Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, there was a fierce clash between huge masses of troops using the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles that were victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».

The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943

Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:

« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)

The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel proved to be the beginning of the end for the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».

The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)

Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons entering the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery units, aircraft, and anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed, similar enemy systems.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grand battle A metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.

had the greatest international significance. It had a great impact on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».

Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany, the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.

Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy

Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attracting foreign workers into industry, agriculture and transport, for whom Hitler’s “ new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.

After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».

Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.

Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at the Kursk Bulge, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to come out even more decisively with the demand for the rapid opening of a second front in Europe.

The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.

The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of defensive fronts reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.

Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.

In the Battle of Kursk The Soviet Armed Forces for the third time during the Great Patriotic War successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.

During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. The correct choice of the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this had of enormous importance for the defeat of the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.

In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.

The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.

Soviet tank forces in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.

During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.

Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk The massing of front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main axes was carried out more decisively, and their interaction with ground forces improved.

A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms of military branches and special forces. The tank armies of the new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations, played an important role in achieving victory.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.

Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support to troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.

The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, South-Western and left wing of the Western Fronts were supplied by rail with 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies from central bases and warehouses. By air, 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.

The medical service of fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of the forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.

Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between a mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».

Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. So, former boss of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder back in 1949 at work "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».

Documents show that miscalculations in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.

The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.

IN last years Works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events in the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».

Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy produced more military equipment and weapons than industry fascist Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.

But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimating its own strengths were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.

From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the efficient work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.

An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.

The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.

At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible decisions of the Soviet command were assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from their previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.

Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Military orders sparkled on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.

Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.

An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.

The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.

« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.

The Battle of Kursk, in its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk, is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk two of the most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk is difficult to overestimate. If not for the exploits of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again moving towards Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the Wehrmacht's combat-ready units on the Eastern Front, and it lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Military Glory of Russia. In addition, the battles included the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history, and also involved a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of utmost importance this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which occurred earlier than the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the German plans for the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union had gathered its strength and was able to pose a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, historians estimate that at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed and more than half a million were wounded. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may have been much more significant. It is mainly foreign historians who speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

Soviet intelligence played a huge role in the victory over Germany, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began receiving reports of this operation at the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the Soviet leader’s desk, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its conduct, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was difficult to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had not done its job. Probably, the Germans would still have been able to break through the Russian defense, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they prepared for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered this important knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called “Cambridge Five” (a group of British intelligence officers who were recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that information about the plans of the German command was conveyed by the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about Operation Citadel was conveyed to Moscow by one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War, Rudolf Ressler, who was in Switzerland at that time.

Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz encryption machine, which transmitted messages between members of the senior leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept the plans for the summer offensive in the area of ​​Kursk and Belgorod, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would proceed. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation “Citadel” and was able to adequately prepare for it so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive actions that led to the formation of a bulge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the “Kursk Bulge”. In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles would soon begin for this ledge, which could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

There was no consensus at German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not develop an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at this moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced military leader of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler still agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 was the Union’s chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation for the operation was taken with previously unprecedented seriousness.

The situation at the USSR headquarters was much better. Stalin was aware of the German plans; he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would attack, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications and laid minefields to meet them in order to repel the attack and then launch a counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, after two years of military operations, were still able to develop the tactics and strategy of waging war among the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed even before it began.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name ( code name)"Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to launch descending attacks from the north (area of ​​the city of Orel) and from the south (area of ​​the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans had to unite in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk, thus completely encircling the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. In addition, the German tank units had to turn in an eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and would not help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people in Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of tank divisions was common for the Germans. The Wehrmacht forces always used lightning attacks from tank units to prevent the enemy from even having a chance to group and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht forces were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were commanded by General Hermann Hoth.

Before the start of the battle, the German army received long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" were some of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If Soviet soldiers had already seen the “Tigers” and learned to fight against them, then the “Panthers” and “Ferdinands” caused many problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers were medium tanks that were slightly inferior in armor to the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank gun (tank destroyer), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to USSR tanks, since at that time it had perhaps the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, his the main problem consisted of a small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was highly vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to fire sub-caliber shells. The most vulnerable point in the tank’s defense was the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already out of date at that time.

