bucharest. Kadar claimed that the Yugoslavs were aware of the agreement, although they later protested why Nagy was taken to Romania.

At the end of March 1957 in Moscow, Kadar reached an agreement with the Soviet leadership that Nagy and his group could not escape responsibility. In April 1957, they were arrested in Romania, where they enjoyed the right of “temporary asylum,” and were secretly transported to Hungary. The investigation lasted until the autumn of 1957. By this time, 74 more “active participants in the counter-revolutionary rebellion” had been detained in connection with the “Nadya case.” From among them, according to the proposal of the Soviet competent authorities, a “leading core of conspirators” was identified in the amount of 11 people. In June 1958, a closed trial took place. Imre Nagy and several of his associates, including the Minister of Defense P. Maleter, the famous publicist M. Ghimes and J. Sziládi, received capital punishment by hanging. On June 16 at 5 a.m. the sentence was carried out. It should be noted that the Soviet leadership opposed the execution of I. Nagy. N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to handle the case of the former Hungarian leader “with soft mittens” (put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then get a job as a teacher at some agricultural institute in the province). Kadar did not listen. According to some researchers, behind this lay “personal grievances” and Magyar stubbornness.

More than 50 years have passed since the October events in Hungary. In December 1991, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech on the occasion of the reception of Hungarian Prime Minister J. Antall, condemned the 1956 invasion. Nevertheless, to this day the question remains controversial: who constituted the main armed force of the “popular uprising”, as the Western media characterized the rebellion?

According to experts of various political views, the number of those who took part in armed battles in Budapest was 15-20 thousand (with a total population of the capital of about 1.9 million people). Moreover, the “revolutionary vanguard” - workers and peasants, apparently occupied the smallest percentage in this series, although many “revolutionary committees” were called workers and peasants. It is likely that individually a significant number of workers nevertheless took direct part in the demonstration and armed struggle. This is confirmed by the materials of the trials. However, what is significant is that on October 23, work was not stopped at any factory, there were no strikes in support of the demonstration and then an uprising, and armed centers were not organized at any factory. The same can be said about agricultural cooperatives and state farms.

In connection with the issue raised, it is important to cite the observations of the Hungarian philosopher, Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. József Foriz. In the article “On the counter-revolution in Hungary in 1956,” he notes: “Armed centers were organized in such squares, in such public buildings, which from a military point of view were well defended and made it possible to conduct armed activities secretly and with impunity.” The competent and skillful actions of the rebels during the assaults and defense of various objects were noted by many eyewitnesses of the events. An analysis of the fighting also suggests that their leaders had good professional military skills. And also, in a number of cases, clearly special training - for conducting combat operations in urban conditions. This is confirmed by the professional choice of positions for organizing firing points, the use of snipers, and more.

Many sources mention the participation of a large number of military personnel of the Hungarian People's Army and internal troops in the struggle. Even facts of individual military units going over to the side of the rebels were broadcast on the radio. For example, András Hegedüs speaks about the defection of the personnel of the Miklós Zrini Military Academy to the side of the rebels in his autobiographical work. But J. Forizh refutes this information. He writes, in particular, that on October 28, 1956 Military Academy With its full complement, it went out to suppress the rebels in Corvin Kez, which was thwarted by the speech of Imre Nagy. A little later, on the basis of the academy’s personnel, the 2nd revolutionary regiment of internal troops was formed. “This,” as Forizh emphasizes, “meant speaking out for socialism.”

Laszlo Durko, a famous Hungarian writer, in his book mentions only one such part - the construction one, located in the Kilian barracks. In it, as he writes, “children of class-alien families were drafted, but not into armed service.”

Former boss Headquarters of the Special Corps, Colonel E.I. Malashenko writes that a small part of the Hungarian army went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in Budapest, the rebels were supported and provided armed resistance by units of two mechanized and one rifle regiments, several construction battalions, and about ten anti-aircraft batteries. At the same time, most researchers note that, in general, the army did not side with the rebels and did not oppose the Soviet troops. Moreover, a significant number of Hungarian military personnel took part in the fight against armed rebel groups and assisted Soviet troops.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to touch upon the issue of armed assistance from external forces, namely Western countries interested in destabilizing relations in the socialist bloc. First of all, the USA. This assistance was not provided at the state level. An analysis of National Security Council documents suggests that the rapidity of events in Hungary took American leaders by surprise. To provide military assistance to Hungary, the United States had to secure the consent of its allies, but they were busy with the war in Egypt. Under these conditions, the US Security Council removed the issue of military assistance to Hungary from the agenda. Moreover, Austria would hardly risk its neutrality to allow military transport aircraft to pass through its airspace.

Nevertheless, it is known that during the Hungarian events, the “legend” of American intelligence, the former head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), General William D. Donovan, was in Austria as the head of the International Assistance Committee. According to the Washington Daily News, at the end of November he returned to Washington from Hungary, whose border, according to the newspaper, he crossed several times during his stay in Austria. In Washington, Donovan told the press that "supplying arms to those still fighting" was the best way to "help" the Hungarians. Asked whether the United States should "encourage continued fighting," Donovan replied, "Of course!" . With the outbreak of the rebellion, then US Vice President R. Nixon also visited Austria. He also traveled to the Hungarian border and even talked with the rebels. During judicial trial over I. Nagy and his associates in February and June 1958, the names of the British military attaché Colonel D. Cowley and member of the West German parliament Prince H. von Lowenstein were heard. The first of them was accused of direct participation in leading the uprising, the second was called a link with “the large imperialist capitalists in West Germany.”

To a greater extent, Western intelligence services were prepared for the Hungarian events. Thanks to their direct assistance, active work was launched to form and prepare combat detachments and sabotage groups for deployment to Hungary. Moreover, it began long before the October events. Popular American journalist Drew Pearson reported interesting facts on November 8, 1956. As early as 1950, he heard from the Hungarian emigrant Dr. Béla Fabian about “underground preparations” in Hungary, with which Fabian was closely associated.

“The Hungarian people want to rebel,” Fabian told Pearson. “Hungary wants to be the first to oppose its Soviet masters... I know about the restlessness among the peasants... If you help a little, a fire will break out in Hungary.”

Pearson asked Fabian what the United States government could do to help.

“You can’t win anything in this life if you don’t risk something,” Fabian replied. “Let them risk shedding a little blood!” .

Pearson's recollections are consistent with the words of D. Angleton, who in 1956 was in charge of counterintelligence and subversive operations at the CIA. A conversation with him was published in the New York Times on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the October events. Here's how the newspaper reported Angleton's story:

“By the mid-fifties, we had brought into line the task forces that were created by divine order in 1950,” Angleton said, citing the directive establishing the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination. – Auth.), the concept of which included the use of quasi-military task forces in order to “in no way agree to the status quo of Soviet hegemony.” Mr. Wisner, recommended by General J. Marshall (then US Secretary of Defense. - Author) to head the subversive program, and Mr. Angleton “undertook extensive training”... Eastern Europeans, partly members of pre-war peasant parties in Hungary, Poland; Romania and Czechoslovakia, were trained at secret CIA centers in West Germany under the guidance of CIA experts. Mr. Angleton added that the units were led by "a natural leader from Yugoslavia who had received military training in Habsburg Austria-Hungary."

One of the training camps for “freedom fighters” was located near Traunstein in Upper Bavaria. It is known that in October 1956 a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. From them, cohesive core groups of rebel detachments were formed, which were then transported by plane to Austria, and from there, by ambulance planes and vehicles, to Hungary.

It should be noted that the basis of the Hungarian combat units were mainly the Horthys who fled to the west in 1945.

William Colby, a former employee of the OSS and, since 1950, the CIA, also mentions special CIA detachments trained to participate in combat operations in socialist countries, including Hungary. In his memoir, My Life in the CIA, he writes:

“Since the creation of the OIC under the leadership of Frank Wiesner, the CIA had the task, or believed that it had a task, to provide OSS-style military support to resistance groups seeking to overthrow totalitarian communist regimes. In Hungary, such groups we called freedom fighters ... As soon as the uprising began in Hungary, Wisner and the senior leadership of the Directorate of Plans (as the defense industrial complex was called since 1952, merging with other divisions of the CIA. - Auth.), especially those involved in subversive work, were fully prepared for action - to come to the aid of freedom fighters with weapons, communications and air transport. This is exactly the kind of work that the CIA's quasi-military units were designed for."

Thanks to the support of Western intelligence services, underground paramilitary groups were created in Hungary itself. Such as “White Partisans”, “National Resistance Movement”, “Union of Junkers”, youth organization “Lux” and others. By the mid-1950s, their activities intensified sharply. In 1956 alone, security agencies uncovered 45 underground organizations and detained a number of West German intelligence agents and the US CIA.

Emigrant organizations were also actively involved in the formation of combat detachments to be sent to Hungary, in particular the Hungarian Bureau (Austria), Caritas (Austria) and the Legion of Hungarian Freedom (Canada). The latter, according to the newspaper Neues Deutschland on October 31, planned to transfer three thousand volunteers - former officers and soldiers of the Horthy army.

Emigrant recruitment centers, supported by Western intelligence services, operated in Salzburg, Kematen, Hungerburg and Reichenau. In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting center headed by an American army captain. From here, former Nazi supporters headed to the scene of events. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of border neutral Austria. More than 500 “volunteers” were transferred from England. Several dozen groups were sent from Fontainebleau, France, where NATO headquarters was then located.