The 2nd Panzer Army during the Battle of Kursk included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (it aka "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In the number of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet army, and some sources indicate a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding off a massive offensive by German armored forces. According to the command's plans, the Red Army was supposed to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counter-offensive at the most unfavorable moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and effective generals in the army - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took upon themselves the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk ledge. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native Voronezh region Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders fell the task of defending the southern front of the ledge. USSR Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of troop numbers was far from being on Germany's side. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than twice as inferior: 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of forces before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. Great Patriotic War historian Alexey Isaev says that the strength of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of fighters of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations amounted to more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the diagram of the Battle of Kursk. A map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat units acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans would soon face resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front in order to provide a response artillery barrage, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was supposed to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare a defense. Manstein told Hitler more than once that this offensive no longer made sense at the moment. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try to first repel the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkassy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. The strong defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to penetrate 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions were barely making any progress. As soon as it became clear that German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the Prokhorovsk direction.

On July 11, heavy fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered German tanks, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted its offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

Tank battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks were involved on both sides, since data from different sources differs. If we take average data, then the number of USSR tanks reached about 1 thousand vehicles. While the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four tank divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were sent from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, since the rising sun shone directly into the Germans’ tank observation devices. The battle formations of the sides quickly became mixed up, and just a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to tell where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks lay in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation maneuverability was key. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, since they had a chance to target the vulnerable spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (this is especially true of the famous T-34).

However, the Germans still gave a serious rebuff with their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tank crews - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form formations.

While the bulk of the tank forces were engaged in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack it was necessary to use the tank reserves of the Red Army. In the southern direction, already by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push back German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening the battlefield was already far behind Soviet tanks units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation were as follows:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irrecoverable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly greater. For example, after the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier, also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 units of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the Union tank units, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the Germans' tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that “tanks do not fight tanks.” Most tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle became a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of the bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and bleeding, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks that took part in the battle of Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed, or fell into enemy hands.

The loss ratio during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops reached the line they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went into deep defense.

During the Battle of Kursk, a radical change occurred. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, Soviet troops carried out the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the enemy’s Donbass group so that the enemy would not be able to transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. Despite the fact that the enemy threw perhaps his best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and pin down and encircle the Donbass German group with powerful blows. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Mius offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull fresh German reserves from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant air forces and tank units to protect the city. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”.

The offensive Operation Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​the city of Orel, where Soviet troops were confronted by two German armies. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold a bridgehead; on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943 that for the first time during the entire period of hostilities with Germany, a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully completed.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called “Rumyantsev”. The operation was carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front.

Just two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the German Kharkov-Poltava railway line. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the Red Army forces continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The Battle of Kursk was already won by Soviet troops at that moment. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order to “stand until the last.”

The Mginsk offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the German plan of attack on Leningrad, to prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and to completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery bombardment, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the Red Army forces managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy’s defense, they were unable to advance further.

At the beginning of August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, USSR soldiers managed to capture the enemy’s defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded over Sinyaevo and Sinyaevskie Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they went back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the spacecraft command decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and switch to a defensive defense. Thus, the Mgin offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use reserves that were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible that the Wehrmacht could send under the Kursk to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy’s defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, since it marked the beginning of the liberation of Belarus. However, most importantly, the military leaders of the Battle of Kursk achieved pinning down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from heading to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the enemy’s positions near Kursk, the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties’ plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German group in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle and managed to break through the enemy defenses. Of all the regiments, the 67th stood out especially in battles. The successful offensive continued and on August 30 the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, but the Donbass offensive operation continued - the spacecraft forces had to push the enemy beyond the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in this area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino, or as the city is now called, Donetsk, was taken.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running low on ammunition for their artillery guns. During the retreat, German soldiers actively used “scorched earth” tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages and small towns along their route. During the Battle of Kursk 1943, retreating through cities, the Germans plundered everything they could get their hands on.

On September 22, the Germans were pushed back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After this, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending in complete success for the Red Army.