In total, according to some data, during the period of active armed resistance, more than 20 thousand emigrants were brought into the country with the help of Western intelligence services. About 11 thousand people who were part of the “expeditionary force” were awaiting orders to march near the Hungarian border. And the border restaurant of Nikkelsdorf (Austro-Hungarian border), as the Osterreichische Volksstimme wrote, was “like a transit point where people from West Germany arrived, speaking Hungarian and dressed in American uniforms ... each of them had camping equipment.”

Other national anti-communist organizations of the world, including Russians, did not remain indifferent to the events in Hungary. The author does not have any facts about the participation of Russian emigrants in hostilities on the side of the rebels. Nevertheless, there is information about a sabotage group of approximately 200 people, which was planned to be transported to Hungary from the territory of Austria. The saboteurs were led by Nikolai Rutchenko, a member of the NTS since 1942. Information about this group was presented in the documentary film "The Hungarian Trap", shown on November 9, 2006 on the Rossiya TV channel.

More is known about the activities of representatives of Russian organizations in the field of propaganda. NTS and RNO were particularly active in this direction. Here is a sample of one of the RNO's appeals to Soviet soldiers and officers, broadcast over the radio.

"RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Like a terrible spider, the Soviet Union keeps the countries of the so-called Eastern bloc in its web. Many of you visited and saw there the remnants of those freedoms and prosperity that were created before the war under the conditions of a democratic regime, which our Motherland has been deprived of for almost forty years.

The Soviet government, with the help of its agents, enslaved these states, deprived their people of any rights and introduced a communist regime of terror and lawlessness into them.

The first outbreak of popular anger was the Poznan uprising of Polish workers. At the recent trial it definitely became clear that the Poles fought for bread and freedom. The cruel and inhumane actions of the communist police with their provocation, lack of legality and mockery of the population were also revealed.

Then genuine popular indignation broke out in Poland. Soviet troops were sent to Poland, but at the last moment the collective leadership gave in and the regime of freedom began to be restored in Poland.

And Poland was immediately followed by Hungary. Driven to despair by poverty and lack of rights, the Hungarian people rose up and overthrew the despicable and corrupt communist government. AND THE WORST THING HAPPENED IN HUNGARY. By order of the collective leadership, Soviet troops were sent to suppress the PEOPLE'S UPRISING. Soviet aircraft began to bomb Hungarian cities, Soviet tanks shot Hungarian freedom fighters.

We know gratifying cases when Russian officers and soldiers refused to shoot at the Hungarians. Moreover, in certain cases they helped the rebels, expressed their sympathies for the Hungarian patriots and fraternized with them. But the overall impression for the entire free world is terrible: on the orders of the Soviet government, which falsely and hypocritically declares itself to be the defender of the working people, Russian soldiers found themselves in the role of suppressors of the popular uprising.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Tomorrow, other countries enslaved by communism will follow the example of Poland and Hungary. You will be sent to pacify popular uprisings in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Executing the orders of an oppressive government, you will shoot at crowds of people just because they want freedom.

The Russian soldier, a centuries-old synonym of heroism, sacrifice and humanity, will become in the eyes of other peoples the executioner of freedom. This will affect the future relations of the countries liberated from the communist yoke with the future free Russia.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Do not carry out the inhumane and illegal orders of the communist government, which has kept our people in terrible slavery for 39 years.

Help the rebel peoples who are fighting for their and YOUR freedom.

Show these peoples all the generosity that RUSSIAN is capable of.

Turn your bayonets, machine guns and tanks against the communist tyrants who hold our people, other peoples in terrible slavery and disgrace the name of our homeland.

RUSSIAN GENERALS AND OFFICERS. Set an example for your soldiers. The fate of Russia and its people is in your hands. Overthrow the communist government. Create a people's government, responsible to the people and caring only about the interests of our Fatherland.

Down with the dishonest, slave-owning, communist regime.

LONG LIVE FREE RUSSIA.

LOG LIVE THE UNION and FRIENDSHIP OF FREE RUSSIA with OTHER FREE PEOPLES."

Western “psychological warfare” services played a special role in the events in Hungary in October–November 1956. Primarily the radio stations Voice of America and Free Europe. The latter, as G. A. Kissinger noted in his book “Diplomacy,” was under the special patronage of John F. Dulles. These radio stations not only called for open protest against the ruling regime, promising support from NATO countries, but were actually the coordinating body of the uprising. Moreover, even the Western media were forced to admit that many Free Europe radio broadcasts grossly distort the actual state of affairs. “Radio Free Europe,” said an article in the American magazine “News Week,” “specialized in presenting the communist system in the worst possible light.”

Hungarian broadcasts were compiled with the active participation of Hungarian emigrants, most of whom collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War. For example, radio broadcasts of “Free Europe” organized specifically for Hungary under the name “Voice of Free Hungary” were opened on October 6, 1951 by Count D. Dejeffi, a participant in the anti-republican conspiracy in Hungary. Former Horthy diplomat A. Gellert participated in the radio broadcasts. One of the leading commentators on the Hungarian section of Radio Free Europe was former Horthy army captain J. Borsanyi, who spoke under the pseudonym “Colonel Bell.”

At the end of October 1956, a secret meeting of representatives of American intelligence and leaders of Hungarian emigrant organizations took place in Munich. At this meeting the question of how the propaganda of “Free Europe” should contribute to the development of a “revolutionary situation” in Hungary was considered. The tactics of “two stages” were adopted: the first – the destruction of state security agencies, the banning of the Communist Party, the declaration of “neutrality”, economic and later military accession to the Western bloc; the second is the overthrow of the socialist system, the bourgeois revolution. From that moment on, Radio Free Europe became, in essence, the governing body and organizer of rebellious protests. Having switched to round-the-clock broadcasting, it began to broadcast, along with general propaganda statements, specific combat instructions. Advice was given to illegal radio stations on what wavelength and how to broadcast. Those who did not surrender their weapons were encouraged to continue resistance. For example, when the government of Imre Nagy issued a call for a ceasefire, Free Europe immediately called on its listeners to disrupt the truce. The already mentioned military expert and Free Europe commentator, “Colonel Bell,” believed that a ceasefire was “as dangerous as a Trojan horse.”

“Imre Nagy and his friends,” he said on October 29, “want to insidiously, in a modern way, repeat the story of the Trojan horse. A ceasefire, like the Trojan horse, is necessary so that the Budapest government, which is still in control at the moment, power, could hold its position as long as possible... Those who fight for freedom must not forget for a minute about the plan of the government opposing them, because otherwise the tragedy of the Trojan Horse will repeat itself."

As is known, it was under the active influence of the propaganda of Radio Free Europe and as a result of the intervention of some Western missions that the truce was actually disrupted. The next day, literally a few hours after the above radio broadcast, an attack began on the city party committee on Republic Square and other organizations, as well as mass attacks on communists, which resulted in numerous casualties.

On October 31, "Colonel Bell" demanded that the portfolio of the Minister of Defense be transferred to the "freedom fighters", and soon, on November 3, this post was taken by Colonel Pal Maleter. On the same day, Radio Free Europe issued new instructions: “Let them liquidate the Warsaw Pact and declare that Hungary is no longer a party to the treaty.” The next day, November 1, Imre Nagy announced his withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. And many such examples can be given.

The leading role of “Free Europe” in inciting the armed conflict in Hungary was recognized even by representatives of the Western press. Here, for example, is how the Paris correspondent of the France Soir newspaper Michel Gorde, who was in Hungary during the rebellion, described the broadcasts of this radio station. “We could listen to foreign radio broadcasts, which was our only source of information from the outside world. We heard many false reports about what was happening in Hungary.

We listened to broadcasts from Radio Free Europe in Munich, intended for satellite countries. Her impatient tone and excited calls for rebellion undoubtedly caused much harm.

Over the past few days, many Hungarians have told us that these radio broadcasts have led to great bloodshed." A correspondent for another French publication, the weekly Expresse, wrote the following about his impressions in Budapest: "Everywhere in Budapest I met Hungarians of the most varied social status who, with bitterness, and even spoke with hatred about the Americans, about Radio Free Europe, about the sent balloons with propaganda leaflets." And one more piece of evidence. The West German newspaper "Freies Wort" wrote: "We are convinced that, first of all, the aggressive propaganda of the Free Europe transmitter is largely to blame for the bloodshed in Hungary... Propaganda, which was ultimately paid for with the blood of the introduced misleading people is a crime against humanity."

Speaking about the “psychological warfare” launched by Western propaganda services, it is important to touch upon two mythological stories that have become widespread on the pages of many “free” media. Echoes of these stories can be heard to this day.

The first myth. According to Western media, during the Hungarian events a large number of Soviet troops went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in particular, in the Parisian emigrant magazine "Renaissance" it was noted that already in the first days, among the wounded rebels who were evacuated to Austria, there were many Russian officers and soldiers. In total, according to Pastor, a member of the Budapest Revolutionary Committee, “3,000 Russians with 60 tanks went over to the side of the “revolution.” The same figures are cited in some other emigrant publications. At the same time, A.N. Pestov, a Russian White emigrant, talking about his stay in Hungary on the pages of the authoritative emigrant magazine “Chasovoy”, writes that rumors about large armed detachments allegedly leaving for the mountains were “extremely exaggerated.” Although he mentions “one Soviet unit that joined the Hungarian detachment.” True, and this is not true. In any case, there is no data on the transition of any groups of Soviet military personnel to the rebels. Only about five cases of escape to Austria are known. Soviet soldiers who went over to the side of the Hungarian rebels did not “surface” on the pages of propaganda publications in subsequent years.