All of the above operations led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to retreat beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one doubted anymore that victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. Germany’s allies also understood this, and they began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an attack on Sicily and Italian troops surrendered to British and American forces with virtually no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler’s plans, since in order to retain Western Europe he had to transfer some troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the German positions near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and go into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases involves the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the KV-1’s armor. German tank crews tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing worked. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base to deal with the tankers there. They hooked up the KV-1 and began towing it. About halfway there, the KV-1 engine suddenly started and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tank crews were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin’s desk, the General Secretary stated that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the line.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the Allies' attitude towards the USSR. A report to the US President, written in August, stated that the USSR now occupied a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the success of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a “second front” would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit for itself. Consequently, the opening of a “second front” should follow as quickly as possible, while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel entailed the breakdown of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which had already been prepared for execution. A victory at Kursk would make it possible to develop an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans set off to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front gave the Americans and British the opportunity to turn around in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat for Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke the agreement with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.

Success, of course, came at a heavy price. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as were the German ones. The balance of forces has already been shown above - now it’s worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources differ greatly. Many historians take average figures - 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The sides also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and aircraft losses amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German ones - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like 5:1 or 4:1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to German ones, whereas at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manschein, who was considered the best military leader of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards “For participation in the Battle of Kursk.”

Another interesting fact– children also took part in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military personnel and supplies.

Finally, it is important to secure all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 – 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 – August 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 – bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 – 27, 1943 – Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 – August 2, 1943 – Mius offensive operation;
• July 12 – August 18, 1943 – Oryol strategic offensive operation “Kutuzov”;
• August 3 – 23, 1943 – Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Rumyantsev”;
• July 22 – August 23, 1943 – Mginsk offensive operation;
• August 7 – October 2, 1943 – Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 – September 22, 1943 – Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Arc of Fire:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• the complete fiasco of the German campaign to capture the USSR;
• The Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to transition to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once was achieved.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

At this time, new combat aircraft entered service with the German Air Force: Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use of La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters by the Soviet Air Force took place.

On May 6-8, Soviet aviation with the forces of six air armies struck on a 1200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast Sea of ​​Azov. The targets for this strike were German Air Force airfields. On the one hand, this really made it possible to inflict some damage on both vehicles and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aviation suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.

In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railways, bridges, and places where Soviet forces were concentrated. It is worth noting that German aviation was often more successful. Claims about this were expressed by units of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops failed to achieve serious damage and disruption of the communication routes of the Red Army.

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this event was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the German troops suffered significant damage. However, apparently, it was not possible to cause much damage. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

Aviation was supposed to support Soviet troops in countering the artillery attack, but due to the dark time of day, all flights were canceled. At 2:30 on July 5, the aviation units received a readiness directive from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, fighter units had to be ready at dawn to repel possible Luftwaffe raids, and attack aircraft and bombers were required to be combat ready by 6:00 am.

Early in the morning, Soviet fighters began fighting German bombers and attack aircraft. In the Maloarkhangelsk area, German Ju-88s, operating under the cover of Focke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. The pilots of the 157th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost its unit commander, Hermann Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.

Until half past eight in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel Luftwaffe attacks. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air has also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to fly in groups of 6-8 fighters: an organizational error made by the aviation command had an impact. This led to serious difficulties for the Red Army Air Force fighters. In general, during the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the mistakes mentioned above, the lack of experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.

On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps near Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st Bomber Division flew sorties until the afternoon, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan and other populated areas. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed Soviet positions. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by ground forces.

Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also at the same time to try to change the tactics of using aviation. They tried to send large groups of fighters ahead of the bombers to “clear” the airspace. Commanders of air divisions and regiments began to receive more initiative when planning operations. But during operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with given goals, without being distracted from the plan.

In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army flew about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy losses, but did everything possible to provide adequate support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of fighting, the army command changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive attacks on concentrations of enemy equipment and manpower. These attacks had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - Army General Vatutin) fighting began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of military outposts of the front and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoe. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

Air support for the Red Army units on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was provided by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. Early in the morning of July 5, German aircraft began bombing the battle formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. The sorties of fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite significant damage on the enemy, but the losses of Soviet troops were also high.

On July 6, German tanks launched an assault on the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among other Soviet units, the 291st Assault and 2nd Guards Assault Air Divisions of the 16th Air Army should be noted, which for the first time used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy equipment was described as "excellent".