Nevertheless, special committees were even organized to assist the “Russian heroes who joined the Hungarians in their struggle for freedom.” The collection of donations was initiated by a number of Russian emigrant organizations, including the Tolstoy Foundation, the Union of Officials of the Russian Corps, and the Russian National Association (RNO).

"Russian people!

According to the latest information received, many officers and soldiers of the Soviet army went over to the side of the Hungarian freedom fighters and fought in their ranks. Russian soldiers have already arrived in Austria.

Seven Russian organizations have already addressed a special memorandum to the International Red Cross, drawing its attention to the exceptionally difficult legal situation of Russians who rebelled against the usurper Soviet power, and demanding the application of the legitimate norms of international law to them.

But at the same time, urgent sanitary and material assistance is needed. Germany is already organizing the sending of sanitary and food aid to Hungary. A special Russian Help Committee was formed in Munich.

We appeal to all Russian people in Belgium with a request for urgent assistance with monetary contributions in favor of Russian officers and soldiers who raised the banner of the struggle against communism in Hungary.

Every contribution, even the smallest one, will be accepted with gratitude.

All collected amounts will be urgently sent to the Russian Committee in Munich, in whose hands this assistance will be centralized.

Please send all contributions to SSR - 60.039 to the address: de I "Union Nationule Russe, 4, rue Paul-Emile Janson, Bruxelles, or collect them by subscription sheets, transferring them to the Office of the Russian National Association."

According to the magazine "Our News", in just ten days more than 200 Russian emigrant families in Corinthia and Styria donated about 13,000 shillings to the needs of new refugees.

True, where the funds collected by Russian emigrants went “for the thousands of compatriots who left the “communist paradise”, the author was unable to find on the pages of the same emigrant newspapers and magazines.

The second myth is related to the alleged “atrocities of Soviet soldiers.” Many pages of the Western media of those years were devoted to these “facts”. According to an eyewitness to the events, Russian White emigrant A. Pestov, who is difficult to suspect of sympathizing with the Soviet Union, this is not true. In the essay “I Was in Hungary,” he notes the strict discipline in Soviet units, which were under the complete control of their commanders. A former officer of the Volunteer Army describes his impressions of Soviet soldiers as follows:

“When I looked at these Russian guys and saw them every day and in the most varied situations, I did not find in them those “Bolsheviks” who were pictured to me and are pictured to thousands of my comrades abroad. We imagine an unbridled robber, with a swirl of hair, with with brutal eyes and an evil grimace, this is how we remember the “Bolsheviks” from civil war. Now these are the same Russian guys with shaved heads, with kind faces, with a desire to joke and laugh, like the soldiers of that company that I, a young warrant officer, first led into battle in the August forests at the beginning of the war. My boys shed their blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. And they shed it selflessly. These, too, perhaps a few of the “armed peoples” of the civilized world, will go into battle, even without a supply of crackers, without any canned chicken, without field cinematographers and lupanars, and without artillery preparation sweeping away everything and everyone in front of them.”

In addition, he notes the “truly humane attitude” on the part of Soviet soldiers towards local residents, especially women and children. And not only in the first days, but also after the suppression of the rebellion. Despite the often emphasized hostility towards the soldiers of the population of Budapest, A. Pestov claims that there was neither a thirst for revenge nor reprisals, emphasizing the respect of Soviet soldiers for the church and the execution of orders so that the population suffered the least.

In conclusion, the essay should be said about the consequences of the Hungarian events. They influenced not only the aggravation of relations with Western countries, but also caused a negative reaction in some states of the socialist bloc. Thus, one of the university professors in Brno, in an article published in the newspaper Literaturny Noviny, noted:

“Our youth are also infected with the “Hungarian disease”. We have youth in front of us and do not really know who we have in front of us. Youth organizations are indifferent to the majority of our youth... The “Communist Manifesto” is considered by our students only as material for preparing for the next seminar..."

Some leaders of countries “friendly” to the USSR also condemned Soviet policy in Hungary. The prime ministers of India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, in a joint declaration adopted on November 14, condemned the armed solution to the political crisis in Hungary. In their declaration they wrote that “Soviet armed forces must be withdrawn from Hungary as soon as possible” and that “the Hungarian people must be given complete freedom to decide about their future and the form government controlled" .

I am deceived in bright hope,
I am deprived of Fate and soul -
Only once did I rebel in Budapest
Against arrogance, oppression and lies

Do you know what the burning corpses on the pillars smelled like? Have you ever seen a naked woman with her stomach ripped open, lying in the street dust? Have you seen cities where people are silent and only crows scream?

“It’s hard to be God” Strugatsky

Anarchists and fascists took the city,
Anarchists and fascists walk the streets together,
Young and beautiful

Eduard Limonov

It is quite unpleasant for me to analyze the motives of people whom even friendly historians called “a primitive, primitive and cruel crowd.”

After reading the memoirs of eyewitnesses to the Hungarian events of 1956, you smile with a smile at the benevolent apocrypha, in which the actions of Soviet soldiers to suppress the rebellion are explained by the “ignorance of recruits from Central Asia, who were told that they were sent to fight NATO soldiers in Berlin.” Everything was much simpler. What analogies arose in the minds of Soviet tank crews and infantrymen when they saw mutilated corpses hanging on poles, the burned bodies of their comrades who were captured, broken communist symbols and piles of burned books? Who could do such a thing? Only the fascists are the only obvious answer.

But why did this happen? Why, 11 years after the collapse of Nazism in Hungary, did a mass fascist movement almost win in the country? Perhaps the answer to these questions will help us understand not only the origins of the tragedy of 1956, but also the reasons for the collapse and collapse of “real socialism” in subsequent decades.

Soviet propaganda explained the Hungarian catastrophe by the intrigues of imperialism, which, as we know, does not sleep. But the Hungary of 1956 was not the Honduras of 1954 or the Cuba of 1961. For the American authorities, the events in this country were a complete surprise. By October 24, 1956, the American Embassy in Budapest had only one Hungarian-speaking employee. Only at the beginning of November did American instructors and combat detachments of Hungarian emigrants apparently begin to arrive in the country, but they had no real influence on the development of events. This cannot be said about the propaganda effect of the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, which during the days of the uprising became an analogue of the perestroika “Ogonyok” and “Echo of Moscow” in one bottle. American propagandists from Munich called on the Hungarians to fight the Soviet troops to the last and promised Western help long after Budapest fell and Cardinal Mindstedy locked himself in the American embassy. But the inflammatory broadcasts of the Americans also gained important, only after October 24, 1956.
The causes of the crisis must be sought in Hungary itself.

Although current Hungarian propaganda presents Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s as a “lost paradise,” it should be understood that we are talking about a poor, agricultural country. Destructive Second World War destroyed 40% of the national industry, which also did not contribute to the progress and well-being of the population. Moreover, Hungary, as the losing side in the war, was forced to pay reparations to the victors. The situation became even more aggravated after the start of the Cold War, in which Hungary became one of the “front-line powers.” The constant threat of invasion from the West forced the Rákosi regime to create a militarized economy, in which every forint was spent on military expenditures at the expense of living standards.

The situation of the working class was very difficult. In 1954, 15% did not have blankets. 20% did not have winter clothes. A worker at that time received about 1,200 forints a month, which was not enough to live on. Only 15% of families could support themselves at the subsistence level.

Up to a certain point, the authorities could refer to the “difficult legacy of the old regime,” but the post-war economic boom made this argument more and more vulnerable every year. To make matters worse, industrial wages fell in 1953, returning to 1949 levels. The generous promises made by the communists after the war turned out to be unfulfilled and the masses were gradually overcome by a feeling of hopelessness and despair.
Already in 1953, at the Csepel plant in Budapest, the flagship of Hungarian industry, there were unrest of almost 20 thousand workers protesting against low wages, food shortages and harsh production standards. Labor unrest also took place in other cities of the country.

Economic difficulties were aggravated by the tense situation in the national question. Like the USSR, Hungary after 1945 faced an acute problem of personnel shortages. There were two reasons for this: First, rapid growth in the economy and education. Secondly, the emigration of old elites. As in the Soviet Union, this issue was resolved by using personnel from among more educated national minorities, primarily Jews. This led to a surge in anti-Semitism. As in the pre-war Soviet Union, for the backward masses and the old Hungarian intelligentsia the words Jew-communist-boss were synonymous.

American sociologist Jay Shulman, who conducted surveys of Hungarians who fled overseas after 1956, came to the conclusion that “In the eyes of 100% of respondents, all communist leaders were Jews.” “All the important positions are occupied by Jews,” said the young and devout Hungarian Erika, whom Shulman interviewed. Another emigrant, an engineer by profession, insisted that “All the leaders of cooperatives are Cohens and Schwartzes.” “In their eyes there was a pogrom,” the American scientist summed up.
To “fight” anti-Semitism, the Rakosi regime did not come up with anything better than organizing “anti-Zionist” trials and giving secret instructions to limit the number of Jews in a number of areas. However, this did not convince the anti-Semites of anything, since Matthias Rakosi himself was Rosenfeld after all.

The ridiculous and tactless propaganda of the “Soviet way of life” and the USSR also added fuel to the fire. Too many streets were named after Pushkin and Lermontov, Soviet advisers interfered too unceremoniously in matters of political and economic life in Hungary, too many empty words were said about “Soviet-Hungarian friendship.” Even for nationalist-minded Hungarians, copying the Soviet grading system in schools and Soviet uniforms in the army was offensive, but what about the nationalists for whom Russians were “worse than animals”?