The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th Army. However, here too the command tried to adjust the tactics of using aircraft, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible and strive with all its might to increase the efficiency of air force operations. Apparently, these measures achieved their goal. Increasingly, words began to appear in the reports of commanders of ground units that Soviet attack aircraft made it much easier to repel German tank and infantry attacks. The fighters also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Thus, it was noted that only the 5th Fighter Air Corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 downed enemy aircraft.

On July 10, bad weather set in on the Kursk Bulge. This sharply reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5s from the 193rd Fighter Regiment, who managed to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with a cover of six Bf.109s. Enemy planes randomly dropped bombs and began to retreat to their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. A heroic feat in this battle was performed by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went into the oncoming ram of a Messerschmitt and died.

On July 12, at the height of the Battle of Prokhorov, aircraft on both sides could provide only very limited support to ground units: weather conditions continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties on this day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. However, in the reports of German pilots there is no mention of destroyed Soviet tanks. Subsequently, the superiority in the air on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the German 8th Air Corps had dropped to almost zero.

From Kursk and Orel

The war has brought us

to the very enemy gates,

That's how things are, brother.

Someday we will remember this

And I won’t believe it myself,

And now we need one victory, One for all, we will not stand behind the price!

(lyrics from the movie "Belorussky Station")

TO at The Russian Battle, according to historians, was a turning point inGreat Patriotic War . More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. This has never happened in world history, and probably never will happen again. The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and Vasilevsky.

If the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mournful tones for the first time, then Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy again! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree on the same opinion - Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it the outcome of the Second World War.

From a radio speech by the British Prime Minister W. Churchill : “I readily admit that most of the Allied military operations in the West in 1943 could not have been carried out in the form and time in which they were carried out, if not forheroic, magnificent exploits and victories of the Russian army , who defends her native land, subjected to a cowardly, unprovoked attack, with unprecedented energy, skill and devotion, protects at a terrible price - the price of Russian blood.

No government in the history of mankind would have been able to survive such severe and cruel wounds that Hitler inflicted on Russia...Russia not only survived and recovered from these terrible wounds, but also inflicted military vehicle fatal damage. No other power in the world could do this.”

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle fought by Prince Alexander the Teutonic Knights on Lake Peipsi on April 5, 1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans tried with their main forces to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks. If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of front. - Read more at

The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.

“...On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, we were transferred to the city of Orel as part of the 125th special communications battalion. By that time there was nothing left of the city; I remember only two surviving buildings - a church and a train station. In some places on the outskirts some sheds have been preserved. Piles of broken bricks, not a single tree in the whole huge city, constant shelling and bombing. At the temple there was a priest and several female singers who remained with him. In the evening, our entire battalion, together with its commanders, gathered in the church, and the priest began to serve a prayer service. We knew that we had to attack the next day. Remembering their relatives, many cried. Scary…

There were three of us radio operator girls. The rest of the men: signalmen, reel-to-reel operators. Our task is to establish the most important thing - communication, without communication it’s the end. I can’t say how many of us were alive; at night we were scattered along the entire front, but I think it was not many. Our losses were very large. The Lord has preserved me..." ( Osharina Ekaterina Mikhailovna (Mother Sofia))

That's how it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out the last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing the last lines of a letter to their beloved, someone is simply enjoying another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the Wehrmacht positions.Operation Citadelreceived the first hole. An artillery strike was carried out along the entire front line on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not so much in causing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. In a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tacticians and strategists, whose savvy boots trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.

(Volynkin Alexander Stepanovich)

The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet Army. The Germans threw up to 500 tanks into battle, including a new development, the Tiger heavy tank. It was not possible to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide offensive front. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, and the German command was unable to offer anything new in offensive operations. And it was no longer possible to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and the warrior-heroes were simply invincible. How can we not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, this catastrophe called the World War would not have happened.

Lasted only six days Operation Citadel, for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the steadfastness and courage of an ordinary Soviet soldier thwarted all the enemy’s plans.

July, 12 Kursk Bulge found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, began an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was fighting an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the power of weapons that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. Soviet heroes liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force; it seemed that the land itself was helping the soldiers, going and going, liberating city after city, village after village.

The Battle of Kursk is the greatest tank battle.

Neither before nor after, the world has known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks on both sides throughout the entire day of July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow patch of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, who once again surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.