The combination of economic discontent and feelings of national disadvantage created an explosive mixture. In Hungary, as in a number of other Eastern European countries, there was a tradition of mass fascist movements putting forward radical social slogans. They had mass support not only among the middle class and lumpen proletariat, but also among industrial workers. In Hungary, the Nazi Arrow Cross party, created in 1937, received 41% of the votes in elections in the working-class suburbs of Budapest. After the collapse of the Horthy regime, and then Salashism, the leadership of the “Painted Arrows” was sent to the gallows or fled, but many thousands of workers who voted for the fascists did not go anywhere and took an active part in the events of 1956, largely determining the nature of the movement - brutal cruelty in combination with a mixture of nationalist and social slogans.

The immediate impetus for the outbreak of the 1956 crisis, which developed into an uprising, was the attempts of the ruling bureaucracy to reform the system. Comrade Ivan Loch made an interesting point on this issue: bureaucratic reform in Eastern Europe, and later in the USSR, almost always led to counter-revolution. On the one hand, the reform led to conflict and split among the stratum in power, which opponents of the regime in any country and in any era are always happy to take advantage of. The second reason was that these reforms from above were usually the reaction of the bureaucracy to the regime of “proletarian Bonapartism”, which not only limited the political and economic ambitions of the highest party bosses, but also constantly called into question their status and even their lives. Through de-Stalinization, the bureaucracy provided guarantees of its lifelong power, but the most consistent officials like Beria, Nagy, Gorbachev, Yakovlev were given the opportunity to think about implementing the next step: the privatization of the property of the workers' state and the transfer of this property and power by inheritance.

In the period from 1953 to 1956, the struggle between supporters of proletarian Bonapartism (Rakosi, Gere), moderate reformers (Kadar) and a wing of the bureaucracy ready to undertake more radical reforms along the path of restoration of capitalism completely destabilized the political system of the Hungarian People's Republic.
On October 24, 1956, the regime collapsed like a house of cards. The “orderly columns of workers” gathered for a pro-government rally turned into wild hordes of lynch mobs. The attempt to build socialism ended in medieval barbarity.

French journalist Jean-Paul Boncourt, an eyewitness to the events, exclaimed in horror:
“This is not a bourgeois revolution! Look at this motley crowd; This is garbage!
Boncourt was right. What happened was not a bourgeois revolution, but a spontaneous fascist uprising. Dearly beloved in Russia, David Irving, whose Nazi views are, I hope, no secret to anyone, wrote in his 1956 book dedicated to Hungary: “the uprising that began as an old-fashioned Jewish pogrom suddenly grew into a full-scale revolution.” There is a considerable amount of truth in this phrase. In many areas of Hungary, the “Revolution of 1956” began precisely with the beating of the Jewish population.

On October 25, 1956, patients from a Jewish nursing home were slaughtered in the town of Tápiószentgyörgy. Three Jews were killed in Miskolc. Also, three Jews were stabbed to death in the town of Tarcal. On October 25, in Mezökövesd and in Mezönyárad many Jews were beaten; in Hajdunánás the events took the form of a Jewish pogrom, when the crowd tortured and robbed Jews. According to the testimony of Jewish refugees in Canada, Jews fled from pogromists on the roofs of houses. In Debrecen, the massacre of the Jewish population took place according to pre-prepared (!) lists. In the village of Tárpa, demonstrators demanded the hanging of three Jews living in their community, but in the end they limited themselves to “only” beating them. In the town of Mátészalka, anti-Semitic demonstrations by rebels were accompanied by accusations that Jews were drinking the blood of Christian babies. Jews were forced to flee from the lynchings. After the suppression of the revolution or rebellion, the press service of the Kadar government announced pogroms in the villages of Vámospercs-Nyíradony, Hajdunánás, Balkány, Marikocs and Nyirbátor. Even in those places where there were no attacks on Jews, throughout the uprising they lived in fear and every minute in anticipation of the beginning of the massacre.

(It is curious that even in the West, anti-Soviet Jews did not find peace from their former fellow citizens. Riots and attacks on Jews who emigrated from Hungary by other Hungarian refugees in Austria forced the authorities of this country to get rid of the Jews as soon as possible by transporting them overseas).