“...We suffered at the Kursk Bulge. Our 518th Fighter Regiment was defeated. The pilots died, and those who survived were sent to reformation. That’s how we ended up in aircraft workshops and began repairing airplanes. We repaired them in the field, during bombing, and during shelling. And so on until we were mobilized..."( Kustova Agrippina Ivanovna)

“...Our artillery guards anti-tank fighter division under the command of Captain Leshchin has been in formation and combat exercises since April 1943 near Belgrade, Kursk region, to master new military equipment - 76-caliber anti-tank guns.

I took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge as the head of the division's radio, which ensured communication between the command and the batteries. The division command ordered me and other artillerymen to remove the remaining damaged equipment, as well as wounded and killed soldiers, from the battlefield at night. For this feat, all survivors were awarded high Government awards; those who died were awarded posthumously.

I remember well, on the night of July 20-21, 1943, on a combat alert, we quickly set out on the road to the village of Ponyri and began to take up firing positions in order to delay the fascist tank column. The density of anti-tank weapons was the highest - 94 guns and mortars. The Soviet command, having quite accurately determined the direction of the German attacks, was able to concentrate a large amount of anti-tank artillery on them. At 4.00 a rocket signal was given and artillery preparation began, which lasted about 30 minutes. German tanks T-4 "Panther", T-6 "Tiger", self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" and other artillery mortar guns in the amount of more than 60 barrels rushed to our combat positions. An unequal battle ensued, and our division also took part in it, destroying 13 fascist tanks, but all 12 guns and crew were crushed under the tracks of German tanks.

Of my fellow soldiers, I remember the most from the Guard, Senior Lieutenant Alexey Azarov - he knocked out 9 enemy tanks, for which he was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of the second battery, guard Lieutenant Kardybaylo, knocked out 4 enemy tanks and was awarded the Order of Lenin.

The Battle of Kursk was won. In the most convenient place for an attack, a trap awaited the German army, which was capable of crushing the armored fist of the fascist divisions. There was no doubt about victory; even before the start of the defensive operation, Soviet military leaders were planning a further offensive..."

(Sokolov Anatoly Mikhailovich)

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, in interceptions of secret messages from the High Command of Hitler's army and secret directives of A. Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of A. Mikoyan, back on March 27 he was informed in general details. V. Stalin on German plans. On April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk.

There are several versions regarding the sources of information.

Central Front

The Central Front command inspects damaged German equipment. Front commander in the centerK.K. Rokossovsky and commander 16th VA S. I. Rudenko. July 1943.

V.I. Kazakov, commander of the artillery of the Central Front, speaking about counter-artillery preparation, noted that it:

was an integral and, in essence, the dominant part of the general counter-preparation, which pursued the goal of disrupting the enemy’s offensive.

In the TF zone (13A), the main efforts were concentrated on suppressing the enemy artillery group and observation points (OP), including artillery ones. This group of objects accounted for more than 80% of the planned targets. This choice was explained by the presence in the army of powerful means of combating enemy artillery, more reliable data on the position of its artillery group, the relatively small width of the expected strike zone (30-40 km), as well as the high density of battle formations of the divisions of the first echelon of the Central Front troops, which determined their greater sensitivity (vulnerability) to artillery strikes. By delivering a powerful fire strike on German artillery positions and OP, it was possible to significantly weaken and disorganize the enemy’s artillery preparation and ensure the survivability of the army’s first echelon troops to repel the attacking tanks and infantry.

Voronezh Front

In the VF zone (6th Guards A and 7th Guards A), the main efforts were aimed at suppressing infantry and tanks in the areas where they were likely to be located, which accounted for about 80% of all targets hit. This was due to a wider range of probable enemy strikes (up to 100 km), greater sensitivity of the defense of the first echelon troops to tank attacks, and fewer means of combating enemy artillery in the VF armies. It was also possible that on the night of July 5, part of the enemy artillery would change their firing positions during the withdrawal of the combat outposts of the 71st and 67th Guards. sd. Thus, the VF artillerymen primarily sought to inflict damage on tanks and infantry, that is, the main force of the German attack, and suppress only the most active enemy batteries (reliably reconnoitered).