The first days of the riots passed in an atmosphere of bloody chaos and anarchy. In a matter of hours, Hungary went through all those processes along the path of restoration of the old regime, which took Russia six years to overcome (from 1987 to 1993). Not everyone was able to immediately adapt to the situation. Some talked about socialism and sang at the Nagy health resorts, while others burned books of Lenin and Marx on a nearby street. On October 23, 1956, Csepel workers kicked out the necks of students who came to agitate them. A few days later, the same workers, with the name of the Virgin Mary on their lips, went to die under Soviet tanks.
There was another factor in the Hungarian events that is misleading many today. This is a factor in possible restitutions. Unlike the Eastern Europeans of the 1980s, the Hungarians of 1956 had not yet forgotten all the delights of capitalism in the city and feudalism in the countryside. The peasants were so afraid of the return of the landowners that, despite all the costs of Hungarian collectivization, they preferred to quietly sabotage the “people's revolution”, maintaining neutrality. The Hungarian workers of 1956, unlike their children, did not believe in the “good master” and preferred workers’ self-government.

Meanwhile, the country was rapidly moving to the right. Nationalist and fascist methods and slogans absolutely dominated social programs and determined the nature of the uprising. Already on October 25, students covered the walls of Budapest with graffiti such as: “Freedom for Mindszenti!”, “No to communism!” and what is most interesting: “No to workers’ councils - the communists have their paws in this pie.” It's true - the first workers' councils were created with the support of the Nagy government. The first secretary of the Budapest city committee, Imer Meze (killed in the back on October 30), personally ordered the arming of the workers, hoping to rely on them in the fight against the counter-revolution.

As the rebels rapidly radicalized, public sympathy shifted from the hapless “Uncle Imre” to the suffering Cardinal Mindscene, an anti-Semite and monarchist languishing under house arrest. On October 30, the American Embassy in Budapest reported to Washington a list of demands from demonstrators outside the parliament building:
1. Appoint Mindscenti as Prime Minister
2. Appoint Colonel Malter as Minister of Defense.
3. Withdraw Soviet troops from the country by November 15
4. If these demands are not met, demand that the Western powers begin intervention.
As you know, Mindscenti soon received his freedom. To the sound of church bells, like Atoyalla Khomeny, he rode into Budapest in a tank, surrounded by crowds of fans. He set up his residence on the grounds of the royal palace in Buda, in a symbolic place from where in 1944 German paratroopers under the command of Otto Skorzeny rescued Regent Horthy.
Imre Nagy became a completely superfluous figure, like Gorbachev after Foros. After, under pressure from the crowd, he decided to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact organization, the last more or less principled communists left his government, including the philosopher Dergy Lukács.

In early November, the first groups of American military specialists began arriving in Hungary across the open border. They trained Hungarian teenagers to make anti-tank bombs and make Molotov cocktails.
The rolling ultra-right wave was obvious to everyone who was even slightly aware of the real state of affairs in Budapest. The leader of the Hungarian Social Democrats, Anna Kelti (a staunch anti-communist, by the way), who came to a meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna, spoke about the “victory of the counter-revolution.” Her words sounded like a voice crying in the desert amid the raptures of the Social Democrats, singing the praises of the “workers’ uprising.” Before leaving Vienna, the leader of the Socialist International, Herbert Wehner, called her:
“What will Nagy do?
-He intends to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact! You can't put two and two together! Do you want Mindszenti and a fascist putsch in Hungary?

The fanaticism and cruelty of the rebels played a bad joke on them. If they had adhered to a more moderate line, then USSR intervention in the Hungarian events probably could have been avoided. Back on October 29, 1956, at a reception at the Turkish embassy in Moscow, USSR Foreign Minister D. Shepilov and Marshal G. Zhukov openly spoke of their sympathy for the Hungarian workers who opposed the bureaucracy. However, the shocking information about the pogroms and massacres in Hungary ultimately overwhelmed Khrushchev's patience. On November 4, Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border. The rebel resistance was crushed within a few days.

The dominant view in left-communist, Trotskyist and anarchist historiography is that the Soviet regime suppressed the Hungarian labor movement. This is an interesting thesis, the only flaw of which is that it does not correspond to the facts. After all, the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest arose on November 14, 1956, ten days after the start of the Soviet intervention. After the smoke from the gunfire cleared, it turned out that the entire right-wing political spectrum of Hungarian politics was on its way to the Austrian border, and the workers' councils were the only power on the ground. The fascist stage of the Hungarian revolution was over, and there could no longer be any talk of Prime Minister Mindszenty. The anarcho-syndicalist stage began, marked by labor strikes and useless bargaining with the Kadar government. The nationalist sentiments of the Hungarian workers again played a bad joke on them. Kadar was ready to compromise on issues of self-government of enterprises and workers' councils, but the demand for the return of Nadya and the withdrawal of Soviet troops was obviously impossible. But these were the main conditions of the protesters.

As a result, the movement of workers' councils, after several weeks of unsuccessful confrontation with the government based on Soviet bayonets, collapsed. The Hungarian workers could count Kadar’s “goulash socialism” as their asset. The restoration of capitalism was delayed for 30 years. The fascist revolution in Hungary continues to be on the agenda, inspired by the myth of 1956.