“We will stand like Panfilov’s men”

On August 17, 1943, the armies of the Steppe Front (SF) approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. 53 A Managarova I.M. acted energetically, and especially her 89 Guards. SD Colonel M.P. Seryugin and 305th SD Colonel A.F. Vasiliev. Marshal G.K. Zhukov in his book “Memories and Reflections” wrote:

“...The most fierce battle took place over height 201.7 in the Polevoy area, which was captured by a combined company of the 299th Infantry Division consisting of 16 people under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev.

When only seven people remained alive, the commander, turning to the soldiers, said: “Comrades, we will stand at the height as Panfilov’s men stood at Dubosekov.” We will die, but we will not retreat!

And they didn’t back down. The heroic fighters held the height until the division units arrived. For courage and heroism, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, senior lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev, junior lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, senior sergeant G.P. Polikanov and sergeant V.E. Breusov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The rest were awarded orders."

- Zhukov GK. Memories and reflections.

Progress of the battle. Defense

The closer the start date for Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy attack was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to fire artillery on the night of July 5 counter-preparation. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min . After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of the artillery shelling carried out in advance counter-preparations in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later planned time Only after some time were German troops able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of Soviet troops with a ramming attack and reaching Kursk. In the Central Front, the main enemy attack was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the Central Front troops launched a counterattack against the advancing group with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies and the 19th Tank Corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

When Hitler’s offensive began in the direction of Kursk on July 5, we were transferred closer to the front line to reserve positions in order to be ready to repel the enemy’s onslaught. But we didn't have to defend ourselves. On the night of July 11, we replaced the thinned out units in need of rest at one of the bridgeheads on the western bank of Zushi near the village of Vyazhi. On the morning of July 12, after a powerful artillery barrage, an attack on the city of Orel began (at the site of this breakthrough, near the village of Vyazhi, 8 km from Novosil, a monument was built after the war).

The memory has preserved many episodes of heavy battles that took place on the ground and in the air...

On command, we quickly jump out of the trenches and shout “Hurray!” We attack enemy positions. The first losses were from enemy bullets and in minefields. Now we are already in well-equipped enemy trenches, using machine guns and grenades. The first killed German is a red-haired guy, with a machine gun in one hand and a coil of telephone wire in the other... Having quickly overcome several lines of trenches, we liberate the first village. There was some kind of enemy headquarters, ammunition depots... In the field kitchens there was still a warm breakfast for the German soldiers. Following the infantry, which had done its job, tanks entered the breakthrough, firing on the move and dashing forward past us.

In the following days the fighting took place almost continuously; our troops, despite enemy counterattacks, stubbornly advanced towards the goal. Before our eyes even now are the fields of tank battles, where sometimes even at night there was light from dozens of flaming vehicles. The battles of our fighter pilots are unforgettable - there were few of them, but they bravely attacked the Junkers wedges that were trying to bomb our troops. I remember the deafening crack of exploding shells and mines, fires, mutilated earth, corpses of people and animals, the persistent smell of gunpowder and burning, constant nervous tension, from which short-term sleep did not help.

In battle, a person’s fate and his life depend on many accidents. In those days of fierce battles for Orel, it was pure chance that saved me several times.

During one of the marches, our marching column came under intense artillery fire. On command, we rushed to cover, a roadside ditch, lay down, and suddenly, two or three meters from me, a shell pierced the ground, but did not explode, but only showered me with earth. Another case: on a hot day, already on the approaches to Orel, our battery provides active support to the advancing infantry. All mines have been used up. People are very tired and very thirsty. A well crane sticks out about three hundred meters from us. The sergeant major orders me and another soldier to collect our pots and go get water. Before we had time to crawl 100 meters, a barrage of fire fell on our positions - mines from heavy six-barreled German mortars were exploding. The enemy's aim was accurate! After the raid, many of my comrades died, many were wounded or shell-shocked, and some of the mortars were out of action. It looks like this “water outfit” saved my life.

A few days later, having suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, our unit was withdrawn from the combat area and settled in the forest, east of the city of Karachev, for rest and reorganization. Here, many soldiers and officers received government awards for their participation in the fighting near Orel and the liberation of the city. I was awarded the medal "For Courage".

The defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge and the high appreciation of this military feat made us very happy, but we could not and cannot forget our comrades in arms who are no longer with us. Let us always remember the soldiers who gave their lives in the national Patriotic War, fighting for the freedom and independence of our Fatherland!..” (Sluka Alexander Evgenievich)

The first surprise for the German command on both the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: all the spaces between the positions were densely mined, and the passages in the minefields were well shot through artillery. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to maintain air supremacy. More and more often, Soviet attack aircraft – the famous Il-2 – appeared over the battlefield.

“...The heat was very intense and dry. There is nowhere to hide from the heat. And during the battles the ground stood on end. The tanks are advancing, the artillery is showering with heavy fire, and the Junkers and Messerschmitts are attacking from the sky. I still cannot forget the terrible dust that stood in the air and seemed to penetrate into all the cells of the body. Yes, plus smoke, fumes, soot. On the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis threw new, more powerful and heavier tanks and self-propelled guns - “tigers” and “Ferdinands” - against our army. The shells of our guns ricocheted off the armor of these vehicles. We had to use more powerful artillery pieces and cannons. We already had new 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns and improved artillery pieces.

It must be said that even before the battle, during tactical exercises, we were told about these new Hitler machines and shown their weak, vulnerable spots. And in battle I had to undergo practice. The attacks were so powerful and strong that our guns became hot and had to be cooled with wet rags.

(Tishkov Vasily Ivanovich)

In the first day of fighting alone, Model's group, operating on the northern flank of the Kursk salient, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of German “Tigers” advancing against the forces of the Central Front destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period July 5–6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the shock units 20, 2 And 9- thGermantankdivisionsWithconnectionsSoviet 2- thtankAnd 13- tharmies. Bottom linethisbattlesbecameextremelyunexpectedForGermancommand. Having lostbefore 50 thousand. HumanAndnear 400 tanks, northernpercussiongroupingwasforcedstay. Having advancedforwardTotalon 10 – 15 km, ModelVin the endlostpercussionpowertheirtankpartsAndlostpossibilitiescontinueoffensive. ThemtimeonsouthernwingKurskledgeeventsdevelopedByto anotherscript. TO 8 JulydrumsdivisionsGermanicmotorizedconnections« GreatGermany» , « Reich» , « Deadhead» , Leibstandarte« AdolfHitler» , severaltankdivisions 4- thtankarmyGothaAndgroups« Kempf» managedwedge inVSovietdefensebefore 20 Andmorekm. Offensiveoriginallywas going onVdirectionpopulatedpointOboyan, Butthen, due tostrongcounteractionSoviet 1- thtankarmy, 6- thGuardsarmyAndothersassociationsonthisarea, commandinggrouparmies« South» backgroundMansteinacceptedsolutionhitto the east– VdirectionProkhorovka. ExactlyatthispopulatedpointAndstartedthe mostbigtankbattleSecondworldwars, VwhichWithbothpartiesacceptedparticipationbeforeTHOUSANDSTWO HUNDREDTANKSAndself-propelledguns.

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“... A policeman rounded us up, 10 teenagers, with shovels and took us to Big Oak. When they arrived at the place, they saw a terrible picture: between the burnt hut and the barn, people were lying shot. Many had their faces and clothes burned. They were doused with gasoline before being burned. Two female corpses lay to the side. They clutched their children to their chests. One of them hugged the child, wrapping the little one in the hollow of her fur coat...”(Arbuzov Pavel Ivanovich)

Of all the victories of 1943, it was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War and the 2nd World War, which ended with the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine and the destruction of enemy defenses on the Dnieper at the end of 1943. The fascist German command was forced to abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire front. He had to transfer troops and aircraft from the Mediterranean theater of operations to the Eastern Front, which facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily and Italy. The Battle of Kursk was a triumph of Soviet military art.

In the 50-day Battle of Kursk, up to 30 enemy divisions were defeated, including 7 tank divisions. The total losses of the Nazi troops in killed, seriously wounded and missing amounted to over 500 thousand people. The Soviet Air Force finally gained air supremacy. The successful completion of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans on the eve of and during the Battle of Kursk. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out 1,460 raids on the railway line, disabled over 1,000 locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Memoirs of the participants of the Kursk Bulge